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ABSTRACT

As a quantitative auditing tool for Physical Protection Systems (PPS) the Estimated
Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model has been available for many years.
Nevertheless, once a systems macro-state measure has been commissioned (Pi) against
its defined threat using EASI, there must be a means of articulating its continued
efficacy (steady state) or its degradation over time. The purpose of this multi-phase
study was to develop the concept and define the term entropic security decay. Phase
one presented documentary benchmarks for security decay. This phase was broken into
three stages; stage one presented General Systems Theory (GST) as a systems
benchmark for the study. Stage two applied the writings from stage one to physical
security, and stage three presented a benchmark for considering physical system decay.
Phase two incorporated the pilot study towards validating the feasibility of undertaking
the main study and refining interview instrumentation. Phase three executed the main
study, extracting and presenting security experts (N=6) thoughts, feelings and
experiences with the phenomenon of security decay. Phase four provided the
interpretative analysis, responding to the study’s research question.

The study found that within a systems approach to physical security there is a complex
interrelationship between the built environment, physical controls, technology, people
and management processes as they achieve the elements of Defence in Depth. Within
this complex interrelationship the study indicated that decay occurs at the constituent
level, and if left undetected expands to affect the sub-system in which it is located.
Furthermore, based on the interrelationary aspects of Physical Protection Systems (PPS)
the decay expands from its point of entry into the remainder of the system, propagating
throughout the Defence in Depth system. The study suggested that security decay theory
is primarily concerned with managing the natural entropic processes/pressures occurring
against commissioned levels of effectiveness within PPS. In addition, the study
indicated that in order to maintain PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness
during their life cycle, they need to be managed in accordance with their commissioned
designed specifications. The most effective method to manage decay in order to
maintain the designed specifications within PPS is through the utilization of a
performance indicator frame work, which facilitates full management of the system.
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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the effects decay has within the systems approach utilised when
implementing security strategies, specifically the theory of defence in depth. Defence in
depth is implemented within a risk management framework to reduce an organisation’s
identified risks which could lead to undesirable and unacceptable consequences. This
theory aims to link layered security elements into a system to ensure a holistic and
functional security system, underpinned by the functions of: deter, detect, delay and
response. For such a system to be commissioned, and maintain its commissioning
effectiveness these functions must be performed in their sequential order and within a
period of time, which is less than an adversary’s task time. This paper argues that such a
relationship between the defence in depth elements, and each elements constituents
requires an orderly relationship, and that factors which impede this orderliness directly
affects the security system as a whole. This paper applies the concept of entropy,
referred to as the steady degradation of a system, underpinned by the characteristics of
disorganisation and decay to argue that a security system can become degraded through
the reduction in effectiveness of its individual components. Such degradation decays the
effectiveness of the whole system. Within the risk management frame work this paper
argues that as decay increases, risk reduction decreases, therefore risk exposure
increases.

Key words: security, decay, entropic, defence-in-depth, risk management.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
The concept of risk management is well established in academic and organisational
literature and to some degree, so is security risk management; however, the
effectiveness of security risk management has been questioned (Brooks, 2009, p. 1).
Therefore, this study discusses how security risk management may be implemented in a
systems approach, using the theory of Defence in Depth whilst being cognizant of the
concept of entropy. It has been proposed that defence in depth strategies can be impeded
by the characteristics of disorganization and decay underpinning entropy. For an
organisation to maintain a sound security profile, all Defence in Depth elements and
their constituents must be maintained at their optimum level of performance. It is
argued that organisational security should draw on the concept of entropy to establish
the concept of security decay, which results in a reduction in overall system
performance and avoidance through the active monitoring and reviewing of treatment
strategies.
1.2 Background of the Study
In contemporary business, risk management is considered a significant management
activity. Borgsdorf and Pliszka (1999, p. 6) define risk management as “the planning,
organising, leading and controlling of an organisation’s resources” to minimise the
potential of negative effects on the business activity. This approach is a formal
systematic process that includes identifying exposure to risk, evaluating methods to
manage risk, implementing treatment strategies, ongoing performance monitoring of
implemented strategies and implementing necessary adjustments to such strategies,
referred to as a systems approach (Hatfield & Hipel, 2002, p. 1054). Such an approach
is supported through Australian Standards in risk management (AS/NZS ISO 31000:
2009) and security risk management (Standards Australia, 2006). Security management
has embraced the risk management concept for planning how organisational resources
can be efficiently and effectively managed to reduce the chances of negative outcomes
from breaches of security programs.

1

1.2.1 Physical security

For contemporary security professionals, risk arises from a combination of a threat
exploiting some vulnerability such that it could cause some harm to an asset, where an
asset is considered anything with value and need in protection, normally including
people, information, property and reputation (Burns-Howell, Cordier & Erikson, 2003,
p. 11). The risk management process includes the implementation of acceptable
practices; procedures and principles which when organised into a cohesive whole have
the desired effect of significantly reducing the statistical chances of undesirable events
against such assets from occurring. Therefore the aim of security controls (design) is to
decrease the ratio of unfavourable events to total events (Broder, 2006, p. 25). Such a
planning process in security management is in general referred to as security risk
management.

In addressing security risk concerns, Standards Australia HB167 security risk
management (2006, p. 63) states “the key elements of organisational, community or
individual security controls are those components which contribute to the management
of risks through their ability to deter, detect, delay, respond and recover from adversary
attacks”, such a view is supported by Somerson (2009, p. 13) who states, “a security
programs objectives in controlling for security related risks are to deter, detect,
delay/deny, respond and where necessary recover from reasonably foreseeable attacks”.
According to Burns-Howell, Cordier and Erikson (2003, p. 11) acceptable risks can be
defined as “a judgement on the unique elements of each risk, with the decision based
either on the costs of protecting an asset, balanced with the costs if it is damaged or lost,
or on the organisation’s appetite for accepting risks. Therefore, a security risk
management plan determines the level of treatment controls required based on a
facility’s risk rating and are implemented in accordance with the theory of defence in
depth (Garcia, 2001).

The theory of defence in depth aims to link layered security elements into a system
incorporating people, technology, barriers and procedures to ensure a holistic and
functional security system (Smith, 2003, p. 8). This system delivers effective risk based
decisions, enhanced operational effectiveness, and a reduction in overall risks and costs
(Trusted Information Sharing Network, 2008, p. 2). However, it has been argued that
security controls can degrade over time reducing the level of risk treatment. This
argument was first considered by Underwood (1984) who referred to decaying security,
2

stating, “security decay is the most serious threat to a security system” and that
“security decay must be expected”, “avoided”, and “countered” (Underwood, 1984, p.
xi). Underwood (1984, pp. 249-250) postulated that:
“the provision of effective security is paradoxically the first step towards
decay, as an effective system will not only repel successful attacks, but also
prevent the attacks being made: arguing an illusion is then created that the
established security is unnecessary suggesting decay will follow until the
degree of security falls to the point where an attack will succeed”.

Underwood’s (1984) writings were reviewed by McClure’s (1997) thesis “Security
Decay: the erosion of effective security”, where he viewed the theory of security decay
as being primarily concerned with the influence apathy has on security. McClure (1997,
p. 4) defined security decay as “a concept and phenomenon when effective security
indirectly causes an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security, resulting in
ineffectiveness’. McClure (1997, p. 4) states:
“apathy leads to poor compliance with security policy and procedures
causing a decay of security effectiveness”.
However, it could be argued that a lack of education and awareness leads to security
decay or that the two arguments are interlinked. Nevertheless, such arguments only
consider minimal causal factors and do not consider holistic factors, nor describe where
security decay lies within the Defence in Depth system.

Consistent with the writings of Underwood (1984) and McClure (1997) it can
reasonably be argued that the concept of security decay is a significant risk to any
security program. However, to date very little dedicated research has been conducted
into the area. Furthermore, what has been discussed provides very limited insight. For
example, according to Garcia (2001, p. 6) the theory of Defence in Depth should be
implemented in security management using a systems approach. Garcia’s (2001) views
are supported by many published security authors (Underwood, 1984; Fennelly, 1997;
Fisher & Green, 2003). In addition, Underwood (1984, p. xi) states “It is important that
security is seen as a whole, and both designed and operated as a system”. Such views
indicate that security should be designed, implemented and managed as a system. In
considering Underwood’s (1984, p. xi) writings, Bittel (1978, p. 652) explains that the
practice of management also requires a system approach. Underwood (1984, p. xi)
points out that the normal processes of management by objectives should be applied to
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the establishment of the security system. In considering the systems approach to both
security and management, it can be argued that nobody would deny the importance of
applying systems thinking and analysis to security management.

The systems approach to both security and management is a well supported theme. As
such, it is reasonable to argue that any discussion in relation to a holistic approach to
security decay must consider a systems approach. This approach must include
designing, implementing, and managing the security system. That is, a holistic approach
to security decay must encompass both the processes in establishing the system and the
ongoing management processes which aim to ensure the system reliably delivers, over
time, the output for which it was commissioned. In light of such literature, the study
supports the concept of security decay; however, argues that the concept of security
decay must be considered, defined and applied congruous with the systems approach
utilized to employ the theory of Defence in Depth.

However, to date there is a dearth of dedicated published research pertaining to security
decay. This study argues previous approaches by both Underwood (1984) and McClure
(1997) were viewed through a narrowly focused lens and are therefore limited in that
they did not consider the systems approach to security. The systems approach to
Defence in Depth interrelates the functions of detect, delay and response into an
effective security system, referred to as a Physical Protection System (PPS) (Garcia,
2001, p. 5). As such, this research argues that any theory of security decay must be
considered within this approach. The study postulates that decay within a security
system lies within both the elements and their constituents of detect, delay and response
and in their interrelationships towards achieving the desired protection goal. Whereby
factors such as apathy are only contributors towards decay and do not represent the
salient contributor or actual decay within the system.

In considering the concept of security decay from a systems approach, according to
Hamlyn (1969, p. 16) explanations in science may be divided into two kinds. First,
explanations made by reference to laws; second, explanations made by reference to
theories. According to Hamlyn (1969, pp. 16-17) in making reference to laws we seek
to account for deviations from expectations by reference to the law. In contrast, theories
are invoked to account for laws and in doing so, seek to provide a model of some sort
into which the laws may be incorporated. It is therefore argued that any consideration of
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security decay within a systems approach must be discussed by either drawing on those
scientific laws and/or theories which apply to systems in general.
1.3 Significance of the Study
The security industry, both government and commercial, rely on the application of
security risk management. Risk management is becoming a well established discipline,
with its own body of knowledge and domain practitioners. States worldwide have their
own risk management standards and in many of these states, it is the company director’s
responsibility to ensure that appropriate risk management meets internal and external
compliance requirements. Nevertheless, many of these standards and compliance
requirements only consider risk management, not security risk management. However,
security risk management is unique from other forms of risk management and many of
the more generic risk models lack key concepts necessary for effective design,
application and risk mitigation (Brooks, 2009, p. 1).

It is expected that characteristics that may make an organisation prone to entropic decay
can be identified and measured. Once these characteristics are understood, this will
allow the use of considered funding to stimulate and maintain the effectiveness of
various security risk mitigation strategies. Therefore, this research aims to expand
Underwood’s (1984) and McClure’s (1997) theory of security decay towards
establishing the theory of entropic security decay. This theory is based on the argument
that security is achieved through a systems approach and that all systems if left will
degrade due to the effects of natural entropy.
1.4 Purpose of the study
The concept of entropy inevitably leads to security systems decaying over time,
reducing their commissioning levels of efficiency and effectiveness. To purpose of this
study is to articulate the concept and define the term entropic security decay.
1.4.1 Objectives
1. To determine if the theory of entropic security decay is supported by security
experts.
2. To identify a framework for evaluating entropic security decay.
3. To formulate a definition for security decay.
4. To stimulate academic discourse into the concept of security decay.
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1.4.2 Research Question
Do security experts support the theoretical validity of entropic decay theory, which
argues that security decay is represented by “the gradual degradation of the microscopic
quantities (constituents), and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship between the
microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system”?

This research question was considered by responding to the following sub-questions:

1. Do security experts support the systems approach to implementing effective
security controls?

2. Do security experts support the argument that security systems can and do suffer
from decay?

3. Do security experts support that security decay lies within the systems elements,
constituents and their interrelationship?
1.5 Study Overview
According to Lin (1976, p. 5) “social research follows a sequence of phases”, as such,
the study adopted a multiple phase approach incorporating a number of sequential
phases to achieve the research outcomes. Figure 1.1 presents the phased sequencing,
designed to facilitate a logical step by step approach towards responding to the study’s
research question.
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Figure 1.1 Study Phases (Adjusted from Lin, 1976, p. 6).
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The study was designed to explore, define and develop deeper understandings towards
the concept of security decay. Hamlyn (1969, p. 16) stated “explanations in science
are/can be divided into two kinds, those which make reference to laws, and those which
make reference to theories”. In exploring the phenomenon of security decay from a
systems approach, consistent with Hamlyn’s (1969, p. 16) writings stage one of phase
one of the study made reference to theories, developing a literature based benchmark for
considering measured security by drawing on the theory of Defence in Depth and
General Systems Theory (GST) (Chapters 2 and 3). At the completion of a security
system benchmark; the study then made reference of laws towards developing a
literature based benchmark for considering degradation or decay within an open systems
approach to physical security (Chapter 4).

Phase two of the study aimed to consider security experts thoughts, feelings and
understanding of security decay within a systems approach to implementing effective
physical security through the use of a semi-structured interview questionnaire, starting
with a pilot study (Chapter 6). At the completion of the pilot study, the semi-structured
interview questionnaire was adjusted to increase its usability and draw out deeper data.
Phase three incorporated the main study interviews using the Delphi methodology
(Chapters 7-8). Phase four (Chapter 9) of the study sought to interpret the interview data
in relation to the three research sub-questions and the study’s research question. This
phase aimed to validate the theoretical assumptions underpinning the theory of entropic
security decay. The final phase, phase five (Chapter 10) presented the study’s findings,
limitations, its recommendations and conclusion.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented the study’s background and the current limitations within the
area of security decay. The study was designed to reduce the current knowledge gaps
through developing deeper understanding of security decay from a systems approach. In
developing a deeper understanding the study sought to define the term entropic security
decay. The study produced a number of beneficial outcomes. (1), a system based
understanding of security decay. (2), expert validation of the theoretical underpinnings
of entropic decay theory. (3), a systems framework for managing Physical Protection
Systems (PPS) in a manner to maintain their commissioned effectiveness over their life
cycle and (4) initial deductive definition of Security Decay.
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CHAPTER 2

A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SECURITY

2.0 Introduction
Phase one of the study requires the establishment of a systems framed security decay
benchmark. This benchmark was established through a conceptual review of literature.
The choice of such a literature review stems the writings of Stake (2010, pp. 109-111)
who explains that some literature reviews aspire to maximise the broad and complex
conceptual standing of the research question/s, encompassing a vast number of citations
working across multiple disciplines, extending the understanding of a specific
phenomenon related to different fields. Such literature reviews bring together writings
on diverse matters towards providing an existing framework for deductively exploring
phenomenon (Patton, 2002, p. 453). The conceptual review was achieved via a
documentary analysis of published materials including books, journal papers,
conference materials and internet web sites. Stake (2010, pp. 109-111) advocates the
benefits of such a conceptual review, stating “it significantly contributes to highlighting
the complexity of a professional problem”.

This chapter presents the first stage of phase one of the study; establishing a systems
approach to security benchmark. The chapter presents the common thread within
published security literature leading to the study’s theoretical foundation (underlying
theory); being General Systems Theory (GST). This chapter is broken into a number of
sequential sections. Section 2.1 discusses the difficulties associated with academic
security research and provides an operational definition of security for the study.
Section 2.2 presents the systems literature towards providing an open systems frame for
considering physical security within a systems approach. Section 2.3 concludes the
chapter.
2.1 Security
Security management in contemporary times concerns a wide spectrum of activities and
skills. According to McCrie (2004, p. 11) conceptually, and in actuality, no
contemporary organisation can survive or thrive without adequate security. However,
security is a multi-disciplinary profession (Brooks, 2007, p. 1), where the concept of
security can have different meanings depending on context. As a result of its diversity,
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security as a profession lacks consensus in definition (Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006,
p.182; Manunta, 1999, p. 58). Such definitional diversity has implications for security
research. For example, in establishing an academic security frame for considering
security decay, Lorenz (1963; 1968) stated “once the initial state of a system is known,
then any changes in this state can be considered as its measure of error”. Such a view
was also presented by Pitzer (1995, p. 26) who considered that when measuring a
quantity, a standard must be chosen, then find a means of comparing the measurement
of an object of interest with this standard”. McClure (1997, p. 59) referred to this as
“benchmarking”, drawing on the works of O’Leary (1995 cited in McClure 1997, p. 59)
who defined benchmarking as “the process of constantly measuring and assessing
products, services and practices against recognised standards”. However, as McClure
(1997, p. 59) wrote “the problem faced in benchmarking a security function, is
recognising a standard on which to compare”.
2.1.1 Security as a construct

Security as a construct, is one of ancient need (Underwood, 1984, p. x), which
according to Maslow (1970, p. 39) for humans has its basis in psychological necessity.
In discussing the concept of security Maslow (1970, pp. 35-46) states “the concept of
security relates to humans having a hierarchy of five universal needs”. These needs
include:
1. Survival needs- food and shelter;
2. Safety needs- protection and security;
3. Love, affection, and a sense of belonging-the need for humans to feel part of
social groups, such as families, religious groups, fraternal societies;
4. Esteem needs- the need for self satisfaction with work and group activities and
social recognition from others;
5. Self-actualization-which Maslow defined as the simultaneous fulfilling of the
first four (4) needs.
Within Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs the concept of security is one of the more
basic needs and encompasses; stability, dependency, protection, freedom from fear,
from anxiety and chaos, need for structure, order, law, limits and strength in the
protector, which collectively are defined as “security”. Based on the hierarchy of needs
Maslow (1970, p. 39) considers that if security needs are not fulfilled an individuals’
ability to achieve those higher order needs are impeded. In considering security within
the context of social organisation, security has been connected with the notion of law
and order (Manunta, 1999, p. 60), where according to Maslow (1970, p. 43) whenever a
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threat to law, order, or to the authority of society occurs a regression from those other
lower level needs rapidly occurs towards the safety/protection/security needs.
In discussing the diversity within the contemporary security profession Somerson
(2009, p. 51) considers that the connection between safety, protection and security is
drawn from humans early functional pursuit of self protection against the felonious acts
of others. However, in considering the notion of safety within the concept of security
Somerson (2009, p. 51) suggests this originated from mans commissioning of barriers to
guard himself from “the duncery of his own negligence”, where the sum of these guards
provides the function of safety.

In contemporary times this diversity has lead to the concept of security being defined in
many ways, for example, Craighead (2003, p. 21) defines security as “free from danger”
or “safe”. However, Fisher and Green (2004, p. 21) defines security as “a stable
relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends
without disruption or harm and without fear or disturbance or injury”. Such a definition
is supported by O’Block, Donnermeyer and Doeren (1991, p. 7) who define security as
“freedom from fear of crime and the actual danger of being the victim of crime”.

In considering the various definitions of security put forward by Fisher and Green
(2004) and others (O’Block, Donnermeyer and Doeren, 1991; Craighead, 2003, p. 21) it
is argued that whilst they share common themes they are descriptive in nature, therefore
more representative of dictionary definitions, which Runyon, Coleman and Pittenger
(2000, p. 11) suggest lack observable and measurable variables. In the context of
operational security such criticisms and viewpoint are supported by Manunta (1999, p.
58) who argues all encompassing descriptive definitions are inadequate, purporting
security must be considered by a more functional, clearer definition. It is argued that
Manunta’s (1999) approach would be more congruous with Maslow’s (1970) discourse
on security.

In considering Manunta’s (1999) standpoint, the Concise Dictionary (p. 497) defines
functional as (1) involving, or containing a function or functions, regarded as the
“intended purpose” (2) “practical” rather than decorative (3) capable of “working”,
meaning Manunta (1999) takes on a purposeful “functionalism” approach to security.
For example, Manunta (1999, p. 58) defines security as “a function of the presence and
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interaction of Asset (A) requiring protection from either a person, organisation or
community referred to as Protector (P), a Threat (T) to the asset requiring protection in a
given Situation (Si)” defining security by the formula S= ƒ(A, P, T) Si. Manunta
(1999, p. 58) argues the absence of one of the core elements (A, P, or T) voids the
concept of security of its significance, as without an Asset there is nothing to protect,
without a Threat there is no reason to protect, and without a Protector there is no
striving for or pursuit of security.

Manunta’s (1999, p. 58) functional approach towards security is supported by Cohen
and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activity Theory. This theory, within the context of law and
order, postulates that for a crime to occur there must come together a likely offender, a
suitable target and the absence of capable guardians. Such an approach towards
definition is congruous with Underwood’s (1984, p. x) definition of security, defining
security as “confidence in the retention of belongings”, “confidence in personal safety”.
In considering various sentiments towards defining security Manunta (1999, p. 58)
argues that functional definitions have advantages over descriptive views. According to
Manunta (1999, p. 58) they separate beliefs and chance approaches from managed
security, distinguishing security from other attached concepts such as safety, yet being
general enough to embrace all types and levels of Assets, Protectors and Threats in all
possible Situations.

The separation of security from safety at the functional level is supported by Somerson
(2009, p. 51) and Garcia (2001, p. 2). Somerson (2009, p. 51) highlights the sentiment
that, whilst both domains address themselves directly towards augmenting overall
organisational objectives, their emphasised functions remain separate. For example,
security as a function has received its greatest emphasis in economic loss prevention
and defence industries. A focus supported by Garcia (2001, p. 2) who refers to security
as systems used to prevent or detect an attack by a malevolent human adversary. Whilst
Garcia (2001) accepts there are some overlaps with safety, as a function security’s
salient focus is on preventing attacks by malevolent human adversaries. In contrast,
according to Somerson (2009, p. 51) safety’s emphasis is based in losses arising from
workers compensation claims.

Such a functional approach towards security is considered both a process of activity and
a condition resulting from that activity (O’Block, et al, 1991, p. 15). For example, as a
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process, it can be considered that security can be regarded as the utilization of people,
equipment, and procedures to reduce or eliminate risk of loss of assets, tangible and
intangible, from causes and events not considered to be within the boundaries of
conventional speculative or profit/loss activities. As a function, security can be
considered the use of “measures designed to safeguard people, to prevent unauthorised
access to equipment, facilities, materials and documents (information) (O’Block, et al,
1991, p. 7).

It is argued by Post, Kingsbury and Schachtsiek, (1991, pp. 97-99) that to achieve a
holistic security program for any organisation it is a requirement that physical,
personnel and information security components be interrelated into a comprehensive
barrier system. Whilst the level of focus each organisation places on these components
will vary depending on business environment and risk exposures, from a functional
approach, all three systems (Figure 2.1) must be present within every organisation to
provide a comprehensive security function.

Physical
Security

Personnel
Security

Information Security

Figure 2.1 Holistic organisational security program (Adjusted from Post, Kingsbury &
Schachtsiek, 1991, pp. 97-99).
2.1.2 Defence in Depth

From a functional perspective, security as a domain discipline, collectively embraces a
historically consistent strategy towards preventing theft, destruction of facilities, the
protection of personnel and information, referred to as Defence in Depth (Smith, 2003,
p. 8). The theory of Defence in Depth is underpinned by the functions of deter, detect,
delay, response and recovery (Standards Australia HB 167:2006, p. 3). According to
Smith (2003, p. 8) this strategy (Defence in Depth) has been applied to the protection of
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assets for centuries, based on the argument that a protected asset should be enclosed by
a succession of barriers, to restrict penetration of unauthorised access, towards proving
time for an appropriate response and recovery (Standards Australia HB 167:2006, p. 3).

In applying the theory of Defence in Depth Francis (1992, p. 2) explains that this
strategy (Figure 2.2) results in further layers of protection being encountered as deeper
progression occurs into a facility. Whenever a breakdown in one barrier occurs, whether
by accident or deliberate breach, one or more barriers remain to maintain reliable and
effective access control. The functions of Defence in Depth elements are:
 Deterrence - psychological measures or cues implemented to deter opportunistic
offenders from perpetrating deviant acts;
 Detection - means to alert organisations that an attack or breach is underway;
 Delay - physical means for retarding the progress of anyone who has gained an unauthorized level of access;
 Response - an organisations’ means of interrupting persons who have breached the
security perimeter of a facility;
 Recovery – is a planned and prepared approach to reactivating to a realised event.

Figure 2.2 Theory of Defence in Depth (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 28).
In discussing the theory of Defence in Depth further, Smith (2003, p. 8) highlights that
this strategy aims to link layered security elements into a “system” incorporating;
14

people, technology, barriers and procedures to ensure a holistic and functional security
system. For example, Figure 2.2 shows how defence in depth layers are linked into a
barrier “system” incorporating discrete sequential tasks which must be successfully
overcome by an adversary, before they are interrupted by a response force, to achieve
their objective.
2.1.3 Security defined

In their discussion of the security industry Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, pp. 181-182)
highlight that in contemporary times’ security is a key aspect in organisational
management, yet a universal definition remains problematic. Brooks (2008, p. 5) argued
that security can only achieve definition through applied context and concept definition,
where according to Brooks (2008, p. 5) concept definition may be achievable through a
consensual body of knowledge. In considering such definitional barriers Borodzicz and
Gibson (2006, pp. 181-182) explain that the common thread is a desire on the part of all
practitioners to protect those assets, which they hold to be valuable, from deliberate
malicious human intervention in the form of perceived risks and perpetrated
consequences using a variety of countermeasures.

Despite a common cause within the security domain, a fundamental issue remains, to
scientifically study a topic requires a definition which enables researchers to describe
processes and variables by which an object, event or construct can be observed and
objectively measured. Such a definition is termed an “operational definition”. To
facilitate objective measurement it is therefore necessary to utilize or formulate such a
definition (Runyon, Coleman & Pittenger, 2000, p. 11). Given security as a profession
lacks consensus in definition (Borodzicz and Gibson, 2006, p.182; Manunta, 1999, p.
58) this study engaged in thematic analysis (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 259)
extracting common themes (factors) and key words (processes) from the available
literature (see; Maslow, 1970; Felson, 1979; O’Block, Donnermeyer & Doeren, 1991;
Post, Kingsbury & Schachtsiek, 1991; Manunta, 1999; Garcia, 2001; Craighead, 2003;
Fisher & Green, 2004; Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006; Standards Australia HB 167;
Brooks, 2007; Somerson, 2009) to establish an operational definition, operationally
defining security as:
A stable condition stemming from a systematic process which effectively
combines people, equipment and procedures, within a security context,
to restrict unauthorised access to either people, information or physical
assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to attacks
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which may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets manifested by a
malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of
unauthorised access.

This study argues that such a definition enables a security context to be established,
enables direct observation of measures combined to deter, detect, delay and respond to
adversary attacks therefore facilitating objective measurement of the protection systems
effectiveness, which is essential in any endeavour to objectively study a phenomenon
under investigation.
2.2 Underlying theory
The theory of Defence in Depth is implemented in security management using a
systems approach (Garcia, 2001, p. 6), an approach supported by many published
security professional (Underwood, 1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997; Garcia, 2001, p. 6;
Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164). As Fennelly (1997, p. 59) states “maximum security is a
concept, whereas alarm systems, physical barriers, guard forces and other components
of a security system do not individually (in isolation) achieve this”. Fisher and Green
(2003, p. 147) support Fennelly’s (1997) viewpoint, adding, every security program
must be an integrated “whole”. As such, the underlying theory for this study was
General Systems Theory (GST).
2.2.1 Systems theory, history and science

The systems approach towards operational security stems from the science of systems
thinking. Systems approach originated in biology in the 1920s, through the works of
Kohler to elaborate the most general properties of inorganic compared to organic
systems (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 11); however, as an area of scientific generalization, the
idea of a General Systems Theory (GST) was first introduced by Bertalanffy (1950).
Bertalanffy (1950, p. 142) believed a general theory of systems should be an important
regulative device in science to guard against superficial analogies which he regarded as
having no basis in science.

At the same time that Bertalanffy was developing GST, Wiener (1948) was developing
cybernetics as a result of developments in computer technology, self-regulating
machines and information theory (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 15). Cybernetics is a theory of
control systems based on communication transfer (transfer of information) between
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systems, the environment and within the system, and control (feedback) of the systems’
function in regards to the environment (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 22).

These developments in systems thinking occurred simultaneously with Shannon and
Weaver’s (1949) information theory, and Von Neuman and Morgenstern’s (1947) Game
Theory (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 15). Information theory is based on the concept of
information identified by an expression isomorphic to negative entropy of
thermodynamics, where the information may be used as a measure of organisation.
Game Theory is a “system” of antagonistic “forces” with specifications, concerned with
the behaviour of seemingly “rational” players to obtain maximal gains and minimal
losses by appropriate strategies against other players (or nature) (Bertalanffy, 1968, p.
22). However, the focus for this study is the application of Bertalanffy’s (1950) General
Systems Theory (GST) to the security literature.

According to Bertalanffy (1950, p. 139) General Systems Theory (GST) is a logicomathematical field, with the subject matter being the formulation and deduction of those
principles which are valid for ‘systems’ in general. Bertalanffy (1950, p. 139) stated
“there are principles which apply to systems in general, whatever the nature of their
component elements, or of the relations or forces between them. Bertalanffy (1950, p.
142) considered that GST should be methodologically; an important means of
controlling and investigating the transfer of principles from one field to another, where
it should no longer be necessary to duplicate or triplicate the discovery of the same
principles in different fields, isolated from each other.

Systems Theory according to Checkland (1981, p.5) is a meta-discipline, that is, in
contrast to other disciplines, which are concerned with particular sets of phenomena
such as chemistry or physics. GST’s focus is towards subject matter which can be
applied within virtually any other discipline. The underlying premises supporting the
systems approach to science stems from the argument that, general aspects and
viewpoints in different fields of science are alike, and that we find formally identical or
isomorphic laws in completely different fields of science (Bertalanffy, 1950, pp. 136138). That is, the isomorphism of natural laws are characterised by the fact that they, in
general, hold for certain classes of complexes or systems, irrespective of the special
kinds of entities involved.
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As such, general systems laws exist which apply to any system of a certain type,
irrespective of the particular properties of the system or elements involved. In
discussing the premises of systems theory Checkland (1981, p.6) explains that science
provides man with the phrase “a scientific approach”, just as systems provides “a
systems approach”. Both approaches are meta-disciplines, and both embody a particular
way of regarding the world.

Bertalanffy (1968, p. 6) further explains that the systems approach according to the
basic propositions of science; as systems are part of the scientific tradition; assumes the
world contains structural wholes, which can maintain their identity under a range of
conditions and exhibit certain general principles of “wholeness”. Bertalanffy (1968, pp.
36-37) considered that prior to systems theory, science attempted to explain observable
phenomena by reducing it into its elementary units, independently of each other. A
process Bertalanffy (1968) refers to as reductionism. However, according to Bertalanffy
(1968, p. 18) conceptions in science appeared which were concerned with “wholeness”,
where wholeness relates to problems of organisation, phenomena not observable by
respective parts in isolation.

Bertalanffy (1968, p. 18) considered “the system problem as essentially, a problem of
such limited analytical procedures in science (reductionism)”. According to Bertalanffy
(1968, p. 18) the success of reductionism principles are highly applicable depending on
two conditions. First, the interrelations between “parts” must be non-existent or weak
enough to be neglected for certain research purposes. Second, the relations describing
the parts be linear, only then is the condition of sumativity given i.e., an equation
describing the behaviour of the total is the same form as the equations describing the
behaviour of the parts.

Expanding on Bertalanffy’s (1968) discussion, Checkland (1981, p. 105) explains that
General Systems Theory is the skeleton of science, in that, it aims to provide a
framework or structure of systems on which to hang the flesh and blood of particular
disciplines and particular subject matters in an orderly and coherent corps of
knowledge.
2.2.2 Defining systems

The systems approach, and more specifically its framing literature, has lead to systems
being defined in many ways (Churchman, 1968, p. 29), embodying many meanings
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(Midgley, 2003, p. 178). In considering a single definition of a system Aslaksen (2004,
p. 271) explains that systems are defined in terms of their boundaries and interactions.
A view supported by Midgley (2003, p. xxiii) who suggests GST proposes that systems
of all kinds share specific common characteristics which can be described through the
use of both mathematics and ordinary language.

Through the use of mathematics Bertalanffy (1968, p. 56) defines a system as a
complex of interacting elements, for example, P1, p2….pn. Interaction means that
elements, p, stand in relations, R, so that the behaviour of an element p in R is different
from its behaviour in another relation, R’. According to Bertalanffy (1968, p. 56) if the
behaviour in R and R’ are not different, there is no interaction, and the elements behave
independently with respect to the relations R and R’. Bertalanffy (1950, p. 143; 1968, p.
56) explains his approach utilizing a system of simultaneous differential equations.
Denoting some measures of elements, pi (i = 1, 2, ….n), by Qi, these for a finite number
of elements and in the simplest of cases, will be in the form of:

(1)
According to Bertalanffy (1950, p. 143; 1968, p. 56) change of any measure Qi
therefore is a function of all Q’s from Q1 to Qn; conversely, change of any Qi entails
change of all other measures and of the system as a whole.

Bertalanffy (1950, p. 144; 1968, p. 57) argues that this equation can be used to a) show
the structural isomorphism in different fields and levels of reality, that is, to demonstrate
the possibility of a General Systems Theory whose fields of application are to be found
in various sciences. Although the parameters and variables will have very different
meaning in each case of application, b) discuss several general systems properties.
Although nothing is said about the nature of the measures Qi or the functions fi-i.e.,
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about the relations or interactions within the system certain general principles can be
deduced.

In explaining systems through the use of language Bertalanffy (1968, p. 19) defined a
system as “sets of elements standing in interaction”. Bittel (1978, p. 1130) further
defined a system as ‘a set of interrelated components that function together within
constraints towards a common purpose”, whilst Waldman (2007, p. 271) considers a
system to be an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or
unitary whole. However, Morales-Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla and Badillo-Pina (2010,
p. 88) state that a system is defined as “a group of components that keep some
identifiable set of relationships with the sum of their components (subsystems), in
addition to relationships (systems themselves) to other entities”.

Faithful to Bertalanffy’s (1968) works, Midgley (2003, p. xxii) defines a system as a
unity of organised elements, where according to Midgley (2003, p. xxii) a system’s
organisation is crucial as it provides rise to properties of the system which cannot be
found in a disorganised collection of the same elements. For example, Midgley (2003,
pp. xxii-xxiii) states “a person can only remain alive as long as their parts are organised
in a set of particular relationships with one another. A random collection of organs is
not a living person”. Hall and Fagen (cited in Midgley, 2003, p. xxv) consider a system
to be a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their
attributes (Hall & Fagen, cited in Midgley, 2003, p. xxv).

In considering the different approaches (semantics) towards defining systems, according
to Bittel (1978, p. 29) all definers’ agree that a system is a set of parts coordinated to
accomplish a set of goals, where according to Midgley (2003, p. 64) it is the
relationships that “tie the system together”. That is, such relationships create the notion
of “system” useful. Midgley’s (2003, p. 64) view is supported by Ackoff (1981 cited in
Skyttner, 1996, p. 35) who states “a system is two or more elements which satisfy the
following conditions:
 The behaviour of each element has an effect on the behaviour as a whole,
 The behaviour of the elements and their effects on the whole are interdependent,
 However, subgroups of the elements are formed, all have an effect on the
behaviour of the whole, but none has independent effect on it.
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Uniform to Ackoff (1981 cited in Skyttner, 1996, p. 35), Midgley (2003, p. 68)
considers that from the various systems definitions, any given system can be further
divided into sub-systems. That is, “in every system it is possible to identify one sort of
unit, each of which carries out a distinct and separate process, and another sort of unit,
each of which is a discrete, separate structure. According to Midgley (2003, p. 201) the
totality of all the structures in a system which carry out a particular process is a
subsystem”.

Tejeida-Padilla, Badillo-Pina, and Morales-Matamoros (2010, p.88)

explain that a subsystem is “a greater systems component”, that is, when a greater
system is constructed of two or more interacting and interdependent components, where
the subsystems interact in order to obtain their own purpose(s) and the purpose(s) of the
system in which they are embedded.

In considering the lack of a single definition, yet common themes, this research suggests
a system can therefore be summarised as “an organised collection of constituents, which
are combined into various subsystems (elements), which are highly interrelated towards
the accomplishment of an overall, predetermined design goal”. That is, a system
comprises of various smaller constituent parts which provide various inputs, which, to
achieve desired outputs go through specific predefined processes.
2.2.3 The systems approach

Systems theory has a strong history and in contemporary times this approach is
supported by Waldman (2007, p. 1) who states, “now” most outcomes or outputs are
derived from interactions within systems composed of machines, computers and people.
These systems represent thinking systems and thinking systems require system thinking.
Waldman (2007, p. 1) defines thinking as “having a conscious (self-aware) mind, to
some extent of reasoning, remembering experiences, making rational decision”,
thinking involves “volition” (Waldman, 2007, p. 272).

According to Waldman (2007, p. 278) systems thinking embodies an approach towards
understanding how things work. Bertalanffy (1968, pp. 4-14) explains that systems
thinking was driven by technological advances after the 2nd World War, which saw the
combining of components originating in heterogeneous technologies including
mechanical, electrical and chemical. In addition, within these heterogeneous
technologies relations between man and machine became interrelated. These component
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interrelations required a systems approach, as though systems had been studied for
centuries it became a requirement to study the interactions within.

The systems approach is concerned with a holistic view of interacting components that
function together towards achieving a common purpose (Bittel, 1978, p. 1130). This
approach involves a rational plan of the constituent components of a system and their
operational function. That is, it is about thinking about the systems purpose “what it is
for”. The ultimate aim of such component thinking is to discover those components
whose measures of performance are truly related to the measures of performance of the
whole system (Churchman, 1968, p. 43). For example, according to Waldman (2007, p.
272) if a part of the system is changed, the nature of the overall system is often changed
as well. Waldman (2007, p. 272) bases this premise on the argument that by definition,
a system is systemic, meaning relating to or affecting the entire system. Waldman
(2007, p. 272) refers this to co-evolution, where interactive changes between system
components leads to what was eventually termed “the butterfly effect”.

2.2.4 The butterfly effect

Consistent with Waldman’s (2007, p. 272) view that as part of the system changes the
nature of the overall system changes, the butterfly effect is a phenomenon which relates
to this underlying premise of systems theory (Peirce, 2000, p. 5). Systems theory
considers that as small changes occur in the various systems’ sub-systems, or their
constituents, these small changes perturb or reverberate through the system in a manner
which produces significant change. Evidence supporting this premise stems from
research conducted by meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1963; 1968). Lorenz (1963) was
using non-linear equations to plot weather patterns across time. As part of Lorenz’s
(1963) simulation process, the initial conditions of a program he was utilizing had used
the numerical input 0.506127 correct to six (6) decimal places. However, when Lorenz
(1963) repeated the simulation to save time, the numerical input was rounded down to
three (3) decimal places, inputting 0.506. According to Peirce (2000, p. 5) Lorenz
assumed that the difference, one input in a thousand, would be inconsequential.
However, Lorenz (1963) found small changes as an input were not inconsequential.

Lorenz (1963) found a small difference can, over a long period of time, build to produce
a large effect. Moreover, the way the difference affects the outcome is very sensitive to
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small changes, finding that small perturbation of weather elements can have a large
effect later on (Peirce, 2000, p. 5). Technically this is termed “sensitivity to initial
conditions”, which means that any difference in input into a system, no matter how
small, will eventually produce enormous differences in output. More graphically
“sensitivity to initial conditions” is referred to as the “Butterfly Effect” (Warren,
Franklin & Streeter, 1998, p. 363).

The butterfly metaphor stems from Lorenz’s (1968, p. 306) original metaphor for
describing sensitivity to initial conditions where Lorenz (1968) stated “if the theory of
atmospheric instability were correct, one flap of a sea gull’s wings would forever
change the future course of the weather”. According to Lorenz (1968, p. 306) a
disturbance created by a single flap of a sea gull’s wings is a point disturbance,
supposing that after some small time interval the smaller-scale errors resulting from an
initial point disturbance have grown to become large in amplitude as the smaller-scale
motions on which they were superimposed within a region near the initial disturbance,
but the errors are still undetectable over most of the globe (at the macro level). The error
energy is still then very small compared to the global kinetic energy in the same scale.
However, in actuality, the error will already have entered their non-linear phase of
growth, since they are large in those locations where they exist at all, and they should
no longer be amplifying except near the boundary of the region in which they occupy.

This effect error propagation has come to be known as the “Butterfly Effect”, based on
several sea gull analogies such as “the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil can set off a
tornado in Texas (Hilborn, 2003, p. 425), or a single butterfly flapping its wings in
China might, weeks later, cause a hurricane in New York (Peirce, 2000, p. 5). Lorenz’s
(1963; 1968) works are considered in many variations of systems theory, where the
systems approach is based on the premise that as individual measures of performance of
constituent components increase, so does the holistic measure of performance of the
total system (Churchman, 1968, pp. 42-43).

As such, Churchman (1968, pp. 42-43) considers that the separation of systems into
their component parts provides systems analyst with information necessary for
evaluating whether the system is operating properly and if and what corrective measures
are required to maintain the system at its commissioning level of effectiveness. Such a
segmentation process also enables systems managers’ to ensure all monies spent in
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maintaining the system are spent correctly, contributing to the real objectives of the
system ensuring fiscal restraint of limited financial resources.
2.2.5 Different types of systems

According to Midgley (2003, p. xix) there are many different system ideas, with
different systems paradigms embracing various ideas pertaining to what constitutes
systems thinking. Nevertheless, there are common points, for example, Barton and
Haslett (2007, p. 44) suggest systems thinking involves the scientific methods of both
analysis and synthesis, that is, systems thinking lies within the dialectic between the two
scientific methodologies. Analysis is defined as the procedure by which investigators
break-down an intellectual or substantial whole into its constituents (component parts).
In contrast, synthesis involves combining a systems constituents or elements to form a
coherent whole (Ritchey, 1991, p. 1).

According to Barton and Haslett (2007, p. 145) science has debated the order in which
analysis and synthesis are applied. However, Holton (cited in Barton & Haslett, 2007, p.
146) points out that Descartes and Newton agreed with Plato, that for a given initial
hypothesis, analysis must precede synthesis. This sequence is based on the argument
that without a previous analysis, attempting synthesis does not lead to truth. A view
supported by Ritchey (1991, p. 10) who argues that every synthesis is built upon the
results of a preceding analysis, where every analysis requires a subsequent synthesis in
order to verify and correct its results. As such, Barton and Haslett (2007, pp. 147-148)
suggest systems thinking provides a distinctive way of framing this dialectic where
systems thinkers recognize that individual (analysis) events are part of a pattern
(synthesis) of events. That is, the analytic process attempts to explain how something
works, whilst synthesis attempts to establish understanding of its purpose. Therefore
systems thinking occurs when people use the cognitive construct of thinking to frame
the scientific process, defined as “a dialectic between analysis and synthesis” (Barton &
Haslett, 2007, pp. 147-153).
2.2.6 System typologies

According to Midgley (2003, p. xix) there are different types of systems, with a number
of dichotomies each drawing attention to particular aspects of systems thinking (Barton
& Haslett, 2007, p. 151). These include whole versus parts, soft versus hard, complex
versus simple and open versus closed systems; however, according to Barton and
Haslett (2007, p. 151) the most significant development in scientific method towards
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systems thinking has stemmed from the open versus closed dichotomy. In considering
the various systems dichotomies this thesis focused on the closed versus open approach
and briefly discuss these approaches within a complex aspect.
2.2.6.1 Closed systems
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 39) defines closed systems as those considered isolated from their
environment, meaning a concrete system with impermeable boundaries through which
no materials (energy or information) can enter or leave (Midgley, 2003, p. 182).
Midgley (2003, p. 182) explains that within a closed system whatever matter-energy
happens to be within the system is finite and it gradually becomes disordered. Closed
systems theory therefore emphasises the tendency towards equilibrium (Keren, 1979, p.
312), where according to the laws of thermodynamics, closed systems attain a timeindependent equilibrium state, with maximum entropy and minimum free energy
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 23). Thermodynamic equilibrium (Figure 2.3) describes a
condition in a system where the distribution of mass and energy moves towards
maximum entropy (Pidwirny, 2006).

Figure 2.3 The thermodynamic equilibrium of a system over time (Pidwirny, 2006).
Thermodynamic equilibrium (entropy state) is a measure of the amount of heat and
work that is associated with a system, as left to itself accordant with the laws of
thermodynamics, a physical system tends to maximise its entropy (Lovey & Manohar,
2007, p. 99; Styer, 2000, p. 1).
2.2.6.2 Open systems

In contrast to closed systems, there are those systems which by their very nature and
definition are not closed systems. According to Midgley (2003, p. 182) most concrete
systems have boundaries, which are at least partially permeable, permitting magnitudes
of at least certain sorts of matter-energy or information transmissions to cross them.
These systems are defined as open systems. Traditional physics and physical chemistry
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exclusively focused on closed systems; however, the need to consider organisms and
other living systems meant that it was necessary to generalise systems theory
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 155).

According to Bertalanffy (1950, p. 155) open systems theory has lead to new and
revolutionary consequences and principles for the discipline of physics, as it provides
for important generalization of physical theory, kinetics and thermodynamics. This
approach has lead to new principles and insight, such as the principle of equifinality, the
generalization

of

the

second

thermodynamics

principle

(second

law

of

thermodynamics), and the possible increase of order in open systems (Bertalanffy,
1968, p. 102).

Open systems theory considers the interaction with the environment as crucial to the
adoption and evolution of complex systems. Open systems depend on their environment
for resources and are constrained by its influences (Bittel, 1978, p. 1130). For an open
system, the ability to change in response to environmental pressures ensures the
systems’ long term viability. Open exchange with the environment implies adjustment,
both as adaption and innovation (Keren, 1979, p. 316).

In contrast to a closed system which eventually attains a time-independent equilibrium
state, an open system may attain (certain conditions presumed) a stationary state where
the system remains constant as a whole and in its phases, through a continuous flow of
the component materials. Such a state is referred to as a steady state (Bertalanffy, 1950,
p. 23) defined by Martin (2000, p. 210) as a state encompassing very little change,
which according to Honkasalo (1998, p. 134) describes a situation where the flow of
energy is constant and the increase in entropy is at a minimum. According to Martin
(2000, p. 210) the amount of change in a steady state can be considered as a percentage
of a preset threshold level, where Bertalanffy (1950, p. 157) explains that a system’s
steady state condition is maintained through a continuous exchange, between the inflow, and out-flow of feed-back materials, where a steady state equilibrium (Figure 2.4)
shows an average condition of a system where the trajectory (average) remains
unchanged over time (Pidwirny, 2006).

26

Figure 2.4 A steady state system (average condition) over time (Pidwirny, 2006).
Whilst the final state in a closed system depends on the components given at the
beginning of the process, steady state systems (open systems) show equifinality
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 158).

If a steady state is reached in an open system, it is

independent of the initial conditions and determined by the system’s parameters.
Equifinality in open systems can be characterised by phenomena such as overshoot,
false start and asymmetry, (Figure 2.5) where the system may initially proceed in one
direction, which is opposite to, or different from that which eventually leads to its
steady state condition. For example, in Figure 2.5, path A indicates that a steady state
can be achieved from an initial condition of overshoot, whereas path B shows an
asymmetric approach to a steady state, and path C shows a fake start towards achieving
a steady state condition (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 143).

Figure 2.5 System Equifinality (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 143).
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According to Bertalanffy (1968, pp. 142-143) the steady state in an open system is
maintained in distance from true equilibrium and therefore is capable of doing work, in
contrast to closed systems in equilibrium. That is, the system remains constant in its
composition, regardless of continuous irreversible processes, import and export, and
building up, and breaking down, taking place.

In discussing the characteristics of open systems Checkland (1981, p. 83) explains that
the steady state of an open system may be thermodynamically unlikely, creating and/or
maintaining a high degree of order, whereas closed systems by their isolated nature have
no path to travel except towards increasing disorder (high entropy). The steady states in
open systems are not defined by maximum entropy, but by the approach of minimum
entropy production. Entropy in open systems may decrease where the steady states with
minimum entropy production are generally stable systems. Therefore, if one of the
systems variables is altered, the systems manifests changes in the opposite direction
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 26), this property is consistent with Lorenz’s (1963) findings, and
“Butterfly” metaphor.

In discussing an open systems capacity to maintain their steady state (homeostasis),
Keren (1979, p. 316) points out that open systems theory emphasises the role of feedback in systems survival. Feed-back is the process where energy is imported from the
environment beyond that which has been expended. As open systems are energyprocessing, they feed on throughputs of energy to sustain order or negative entropy
(negentropy) and can therefore, through their feed-back processes remain in a
sustainable condition of disequilibrium (Morales- Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla &
Badillo-Pina, 2010, pp. 75-76). In an open system Feed-back means from the output of
a machine a certain amount is monitored back (Figure 2.6), as information to the input
towards regulating the output to stabilize as directed the action of the machine
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 160).
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Figure 2.6 Open system typology with feedback mechanism (Bittel, 1978, p. 1131).
Figure 2.6 demonstrates the processes of an open system, where resources such as
energy, financial inputs and people, etc., become the systems inputs. These inputs are
put through a pre-determined process, influenced by the environment in which they
exists towards producing the desired product as the systems macro-state output. From
the product output, for an open system, a feed-back loop is maintained to ensure
appropriate energy inputs sustain the system at a distance away from equilibrium
(steady state).
2.2.7 System complexity
Systems are generally classified as concrete (physical), conceptual, abstract or
unperceivable, where the most common system being concrete or physical systems.
Physical systems are those which exist in physical reality of space and time, and are
defined as those systems consisting of at least two units or objects. Concrete systems
can be living or non-living, natural or man-made, and can be classified according to
their level of complexity. Complex behaviour can occur in any system made up of a
large number of interacting components with non-linear coupling (Morales-Matamoros,
et al, 2009, p. 72). In an organised-complexity system only a finite but large number of
components will define the system (Skyttner, 1996, p. 43). According to Smarr (1985
cited in Corning, 1995, p. 93) complexity is a multi-dimensional, multi-disciplinary
concept, where there is no single right means to either define or measure it.
29

For example, Smarr (1985 cited in Corning, 1995, p. 93) explains that a mathematician
might define complexity in terms of the number of degrees of freedom in computational
operations, whereas a physicist may be more focused with the number and frequency of
interactions in a system of interacting gas molecules. In contrast, Waldman (2007, p.
271) considers a bicycle to be a complex system based on the variety of its parts and
their interrelations.
In considering a standard definition of a complex system Sheard and Mostashari (2008,
p. 296) have adopted that previously developed by scientists conducting research
focusing on complexity theory and its descendants. Sheard and Mostashari (2008, p.
296) define a complex systems as “systems that do not have a centralizing authority and
are not designed from a known specification, but instead involve disparate stakeholders
creating systems that are functional for other purposes and are only brought together in
the complex system because individual agents of the system see such cooperation as
being beneficial for them”.
According to Sheard and Mostashari (2008, p. 296) complex systems have autonomous
components, where the elements are heterogeneous. In addition, complex systems are
self-organizing, showing a decrease in entropy due to utilizing energy from the
environment. They display emergent macro-level behaviour which emerges from the
actions and interactions of the individual constituents, and their interactions among the
parts matters dramatically. Finally, complex systems elements change in response to
imposed “pressures” from neighbouring elements. Such a discourse regarding what
constitutes a complex system is supported by Midgley (2003, p. 386) who refers to a
complex system as one constructed of a large number of parts that interact in non simple
ways. According to Midgley (2003, p. 386) in such systems the whole is more than the
sum of its parts, not in an ultimate metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic
sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws which govern their interaction,
it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of their whole.
2.2.8 Benefits of systems thinking

In considering the literature relating to systems theory Waldman (2007, p. 1) argues that
such an approach has significant benefits. According to Waldman (2007, p. 1) systems
thinking results in silo framed thinking styles being avoided. Silo thinking is a
phenomenon where humans think and react individually and locally rather than
collectively or globally. Silo thinking aims to simplify or reduce complexity
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(reductionism) towards a phenomenon being investigated, whereas systems thinking
aims to analyse and integrate as part of the same thought process (Albrecht, 2010, p. 2).

Silo thinking refers to a metaphor drawn from large grain silo’s and its term suggests
that just as each silo stands alone, each aspect of a problem (such as a system) is solved
in isolation, standing alone. According to Waldman (2007) such thinking often degrades
net system outcomes, whereas systems thinking forces people to focus on processes,
interactions and causes of outcomes, rather than the components in isolation. In
contrast, GST is considered the scientific exploration of “wholes” and “wholeness”
(Schaefer, Hensel & Brady, 1977, p. 12). For example, giving a drug to a patient to
improve kidney function without considering its effects on the liver is an example of
silo thinking (Waldman, 2007, p. 1). In short, the system model considers the whole
system in action, not just the output of the system (Keren, 1979, p. 314).

In applying GST to the application of physical security the underlying assumptions of
systems theory can be traced through history; however, Fredrich Hegel (1770-1831)
formulated four generic and significant statements concerning systems theory which
hold true in contemporary systems thinking:
 The whole is more than the sum of its parts,
 The whole defines the nature of the parts,
 The parts cannot be understood by studying the whole,
 The parts are dynamically interrelated and interdependent (Skyttner, 1996, p.
30).
2.2.9 The systems approach to physical protection
Designed physical systems exist as a direct result of an identified specific need in some
human activity (Checkland, 1981, p. 119). For security systems, Garcia (2001) explains
that the designed goal is the successful interrupting of an adversary. To achieve their
goal security systems require resources from their environment. That is, consistent with
the premises supporting open systems in general, security systems rely on the input of
finances, people, energy, equipment, information and organisation to achieve their
service product. This product is the successful interruption of a malevolent human
adversary.
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2.3 Conclusion
The chapter provided stage one of the study’s first phase in the research process. In this
chapter security’s diversity and lack of definitional consensus among published authors
was discussed. Nevertheless, the chapter highlighted that despite such diversity a
common thread was the systems approach utilized to employ the theory of Defence in
Depth towards protecting organisational assets. These themes set the theoretical frame
for the study. Consistent with these themes and conforming to the writings of Runyon,
Coleman and Pittenger (2000, p. 11) this chapter presented a systems based operational
definition of security, establishing a measureable context for discussing physical
security decay.
Congruous with the study’s operational definition of security, the chapter presented and
discussed General Systems Theory (GST) as the study’s underlying theory. Within the
context of GST, Section 2.2.1 discussed Systems Theory, history and science. In
addition, a number of GST concepts and principles were discussed including defining
systems, the systems approach, the Butterfly effect, different types of systems and
typologies such as closed and open systems. These combined concepts and principles
lead to a discussion on the benefits of systems thinking. As a result of this discussion a
systems approach for considering the concept of physical security consistent with the
writings of such published security professional (Underwood, 1984, p. xi; Fennelly,
1997; Garcia, 2001, p. 6; Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164) was established. This
discussion provided a detailed theoretical underpinning to be taken forward into
Chapters 3 and 4 for considering the concept of security decay within an open systems
approach to physical security.
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CHAPTER 3
AN OPEN SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PHYSICAL SECURITY
Introduction
This chapter presents the second stage of phase one of the study; establishing an open
systems framed physical security benchmark. Consistent with the principles of the
conceptual review of literature, the chapter brings forward the writings from Chapter 2
to establish an open systems physical security benchmark. Section 3.1 discusses an open
systems approach to physical protection. This discussion applies the underpinnings of
General Systems Theory (GST) highlighting how the systems interrelations achieve the
systems output goal. Section 3.2 combines the available literature defining Physical
Protection Systems (PPS) within GST frame. Accordant with the study’s operational
definition of security, Section 3.3 presents a discussion on measuring a Physical
Protection System’s effectiveness. This discussion embeds a quantitative approach to
physical security for discussing physical security decay. Central to establishing a steady
state PPS Section 3.4 discusses security and risk management which underpins the
systems established level of Defence in Depth elements. The chapter concludes with
Section 3.5.
3.1 An open systems approach to physical protection
In applying the systems literature to physical security, the physical components of an
organisational security program relates to the establishment of barriers including fences,
locks, gates, vaults, alarm systems, sensory devices, protective lighting and security
personnel (Post, Kingsbury and Schachtsiek, 1991, pp. 97-99).

Within a systems

approach these physical components of the holistic security program are defined by
Garcia (2001, p. 6) as a Physical Protection System (PPS). Concordant with the study’s
operational definition of security, an effective security system must be able to detect an
adversary then delay this adversary long enough along their attack path to provide
sufficient time for a facility’s response force to arrive and neutralize the threat before
the adversary accomplishes their desired goal (SAND Report, 2002, appendix D). As
such, congruous with the theory of Defence in Depth the primary functions of such a
system are the detection and assessment of any adversary’s intrusions, the delaying of
the adversary’s progress along their attack path exposing them to a prompt response
(Spencer, 1998, p. 3).
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Concordant with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950, p. 26; 1968, p. 39; Bittel, 1978, p.
1130; Keren, 1979, p. 316; Checkland, 1981, p. 83) a Physical Protection System (PPS)
is defined as a complex, open system. Bittel (1978, p. 1131) explains that for open
systems, external constraints become important parts of the definition of the system
boundary. The characteristics of such systems are constitutive, that is, those which are
dependent on the specific relations within the complex. As such, for understanding such
characteristics their parts and their interrelations must be known. That is, the system
must be spelt out (mapped) (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55). Conforming to the systems
philosophy Garcia (2001; 2006) explains that a PPS must achieve its objectives by
either deterring, or a combination of detection, delay and responding to unauthorised
security events. Therefore, in order to map the system the various components of deter,
detect, delay and response, and their systems based interrelations must be spelt out in
detail.
3.1.1 Deterrence

According to the theory of defence in depth the first element is deterrence (Smith, 2003,
p. 8). All security systems have some level of deterrence which is related to level of
dedication and sophistication of the threat agent and the relative value and/or criticality
of the asset requiring a level of security (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 24). Mosely and
Coleman (2000, p. 101) consider it is the systems deterrence value which is saliently
important when protecting a site against low level opportunistic offenders. As such,
according to Broder (2006, pxiv) true to the first element of Defence in Depth cost
effective security measures should be designed, refined and evaluated to deter would-be
offenders, where Broder (2006) considers that to deter an attacker the perimeter must
have the appearance of being too difficult to defeat and/or being able to inflict injury.

Deterrence can be defined as ‘something which discourages (from acting) or prevents
(from occurring) usually by instilling fear, doubt or anxiety (Collins Dictionary, p. 342).
As such, deterrence as a concept is argued to be a perceptual phenomenon (Nagin, 2002,
p. 5), which according to Walker (1988) stems from the Latin word deterre, meaning ‘to
frighten’. Walker (1988, p. 11) suggests that experience and research supports the
argument that offenders are not immune to fear as a deterrent. Therefore, in designing
security systems the psychological aspects governing offenders are considered towards
persuading them that it is not worth their while to make an attempt against an asset, or
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that if they do try, they will fail or be caught in the act (Walker, 1988, p. 11). In
considering the concept of deterrence Tilley (2005, p. 268) explains that where there are
predictable systems, risks, rewards, effort needed and the tools required for success can
all, in principle, be gauged in advance.

The application of GST, that is, a systems philosophy to the deterrence, is related to the
concept of free choice, where according to Bertalanffy (1986, p. 114) free choice from a
system perspective is described by formulations of Game Theory and Decision Theory.
Axiomatically both Game Theory and Decision Theory are concerned with “rational
choice”. Rational choice refers to a choice which “maximises” an individual’s utility or
satisfaction, that the individual is free to choose among several possible courses of
action and decides among them on the basis of their consequences of their actions, what
stands highest on the list, “they” prefer more of a commodity to less, other things being
equal. This discussion of “rational choice” includes everything that can be meant as
“free will”.
The concept of deterrence is considered within the rational choice framework where it is
argued that an attack will occur if; EUoffence > EUlegal + U taste (Winoto, 2003, p. 2), where
such expected utility decisions are based on the decision making formula: (1), the
expected gain from committing the offence symbolised by, EUoffence, an offender acts
according to their expected utility, represented by: EUoffence = (1-p) U1 + pcU2. Where
U1 is the return from the offence, Pc is the perceived probability of conviction, and U2 is
the punishment. (2), Expected gain from not committing the offence, EUlegal. (3), Taste
(or distaste) and preference for offence, Utaste- a combination of moral values, proclivity
for violence, and preference for risk. Based on this model an offender will attempt an
offence/attack if EUoffence > EUlegal + U taste (Winoto, 2003, p. 2).
Based on Winoto’s (2003) formula, it is purported that the sequential strategy of
Defence in Depth aims to, and for deterrence to be achieved must, communicate to an
adversary that EUoffence < EUlegal + U taste (adjusted from, Winoto, 2003, p. 2) resulting in a
rational choice by adversaries to refrain from their desired course of action, deterring
them from ever attempting a penetration against an organisation (Cornish & Clarke,
1987, p. 934).
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Within a linear relationship each function of the theory of defence in depth strategy
must be achieved in their sequential order, where deterrence is achieved through
systematic application of detect, delay and respond (D-DDR) (Garcia, 2006, p. 240), in
this sequential combination (Garcia, 2001). This systematic combination aims to
communicate to potential adversaries that the risks outweigh the benefits influencing
their (however rudimentary) cost benefit equation (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 934).

However, according to Cioffi-Revilla (1999, p. 243) deterrence must be supported by an
efficacious capability for the risks to be perceived at the cost benefit analysis as greater
than the potential gains. That is, deterrence is not a protection strategy; rather it is the
anticipated result of implemented security measures at a facility (Garcia, 2006, p. 240).
This supports deterrence as “a perceptual phenomenon”, where, according to Hamlyn
(1969, p. 3) contemporary psychological theories of perception have their roots, in one
way or another, in Gestalt Theory. Gestalt in the German language has two meanings,
its connotation with shape or form as an attribute of things, and a concrete entity which
has, or, may have, a shape as one of its characteristics (Kohler, p. 104).

Gestalt principles help explain how people subjectively organize perception, drawing on
the principles of proximity, closure, similarity, simplicity and continuity (Weiten, 2002,
p. 109). Gestalt is a product of organization, organization, the process that leads to a
Gestalt. That is, organization as a category is completely opposed to more side-by-side
or random distribution. In the process of organization, “what happens to a part of the
whole, is determined by intrinsic laws inherent within this whole” (Koffka, 1963, pp.
682-683).

Weiten (2002, p. 109) explains, sometimes “wholes”, as they are perceived, may have
qualities which do not exist in any of their parts. This “insight” became the basic tenant
of Gestalt psychology (Weiten, 2002, p. 109), where according to Hamlyn (1969, p. 58)
the most general thesis of Gestalt theory is that humans not only see whole objects or
forms rather than parts which are synthesized, but there is a tendency to see such forms,
“gestalten”, as being as simple or “good” as possible. Hamlyn (1969, p. 3) points out,
Gestalt psychologists purport that humans generally don’t perceive the gaps between
things, that is, unless they attend to them specifically with care (Hamlyn, 1969, p. 84).
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Gestalt in English is used to refer to a concept of wholeness (Collins Concise
Dictionary, N.D. p. 516), represented by the phrase “the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts” (Gestalt, Psychology and Psychiatry, 2010), this phrase, drawn from Gestalt
Theory, is congruous with the first of Fredrich Hegel’s (1770 cited in Skyttner, 1996, p.
30) four statements concerning systems theory, which still hold true in contemporary
systems thinking, Hegel (1770 cited in Skyttner, 1996, p. 30) also suggested as part of
his systems thinking paradigm “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”. It is this
aspect of perception, “the view of wholeness” which it is argued that lends some
offenders to view the security program as a “whole”, and determine that the risks
outweighs the benefits, ultimately “deterring” them. This is consistent with Underwood
(1984, p. xi) who stated “it is important that security is seen as a whole”, it is argued
that the perceived ∑ detect, delay and response, as a form of “wholeness” is what drives
the deterrence value of a PPS, where according to Garcia (2001, p. 2) the deterrent value
of a true PPS can be very high.

Deterrence can be useful in discouraging attacks from opportunistic offenders’.
However, the deterrence function of a security system is difficult to measure with no
substantiated key performance indicators. As such, the reliance on successful deterrence
can be risky (Garcia, 2001, p. 2). This is a view supported by Cioffi-Revilla (1999, p.
243) who states “sometimes deterrence works and sometimes it fails”. Therefore, based
on a two type offender typology (opportunistic/deliberate) (Underwood, 1984, pp. 3-4),
where an adversary’s internal drive is great enough, including situations stretching
beyond personal gain towards subversion, systems must be designed for defeating
attacks which are going ahead regardless of their overt deterrent value (Walker, 1988,
p.11). Robinson (1999, p.38) supports such a view, stating “all targets can be breached
given enough time”. Therefore, “the aim of a protection system is to provide initial
detection, then enough time for a response force to arrive and thwart an attack”.
3.1.2 The physical protection system

When deterrence fails conforming with the remaining elements of defence in depth and
Standards Australia HB 167 Security Risk Management (2006, p. 63) for a PPS to meet
its objectives there must be an awareness that an attack is underway (detection), the
slowing of an adversary’s progress to the target (delay) and enough time for the
response force to interrupt or stop the adversaries (response) before they achieve their
goal. Physical Protection Systems (PPS) integrate people, procedures and equipment for
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the protection of assets (Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim & Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 747) which makes
them heterogeneous in nature. For example, Figure 3.1 highlights the functional
elements of defence in depth and their interrelationship within PPS.

Figure 3.1 Functional elements and components (constituents) of a physical protection
system (Garcia, 2006, p. 34).
3.1.3 System performance

According to Churchman (1968, p. 43) within a systems thinking approach, the ultimate
aim is to discover those components whose measures of performance are truly related to
the measure of performance of the whole system. A systems performance is proven by
providing objective evidence that the program and/or system are doing what the
designer states they are doing (Robinson, 1999, p. 58). Accordant with the premises of
systems theory according to Churchman (1968, p. 30) system objectives must be some
precise and specific measures of performance of the overall system.

In applying Churchman’s (1968, p. 43) approach it is argued that a salient focus must be
towards a systems macro-state performance measure and the various sub-system
measures which combine to produce this macro-state measure. That is, the component
measure must be analysed where ultimately a synthesis process must occur to achieve a
macro-state output measure; where according to Dillon (1983, p. 183) mathematics
provides the means of expressing such functional relations to which operational
significance (measures of performance) can be attached. According to Dillon (1983, p.
183) from such mathematical relations logical deductions can be drawn through
numerical manipulation. A systems performance measure is therefore a score which
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describes how well the system is actually doing. Such objective evidence of a systems
performance is also essential for a security system (PPS). For security professionals
operating at levels from medium to high-risk facilities it is important to be able to
determine the likelihood (probability) that, if their facility was attacked, the attacker(s)
would be denied their success.

In considering a total system evaluation Churchman (1968, p. 29) suggests that when
evaluating a system it is necessary to spell out in detail what the whole system is, the
environment in which it lives, what its objectives is/are and how this is supported by the
activities of its parts. Compatible with this study’s definition of security Garcia (2001,
pp. 242-249) explains that a PPS is a complex configuration of detection, delay and
response elements, and that system performance measures should include probability of
detection, delay times, and response times. This literature suggests that the best
effectiveness measure (macro-state) for a PPS is one which combines these functional
elements of defence in depth into a functional whole.

The holistic performance measure for a PPS (its macro-state) is the principle of timely
detection, represented as its probability of interruption (Pi) (Garcia, 2001, p. 246). Pi is
calculated from the variables of detection, delay and response (Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim
& Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 748) and is the probability of intercepting an adversary before any
theft or sabotage can occur, defined by Garcia (2001, p. 246) as “the cumulative
probability of detection where there is enough time remaining for the response force to
interrupt adversaries”. Overall system performance measures are achieved through the
combining of component subsystem performance measures (Spencer, 1998, p. 3), where
consistent with the theory of Defence in Depth; the overall performance measure for a
PPS is the measure of the sum of the detection, delay, and response function of the PPS
(Garcia, 2001, p. 246).

Congruous with the study’s definition of security, the scientific principles of analysis
and synthesis facilitate the calculation of PPS effectiveness in terms of its degree of
success in producing detection, delay and response functions of Defence in Depth (Jang,
Kwak, Yoo, Kim & Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 748). According to Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim and
Ki Yoon (2008, p. 748) due to the complexity of PPS its quantitative macro-state
performance measure (PI) is usually evaluated using computer modelling techniques,
where Garcia (2001, p. 252) suggests this can be achieved utilizing the Estimate of
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Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model. This model referred to as EASI was
developed in the 1970s and models one adversary path at a time, as selected by the
model user. EASI uses specific quantitative input parameters representing the PPS
functions of: detection, transmission, assessment, communication, delay and response
performance values to compute the probability of interrupting an adversary before they
accomplish their objectives (Spencer, 1998, p. 4). Such quantitative methods are
systematic, repeatable and based on objective measures and demonstrate high statistical
validity (SAND Report, 2002, p. 11). The input parameters for EASI require:
 Detection and communication inputs as probabilities that the total function will
be successful; and
 Delay and response inputs as mean and standard deviation time measurements
for each element.
EASI is a simple calculation tool which draws on the basic laws of probability (see
Howell, 2008, p. 128) to combine through calculation the quantitative performance
measures of the systems constituent subsystems to determine the macro-state of the PPS
(Garcia, 2001, p. 252).
3.1.4 Intrusion detection

For an adversary to be caught, their penetration must be detected (Walker, 1988, p.19).
Detection is the second element of defence in depth (Smith, 2003, p. 8) and the first
required function of a security system (SAND report, 2002, p. 39). In discussing and
achieving detection Underwood (1984, p. 137) refers to the geometry of detection
stating an adversary can be detected when they cross a line (linear protection), when
they enter a space (volumetric protection) and when they contact an object (point
protection), and that this is employed from the perimeter inwards. In addition, once a
sensor has activated the detection system must then transmit this signal notification to a
location where it can be displayed with meaning to generate an appropriate facility
response (Garcia, 2006, p. 14). As such, detection not only includes sensor activations
but also alarm assessment, alarm communication and display, and entry control as
subsystems synthesised together. The detection subsystem of a PPS therefore includes
exterior and interior intrusion sensors, alarm assessment and alarm communication
(Garcia, 2006, pp. 13-14).

In evaluating the detection function of a PPS, conforming to systems principles (Barton
& Haslet, 2007, p. 44; Ritchey, 1991, p.1) the detection constituents are initially broken
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down for analysis, then the constituents are combined through a process of synthesis to
form a coherent whole in order to verify it’s operating according to purpose.
3.1.4.1 Detection

According to Armstrong and Peile (2005, p. 34) for intruder detection purposes each
application requires a sensor, irrelevant of its technology, to perform a particular
function. For the detection system its quantitative performance function is calculated as
a product, where Garcia (2001, p. 64) explains that for an ideal sensor the probability
that it would detect an unauthorised intrusion would be 1.0 (100%). For example,
according to Armstrong and Peile (2005, p. 35) the probability of detection is calculated
from the result of three trials in a controlled environment.
In discussing the key performance indicators of the detection subsystem Garcia (2001,
p. 56) states that the probability that an individual sensor will sense unauthorised
activity is its probability of sensing (PS). This view is supported by Adams, Snell, Green
and Pritchard (2005, p. 2) who denote this as P(sensing) which is the product of:
•

PF= the probability that the sensor is functioning at the time of the attack
(measured between 0.0 and 1.0);

•

PR = the reliability of the sensor itself at the time of the attack (measured
between 0.0 and 1.0); and

•

PS = probability that the sensor generates an alarm-that is, senses an intrusion
(measured between 0.0 and 1.0).

Drawing on the multiplicative law of probability (see Howell, 2008, p. 129), this is
summarized by the equation:
P(sensing) = PF × PR × PS
(2)
This equation argues that the probability of sensing is the accomplishment of many
phenomena. As such, drawing on the writings of Garcia (2001, pp. 63-64) the
probability of detection is represented by the equation:
Pd = P(sensing) coupled with CL
(3)
The PD is measured between 0.0 and 1.0, and CL = a confidence level, where confidence
levels can vary, generally with the number of trials. Usually CL levels are equal to
values ranging between .90 or 90%, .95 or 95%, or .99 or 99%. In addition, EASI uses
the input P(Detection) as its probability of detection inputs for detection element
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performance indicators along an adversary’s path. EASI also uses location parameters
of delay for calculating P(Detection) where EASI assigns detection relative to delay along
an adversary’s path to more accurately model system effectiveness. For example, an
entry of B in the location column is added where delay occurs before detection, an entry
of M is added for delay between the before and end of detection (middle) and an E is
entered where delay falls after detection (Garcia, 2001, pp. 256-260).

In establishing a measure of detection towards obtaining an overall effectiveness
measure for a PPS Adams, Snell, Green and Pritchard (2005) consider slightly smaller
factors into some of their component terms than Garcia’s (2001; 2006), however,
congruous with the basic laws of probability the general construct used in EASI is the
same. As such, for this study, an individual sensors performance measure will be
denoted by Pd, where Pd represents the EASI input of P(Detection), through the equation:
Pd = PS coupled with CL
(4)
Where:
 PS = probability of sensing unauthorised activity (measured between 0.0 and
1.0);
 CL = the product confidence level (measured between 0.0 and 1.0) including
Adams et al, (2005, p. 2) PF (measured between 0.0 and 1.0) × PR (measured
between 0.0 and 1.0).
Accordant with the basic laws of probability and the premises of systems theory (see
Howell, 2008, p. 128 and Churchman, 1968, p. 42) theoretically this is summarised as:
Pd = PS coupled with CL for each detection sensor along an adversary’s path. However,
the EASI performance measure of intrusion detection along an adversary path is
calculated as the probability of non-detection which is the complement of PD. That is,
consistent with the additive law of probability (mutually exclusive events) nondetection is the mathematical complement of Pd. This measure means the systems
probability of non-detection along an adversary’s path is a combined measure of
between 0.0 and 1.0 as product of probability. For example, along an adversary’s path
there may be three (3) intrusion technologies, the theoretical Pd along this path = Pd for
S1 × PD for S2 × PD for S3, that is, 0.95 × 0.95 × 0.95 = PD = 0.85. However, to account
for an adversary getting to the next layer along their path EASI draws on the probability
of non-detection (Garcia, 2001; 2006) with a variation for where the sensor is located
relative to delay measures (Garcia, 2001, pp. 256-260). Thus, in this example, this
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would be S1.05 x .S2 .05 x .S3 .05, or .000125, then after multiplying the probabilities of
non-detection, the final product is subtracted from 1 to give the Pd: 1 - .000125 provides
a Pd of .99.
In considering the efficacy of detection constituents, Ball (2007, p. 11) considers that
for detection technologies, their probabilities of detection may vary due to factors
beyond the control of the systems designer. Therefore, as an alternative for a
commissioned system, a detection rate can be utilized towards establishing the detection
systems key performance indicators. This view is based on the work of Armstrong and
Peile (2005, p. 35) who argue that Pd is not a real probability of detection. As a sensor
with a PD of .5 (50%) can deliver three successful trials in a row. Therefore, for a
commissioned system, true probability of detection is a product of an actual detection
rate (walking, running, crawling, jumping climbing etc), where this product is
calculated as:





      × 100


  
(5)

3.1.5 Alarm communication (transmission) and display

Alarm communication and display (AC&D) as a subsystem within a PPS transports
alarm and video information to a human operator for assessment purposes (Garcia,
2006, p. 17). As such, in line with the systems approach, the EASI performance
measure for this constituent sub-system is also a calculated as a product, that is, the
probability that an alarm indication will be successfully transmitted to an evaluation or
assessment point, referred to as probability of transmission (PT) measured as a product
between 0.0 and 1.0 (Garcia, 2001, p. 253).
3.1.6 Intruder assessment

In discussing an intruder assessment key performance indicators Garcia (2006, p. 15)
explains that there is no detection without assessment, therefore once an alarm has been
generated it must be assessed. Therefore the key performance indicator for the
assessment sub-system must include a consideration of human factors, adversary tactics
and technology aspects of this sub-system. Alarm assessment requires direct
observation of an alarm source by people, or immediate capture of an image of a sensor
detection zone at the precise time of an alarm event (Garcia, 2006, p. 15).
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Contemporary assessment systems use fixed video cameras focused on a specific field
of view for designated detection zones to automatically capture images of alarm zone at
the precise time the alarm was generated and display these images on a screen for
assessment by a person to determine the alarm cause (Garcia, 2006, p. 16). This
approach requires effective processing of the sensor detection where the alarm computer
processes the alarm appropriately, effective display so that the relevant information can
be understood (clear) by a human operator through an appropriate interface, and an
operator makes the correct assessment of the alarm source (Adams, et al, 2005, pp. 2-3).

Congruous with systems theory, the assessment subsystems combined process provides
the performance measure of probability of accurate assessment (PA). This probability is
the combined effects of video image quality (resolution), speed of capture for images,
proper installation and integration of detection sensor zones with appropriate camera
fields of view coverage (Garcia, 2006, p. 16). According to Garcia (2006, p. 149) in
practice, the probability of assessment (PA) as a quantitative probability is expressed
using three (3) levels of numerical assessment; 0.25, 0.5 and 0.95.
3.1.7 Detection sub-system

Accordant with the premises of systems theory and the requirement of synthesis to
follow analysis (Barton & Haslet, 2007, p. 44; Ritchey, 1991, p.1), conforming with the
basic laws of probability the Estimated Adversary Sequential Interruption (EASI)
model, interrelates sensor detection, alarm transmission and probability of accurate
assessment to provide a macro detection subsystem key performance measure. This
subsystems performance measure is the probability of assessed detection (Pd), where
the relationships are expressed by Garcia (2001, p. 253) in the equation:
Pd = PS × PT × PA.
(6)
However, for this study the detection sensors key performance indicator denoted as PD
and the EASI detection constituents inputs of P(Detection), this study uses the equation:
Pd = PD × PT × PA.
(7)
The detection systems constituent’s performance measures relationships are represented
by Figure 3.2, where the detection functions of sensor activation, signal transmission,
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and alarm assessment are synthesised to achieve the sub-system performance measure
of Pd.

Figure 3.2 Detection systems performance measure relationships.
(Adjusted from Garcia, 2001; 2006).

Figure 3.2 emphasises how analysis of the constituents precedes synthesis, and how
synthesis of the detection constituents functions in a PPS interrelates the micro-state key
performance indicators for the whole detection sub-system (Garcia, 2006, p. 36). These
combined functions aim to initiate the security systems response time line (MILHDBK-1013/1, p. 75).
3.1.8 Entry control

Entry control is the provision of security controls whereby personnel, vehicles and
materials are identified and screened to discriminate authorised from unauthorised
personnel and vehicles, and to detect contraband or other undesired materials such as
explosives (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, p. 31). The entry control sub-system must afford
maximum security while minimising delay in the flow of authorised traffic (MILHDBK-1013/1, p. 71). The entry control subsystem contributes in a total PPS by
allowing the movement of authorized personnel and material through normal access
routes, and by detecting and notifying facility personnel of unauthorized movements
and delaying unauthorised progression through portals. The entry control subsystem
encompasses all the technologies, procedures, databases, and personnel used to monitor
the movement of people and materials into and out of a facility (Garcia, 2006, p. 16).

Garcia (2006, p. 154) explains that the entry control sub-system uses probability of
detection PD as its primary measure of effectiveness. For example, the performance
measures for entry control components of a PPS include throughput rates and error
rates. Throughput rates are a measure of the time it takes for an authorised person or
materials to successfully pass an entry or exit point. A systems error rates relates to
falsely rejecting authorised access, and falsely accepting the improper acceptance of an
unauthorized person. In addition, when considering the performance measures of this
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sub-system a strong consideration of the security objectives is required as systems can
be set to minimize false rejects or minimize false accepts, however access control
systems cannot be set to minimize both types of errors simultaneously (Garcia, 2001,
pp. 178-179).

Garcia (2006, p. 155) states “the false accept rate is the mathematical compliment of PD
and is equal 1- PD”. According to Garcia (2006, p. 155) this is a key measurement of
sub-system performance because it represents the probability of defeat of the device.
For example, facility characterization may require a high probability of detecting metal
weapons. In this case, entry control technologies (contraband detectors) are incorporated
as part of the detection sub-systems functions which provide a probability of detecting
those materials they have been installed to detect.

3.1.9 Alarm communication
Communications are essential for facilitating an effective facility response, organizing
responders, directing them to the scene, and successful interruption towards
neutralization where necessary. This constituent sub-system starts with alarm reporting
and ends with deployment of guard force and interruption (Garcia, 2006, p. 21). The
performance measure for this constituent system is the probability of guard
communication (PC) measured between 0.0 and 1.0, and the time required for
communication (Garcia, 2006, p. 39) where the time taken to communicate is included
in the response time (Garcia, 2001, p. 253). According to Garcia (2001, p. 253) most
effective systems operate with a PC around 0.95 (95%). In addition, where the time to
establish accurate communications increases the probability of communication also
increases. For example, Figure 3.3 emphasises the relationship between guard
communication time and probability of accurate communications. Figure 3.3 Variation
of probability of communication with time (Garcia, 2006, p. 39).
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Figure 3.3 Variation of probability of communication with time (Garcia, 2006, p. 39).
3.1.10 Delay

Delay is the third element of Defence in Depth (Smith, 2003, p. 8) and the second
required function of a security system (SAND report, 2002, p. 39). In establishing the
delay key performance indicator for a PPS, Garcia (2006, p. 19) explains that the aim of
delay within a PPS is to slow an adversary’s penetration down to gain time for alarm
assessment and where necessary facility response to unauthorised entry events.
Ultimately strategies which establish this key performance indicator impede an
adversary’s progress and are accomplished through the placement of fixed, passive or
active barriers (SAND report, 2002, p. 40). These barriers form the various delay
microstates within a PPS, and are defined by O’Block, et al, (1991, p. 349) as “a system
of devices or characteristics intended to withstand unauthorised penetration for a
specified period of time”. In addition, for this delay to be meaningful in a system, it
must occur after detection.
3.1.10.1 Passive delay

Passive barriers are defined by Fisher and Green (2003, p. 148) as either natural or
structural and are the physical elements which define boundaries initially aiming to
deter unauthorised access. Natural barriers comprise site specific topographical features
which contribute to impeding or denying access to a protected area. In contrast,
structural barriers are permanent or temporary devices constructed to impede
unauthorised penetration for a specified period of time. Garcia (2001, p. 202) considers
that this category of delay includes structural elements such as doors, walls, locks and
fences.
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3.1.10.2 Active delay
Active barriers are those delay resources which utilize a sensing device to initiate the
dispersement of liquids, foams and other irritants to impede unauthorised penetration
(Garcia, 2001, p. 202). According to Garcia (2001, p. 202) whilst passive barriers can
be weak against some threat agents depending on their capabilities, dispensable barriers
when implemented properly can maximise delay to an asset, and due to their
characteristics can be threat independent, maintaining their intended delay regardless of
adversary tactics.

Within a PPS barriers are placed along a potential adversary’s

pathway between the attacker and specific assets requiring protection (Moseley &
Coleman, 2000, p. 100).
3.1.10.3 Measuring delay
In discussing the effectiveness of physical barriers Moseley and Coleman (2000, p. 101)
highlight that no single barrier or series of barriers is impenetrable, as with the
appropriate means including time and equipment a determined attacker will eventually
penetrate, or scale any number of physical barriers. The effectiveness of material
barriers depends upon the amount of time they can withstand physical attack, where the
longer a barrier remains intact, the greater the chances of prevention and apprehension
(O’Block, Donnermeyer & Doeren, 1991, p. 349). As such, the key performance
effectiveness measure for the delay element of defence in depth within a PPS is
calculated as a sum, and is measured by time (Garcia, 2001, p. 2005; MIL-HDBK1013/1, pp. 31-32; Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim & Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 748).

To analyse individual delay constituents true to the principles of analysis and synthesis
individual barrier penetration times are defined as the time interval required for an
intruder to successfully create a man-passable opening through a barrier, or pass over or
around a structure, or move cross an open area. Therefore, when evaluating the physical
barrier the delay time must be assessed against the time it takes an adversary to pass
through, over, or under the barrier and enter their next task. For penetration evaluations,
uniform to the Military Handbook of Physical Security (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, p. 32),
this study defines a man passable opening as an opening of 96 square inches (0.06 sqm),
which is at least 6 inches (150mm) wide or high.

In establishing barrier penetration times, analysis can be based on working time or
elapsed time, where working time does not include variables such as intervals for
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changing tools, changing operators, etc. A working time assessment results in a more
conservative penetration time (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, pp. 29-32).

In establishing penetration time, Garcia (2001, pp. 203-204) suggests that the
penetration time starts at a distance two feet in front of a barrier and ends at a point two
feet beyond the barrier. For vehicle penetrations Garcia (2001, pp. 203-204) suggests
that a vehicle has successfully penetrated when the ramming vehicle passes through or
over a barrier and is still functioning, or a second vehicle can be driven through the
breached barrier. However, this study contends that allowances must be made for a
vehicle penetration of a barrier to occur and then for the attack to proceed on foot from
that point. However, the distance to travel is still a remaining barrier and would be
calculated as the next barrier in the attack. The time it takes to penetrate all barriers
along an adversary’s path is the adversary task time. Given that all barriers can be
defeated in time, the most successful barrier would be the one that could increase task
time (resist a threat) until appropriate action can be taken.

Accordant with the principles of analysis and synthesis, synthesis of the delay
constituents occurs by calculating the cumulative delay time which is the total time an
intruder is impeded from gaining unauthorised access to a secured asset. This means
that an adversary’s task time (ATT) is the cumulative sum of all delay measures along
an adversary’s path. For example, Table 3.1 shows that the penetration time for each
delay constituent is measured in seconds and listed as individual tasks which must be
achieved in their sequential order. Whilst each individual task may only take several
seconds, Table 3.1 shows that the adversary’s task time is the cumulative sum of all six
sequential tasks during scenario 1, ingress route. In addition, where an adversary is
required to remove an asset (scenario 2) then they must retrace their steps back through
their previous penetration path to leave the facility or take an alternative exit path.
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Table 3.1
.1 Adversary estimated delay
de time.
Estimated Delay Time
Scenario 1: Ingress
Task

Mean Time (seconds)

Task Description

Y1

60 seconds

Cut through outer fence

Y2

90 seconds

Cross open ground

Y3

90 seconds

Penetrate building outer door

Y4

12 seconds

Cross room floor

Y5

40 seconds
seco

Breach filing cabinet

Y6

15 seconds

Find and remove required file
Scenario 2: Escape

Y7

12 seconds

Cross room floor

Y8

90 seconds

Cross over open ground

Y9

15 seconds

Climb back through outer fence

Standard total adversary task time is represented
represent by the sum:


 
1

(8)
The cumulative adversary task time (ingress and egress) = 424 seconds.
However, the EASI performance measure for the delay sub-system
sub system requires the mean

and standard deviation of adversary task time, in seconds as formula inputs, represented
represen
by the formulas:

(9)
The standard deviation of adversary task time is represented by the formula:

(10)
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Congruous with the systems approach, barrier effectiveness relates to the barriers
integration with other security subsystems (Moseley & Coleman, 2000, p. 101). For
example, according to Garcia (2001, p. 204) as an adversary encounters a series of
progressively more difficult barriers, it becomes increasingly difficult as it will require
more and different equipment, which adds weight or people to the attack scenario,
which either slows them down or makes them easier to detect. Furthermore, although
the egress path would be quicker as all forced breaching would have been completed,
the response force may still arrive and cut off the adversary’s egress path, interrupting
their escape.
3.1.11 Response
Response is the fourth element of defence in depth (Smith, 2003, p. 8) and the third
required function of a security system (SAND report, 2002, p. 39). Response is a
facility’s means of interrupting an adversary along their attack path (Garcia, 2001, p.
223). In considering and establishing the response key performance indicator within a
system Garcia (2001, p. 21) highlights two interrelated factors associated with
maintaining an effective response capability, these are the performance measures for the
desired response to be placed into effect and the effectiveness of that response. As a
holistic key performance indicator, response is a combination of and an interrelationship
between interruption and neutralization (SAND report, 2002, p. 40).

The response key performance indicator is initially established by focusing on the
probability that the organisation’s response personnel will interrupt an adversary along
an attack path. Interruption is defined as “the response forces arrival at the correct
location to stop an adversary attempting to gain a level of unauthorised access to an
asset (SAND report, 2002, p. 40). In achieving successful interruption Adams, et al,
(2005, p. 3) considers that for successful interruption to occur a response force must
muster, gather their necessary equipment and travel to the alarm site. As such, in
considering the key performance measures for response Bitzer and Hoffman (N.D., p. 5)
highlight that information collected by security equipment (CCTV) must initially be
reviewed and acted upon by human security personnel. For example, Cummings (1992,
p. 177) points out, closed circuit television systems are only as effective as the
personnel viewing them and interpreting their findings. Bitzer and Hoffman (N.D., p. 6)
explain that ultimately a person viewing a scene on a monitor must interpret incoming
information and make key decisions about if and what actions to should be taken. Such
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a salient point is why a differentiation exists between surveillance and assessment.
Therefore, the measure of effectiveness for interruption is the time from alarm
notification of a penetration to the response forces arrival at the correct location to
interrupt the adversary/s (SAND report, 2002,
2002, p. 40; Garcia, 2006, p. 38).
3.1.11.1 Measuring response
In establishing the response key performance indicator, response time is calculated as a
sum, measured in time, where response time is modelled in EASI in seconds (or
minutes but not both) as the time between the generation of an alarm signal by a sensing
device and the confrontation of the adversary by a response force. According to Garcia
(2001, p. 254) this time consists of the sum of tasks listed in Table
able 3.2.
Table 3.2
.2 Facility response times inputs.

Input 1
Input 2
Input 3
Input 4
Input 5
Input 6

Facility Response Time Inputs
Alarm communication time (ACT)
Alarm assessment time (AAT)
Guard communication time (GCT)
Time required by guard force to prepare and gather
equipment and start their vehicle
vehicle (preparation time) (GP)
Guard travel time (GTT)
Time to deploy at incident scene (GDP)

X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6

These response force tasks represent the various micro-states
micro states of the PPS’s
response capability, where total response force time is calculated
calculated through the sum:
6

 
1

(11)

In addition, as an EASI effectiveness measure input, response time is the mean and
standard deviation of the sum of the response input values, where the mean is calculated
through the formula:

(12)
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The standard deviation is the square root of the variance in a set of scores, summarised
as:

(13)
The variance averages the effects of large and small deviations from the mean and can
be used to characterise how much the typical score deviates from the mean (Runyon,
Coleman & Pittenger, 2000, pp. 79-101). This interrelationship between response tasks
is emphasised in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 Interrelationship of response functions. Adjusted from Garcia (2006, p. 38).
3.1.12 Total system synthesis
Once initial constituent analysis has taken place to achieve element synthesis,
conforming to Bertalanffy (1968, p. 56), the system can be defined mathematically;
where total system synthesis is calculated through the equation:
%&
P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P (R/A1) + ∑!"  (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏'!&
(1 – P(Di))
(14)

In this equation, the first part combines the detection, communication, delay and
response values to produce an initial macro-state output. For example, in the first part of
the equation: P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P(R/A). Where step 1 multiplies the probability of
detection P(Detection) with the probability of communication P(C). This process produces a
combined value referred to as probability of alarm P(A), represented by the equation:
P(A) = P(D) × P(C).
Step 2 of the EASI equation then multiplies this probability of alarm P(A) with the
probability of the response force arrival prior to the end of an adversary’s action
53

sequence, given an alarm. This probability is summarised as P(R/A), which is a
combination of time remaining on the path after a sensor activates (TR) and response
force arrival time (RFT). To achieve an effective interruption TR – RFT > 0, that is, the
adversary’s task time minus the response forces arrival time must be greater than 0
seconds.

In calculating this aspect of the EASI equation it is assumed that the variables TR and
RFT are independent, and normally distributed around the mean. Therefore the random
variable X = TR – RFT. P(R/A) = * X (Mean) = E (TR) – E (RFT) and +
(TR) + (RFT). Where through statistical assumptions P(R/A) = P (X > 0).

"

,

(Variance)

Furthermore, for two or more sensors the conditional probability of response force
arrival, P (R/A), for each sensor must be calculated as previously described. For
example, for a path with two detection locations, summarized by the equation:
P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P(R/A1) + (1 − P(D1)) × P(D2) × P(C2) × P(R/A2).
(15)
In addition, Step 3 of EASI considers the impact of previous detection opportunities not
detecting, incorporating a joint probability of non-detection across multiple points in a
layered PPS, hence the joint probability of non-detection:
%&
(Di) ∏'!&
(1 – P(Di)).

(16)
As stated above, the EASI equation for calculating (synthesizing all security elements
PKI’s) into a whole system is:
%&
P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P (R/A1) + ∑!" (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏'!&
(1 – P(Di)).

(17)
3.1.13 System effectiveness
As previously stated, response is a combination of, and an interrelationship between
interruption and neutralization (SAND report, 2002, p. 40). Therefore, total systems
effectiveness P(effectiveness) needs to consider the efficacy of a facilities response.
Different threats require different levels and capabilities in response force personnel.
That is, response force capability must be suitable with regards to the anticipated threat.
This response includes the guard’s presence as a deterrent, or delay, and use of either
less lethal and lethal force options. Garcia (2001, p. 227) explains that the decision
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pertaining to the required level of response is a risk management one, based on the
facilities analysed risk requirements. Whilst the constituents of neutralization are
beyond the scope of this thesis, this key performance indicator can be added to the
EASI PPS key performance indicator (Pi) product. According to Adams, et al, (2005, p.
1) this can be summarized by the equation:
P(effectiveness) = P(interruption) × P(neutralization)
(18)
Neutralization is a product of all neutralization sub-system constituents measured
between 0.0 and 1.0.
3.1.14 Relationship of physical protection system functions
The interrelationships between the functions of the PPS (Figure 3.5) commences with
the element of detection, which begins on receipt of the first alarm and ends with
accurate assessment. Nevertheless, as discussed, the delay function must slow down the
adversary to allow the response force enough time to deploy and interject the adversary.
This delay time must be more than the response force time, which is the total time
required for the adversary to accomplish their desired goal. The delay times are the
adversary task times, and this time must be less than the time it takes to respond to be
effective. And, it must be after detection.

Figure 3.5 Interrelationships of physical protection system functions (Garcia, 2006, p.
39).
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Figure 3.5 emphasises the interrelationships of PPS functions. For example, a sensor
activates at time TO, the time at which the alarm is assessed to be valid is labelled TA.
At this point in time, the location of the alarm must be communicated to the response
force. The time at which the response force interrupts the adversary is labelled TI, and
the adversary task completion time is TC. For a PPS to accomplish its objective of
interrupting an adversary, TI, must occur before TC. In addition, detection should occur
as early as possible and TO, TA and TI should be as far to the left on the time axis as
possible (Garcia, 2006, pp. 37-38). According to Adams, et al, (2005; Jang, Kwak, Yoo,
Kim and Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 747) the interrelationships between the constituents, their
elements, and the systems macro-state output depends on a range of complex
phenomenon to successfully interrupt an adversary.

3.2 Defining a physical protection system
Accordant with Bertalanffy (1950, p. 26; 1968, p. 39; Bittel, 1978, p. 1130; Keren,
1979, p. 316; Checkland, 1981, p. 83; Jang, et al, 2008, p. 747) this study argues that a
Physical Protection System is defined as a complex, open system (Figure 3.6), that is, it
is not isolated from its environment. For example, uniform with Bittel (1978, p. 1131) a
PPS relies on its environment for resources such as energy, financial inputs and people,
etc. These inputs are put through a pre-determined process, influenced by the
environment in which they exist towards producing the desired product as the systems
macro-state output. From the product output, for an open system, a feed-back loop is
established and maintained to ensure appropriate energy inputs sustain the system in a
steady state at a distance away from equilibrium.
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Figure 3.6 Open systems approach towards a Physical Protection System (Adjusted
from Garcia, 2001, p. 4; Bittel, 1978, p. 1131).

3.3 Measuring physical protection
The application of systems thinking, that is a functional definition of a system, and the
scientific process of analysis and synthesis enables this thesis’s operational definition of
security to be measured, where the elements of detect, delay and response combined
provide a security systems macro-state measure and perceived deterrence value of the
security system. That is, it is argued that the equation:
%&
(1 – P(Di))
P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P (R/A1) + ∑!" (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏'!&

(P(neutralization)).
(19)
provides the means of measuring the system’s stable condition. Consistent with the
study’s operational definition, this condition stems from the systematic process which
combines people, equipment and procedures to restrict unauthorised access to either
people, information or physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay and
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respond to attacks by a malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of
unauthorised access to a facility. In addition, within the security domains body of
knowledge, anecdotally, the theory of defence in depth is summarized by the formula
“3DR” to summarily represent the inclusion of all defence in depth elements into a
“system”. It is argued this summary is facilitated through the mathematical relationships
established during the analysis and synthesis process required to obtain the systems
macro-state. As such, this thesis adopts the 3DR formula as a means of representing the
elements of defence in depth in summary form.
3.4 Security risk management
In discussing the implementation of Defence in Depth within a systems approach, all
the elements of defence in depth are equally important and must be operated in an
integrated manner. That is, none can be eliminated or compromised if an effective
security system is to be achieved (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 24). However, in
implementing defence in depth economic judgements and pressures are continually
brought to bear on security measures, where pressure is applied at the immediate field
level, setting the costs of defence against the loss (Underwood, 1984, p. x). In setting a
physical security benchmark, that is, determining the required level of key performance
indicators across the system, the objective is to identify an integrated physical security
system design that achieves a cost-effective application of security system resources
(MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 33). Therefore in establishing a Defence in Depth system
individual security measures must be justified where a protection case has been
constructed (Manunta, 2007).

In establishing a Defence in Depth protection case Manunta (2007) explains that such a
justification process requires managers to evaluate security strategies within a costs
benefit analysis framework. Such an analysis incorporates a combination of potential
harm, financial impact and relevant political concerns. Manunta’s (2007) view is
supported by Underwood (1984, p. x; Walker, 1988, p. 18; Cumming’s, 1992, p. 2). For
example, Walker (1988, p. 18) states “the law of diminishing returns applies to the
security function”, where according to Cumming’s (1992, p. 2) the amount of time and
capital spent towards risk control and management depends on the value of the product
being protected. Walker (1988, pp. 18-22) adds, as the value of the asset increases so
does the requirements underpinning a security systems design, where components are
selected based on perceived suitability for the relevant risk environment.
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In practice, to facilitate the manipulation of risk it is necessary to firstly define the
sources and nature of an organisation’s risk exposure. For example, for security risk
management, according to Underwood (1984, p. 1) malevolent attacks against an
organisation saliently stem from two offender typologies:
 Opportunists, those who may watch or notice holes in the desired level of
security and are tempted by their presence;
 Deliberate criminals, those who plan an attack on a security systems highest
level of capability (Underwood, 1984, p. 1).

Garcia (2001, p. 245) supports Underwood’s (1984, p. 1) two type offender typology,
suggesting that the adversary factor is interrelated with the design characteristics of a
PPS. According to Underwood (1984, p. 3) the opportunist is the most common danger
and at times difficult to manipulate as opportunist do not consider an attack based on the
value of gain, but rather in-line with Manunta’s (2007, p. 58) definition of security, that
is, the coincidence of attacker (themselves) and the absence of suitable protection.
McCrie (2004, p. 16) supports such a view, arguing that for opportunity based asset loss
the security controls relationship can be expressed in the formula:
.

 

/00   1
2  

(20)

In protecting a site against opportunistic offenders Mosely and Coleman (2000, p. 101)
suggest that true with the first element of Defence in Depth it is the deterrence value
which is saliently important. However, in contrast to opportunists deliberate offenders
plan an attack against a security system, and may expend skills, time and effort on
planning their assault against the normal level of security (Underwood, 1984, p. 3-4).

Underwood’s (1984) view is supported by Robinson (1999, p. 74) who states, “There
are those people who, through training, extensive experience, firm dedication, and the
promise of significant reward, attack when they perceive the advantage to be on their
side”. These individuals take the necessary time to gather intelligence, know how to
avoid security measures, and when they perceive the risks to be reasonably low and the
rewards reasonably assured make their approach on the system. For example, according
to Underwood (1984, p. 4) it has been known that the degree of pre-planning involved
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for attacks on super-risks such as bullion vaults to take several years in planning and
execution.

In considering a systems approach to physical security, and ultimately security decay, it
is argued that the measures of performance for the system, that is the systems output
goals, must be considered accordant to the systems strategic purpose. For example,
Underwood’s (1984, p. 4) considerations are supported by Garcia (2001, p. 245) who
explains that the adversary factor is strongly interrelated with the effectiveness measure
of the PPS. That is, in applying a systems approach towards developing the objectives
of Defence in Depth, determining the level of 3DR, the designer must understand the
facilities operations and threat (Garcia, 2001, p. 3).

Drawing on HB 167 (2006, pp. 55-56) it is argued the PPS objectives can be determined
based on the traditional security definition of threat, considered as: Threat = Intent X
capability. Intent as a characteristic is considered the motivational factors which drive
someone to wish to penetrate the defences of a facility. In contrast, capability considers
attributes of potential aggressors including their knowledge, skills and resources. In
defining a threat against a Defence in Depth system, it is argued that the capabilities of
the threat must be considered based on a population sample, in relation to their
capability to defeat each element of Defence in Depth within the system.

In determining this threat, HB 167 (2006, pp. 59-60) draws on the Swiss cheese model
to indicate how many layers of security controls will exist within a Defence in Depth
system, where under normal circumstances the holes in each slice of cheese will be
covered up by subsequent layers of controls. The summation of these controls
represents the effectiveness of the system in managing an attack against the system. For
example, Figure 3.7 presents the Swiss cheese model from HB 167 (2006, p. 60). As
such, it is argued that in defining a facilities threat, and therefore developing the
objectives of the system, each functional element’s resilience must be considered within
a population sample.
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Figure 3.7 The Swiss cheese model of a layered security system (HB 167, 2006, p. 60).

3.4.1 Defined threat and the normal curve
The aim is to implement a system which as a sum can repel a defined threat. For
example, according to Weiten (2002, p. A-10) virtually all data sets are characterised by
some variability. Variability relates and refers to how much individual scores tend to
vary or depart from the mean score of a data set. Weiten (2002, p. A-10) provides the
example of golf scores, comparing a mediocre, erratic player against a mediocre,
consistent player. The scores of the consistent player would display less variability than
those of the erratic golfer, where Weiten (2002, p. A 10) points out, a great many traits
and qualities are distributed in a manner which closely resembles a bell shaped cure,
Figure 3.8 which is referred to as The Normal Distribution or Gaussian distribution
(Runyon, Coleman & Pittenger, 2000, p. 119). The horizontal axis shows how far above
or below the mean score is and the vertical axis shows number of cases obtaining each
score. In a normal distribution, most cases fall near the centre of the distribution Figure
3.8, so that 68.26% of cases fall within plus or minus one (1) standard deviation of the
mean. In addition, the score placed on The Normal Distribution can be converted to
percentile scores which indicate the percentage of people who score at or below another
score (Weiten, 2002, p. A-11).
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Figure 3.8 The Normal Distribution (ASCD, 2010).
According to Weiten (2002, p. A-10) the Normal Distribution provides a precise means,
statistically, of measuring how people compare to each other. As such, in determining
the defined threat, it is assumed that the collective skills, knowledge and resources
required to defeat a Defence in Depth system (PPS) also need to be considered based on
a population sample. That is, some threat agents may have the technical knowledge and
skill to defeat intrusion detection systems, yet lack the skills to defeat barriers in a
timely manner, or overcome response personnel. However, by population sample,
others may possess the skills to easily defeat physical barriers and overcome some
lower levels of response, yet do not possess the knowledge and skills to defeat
technology or overpower a higher level armed response.

It is therefore argued that in defining the threat and therefore the systems objectives, a
holistic appreciation is required where a threats collective capabilities are determined
based on their abilities within a population sample to defeat the collective elements of
Defence in Depth. For example, Figure 3.9 indicates how an adversary’s capabilities to
defeat various elements of Defence in Depth layers is considered within a normal
distribution for each layer, where the sum of the defined threat is the sum of the threat’s
capabilities across all element distributions.
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Figure 3.9 the Standard Distribution applied to the Swiss cheese model. (Adjusted from
HB 167, 2006, p. 60; ASCD, 2010).
3.4.2 Defining risk
The application of security principles, techniques and hardware therefore requires that
costs are balanced against the desired effectiveness of the whole system based on an
organisations risk profile (Post, Kingsbury & Schachtsiek, 1991, pp. 97-99). In
establishing an organisation’s security risk profile, Garcia (2001, p. 272) provides a
quantitative definition, defining risk through the formula:
34  ℎ
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According to Garcia (2001, p. 272) risk is score defined in mathematical terms through
the equation:
R = PA × [1-(PI)] × C
(21)
Where;
•

R= Risk

•

PA = Likelihood (threat) of an adversary attack measured between: 0-1.0

•

1 = Vulnerability: the highest the effectiveness can be.

•

Pi = Probability of interruption measured between: 0-1.0

•

C = consequences (criticality) value measured between: 0-1.0
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Garcia’s (2001, p. 272) formula is a measure of PPS performance and does not include
neutralization. This approach is supported by Standards Australia HB167: 2006, which
establishes the security risk management context as a combination of threat assessment,
vulnerability assessment and criticality assessment (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 14).
Where according to HB 167 (2006, p. 62) vulnerability can be based on an assessment
of the effectiveness of the controls in managing the threat’s interaction with the critical
asset.

In discussing the resource requirements and output product of an open system, Olzak
(2006, p. 1) suggests “which security layers to implement and to what extent is a risk
management decision”. Therefore, the total cost of the security system is determined
within the theory of defence in depth by the degree of security control required to
achieve the amount of time delay judged necessary after detection, to facilitate an
appropriate response in relation to the risk of the asset being protected (Post, Kingsbury
& Schachtsiek, 1991, p. 89; Garcia, 2001, p. 272). It is argued that these controls must
be implemented to achieve a steady state risk reduction capability. For example,
according to McClure (1997, p. 4) effective security refers to a state where, the need for
security has been established, its role defined and the appropriate amount of protection
achieved. McClure (1997, p. 4) explains that an effective security state exists when the
level of risk exposure is reduced, through various means, to a level that is acceptable to
the organisation.

In addition, Spencer (1998, p. 2) suggests the costs/benefits associated with the
implementation of specific measures can be measured against the reduction in
vulnerability. As the level of vulnerability decreases, a decision may be made where the
system has reached the point of “acceptable risk” below which decision makers are
willing to accept the remaining vulnerability as additional system measures are not
justifiable. The sum of this literature is supported by McCrie (2004, p. 16) who explains
that either vulnerability or negligence (opportunity) eventually result in a security loss
event.
3.4.3 Establishing a steady state physical protection system
In applying the systems literature to physical security, such an approach includes the
component resources of people, techniques, procedures, design features, materials and
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educational programs integrated to construct a holistic security program (Post,
Kingsbury & Schachtsiek, 1991, p. 23). Based on the available literature, it is therefore
argued that in line with the theory of defence in depth and the justification of security
measures within a cost benefit frame work, the situation can be represented in
mathematical terms, where from a functional approach to security the relationship can
be summarized as:
7 1 

∑ 89:
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(22)
That is, for an effective state of security to be achieved, a security system must
demonstrate effectiveness in response to a facilities analysed risk level based on its
defined threat (Garcia, 2006, p. 30), which must consider Underwood’s (1984, p. 1) two
offender typology. The defined threat can be more than one level or group. As such,
system effectiveness varies with a threat’s capability. Therefore a system would perform
differently against low, medium and high threats agents.

A PPS functions by combining people and equipment into an integrated system of
subsystems along an adversary path (Garcia, 2001, p. 61). An adversary path is an
ordered series of activities against a facility which if completed results in successful
theft, sabotage or other malevolent outcome (Garcia, 2001, p. 242). The objective of a
PPS is to achieve balanced protection defined by Garcia (2001, p. 60) as, ‘a system
when, regardless of the adversary path chosen, effective elements will be encountered,
where, the minimum time to penetrate each of the barriers would be equal, and the
minimum probability of detecting penetration of each of these barriers should be equal”.
There are potentially many adversary paths within a facility. The critical path is the one
with the lowest probability of interruption, therefore the critical path characterises the
effectiveness of the overall protection system in detecting, delaying and interrupting an
adversary (Garcia, 2001, p. 247).

In addition, according to Underwood (1984, p. 3) the daily levels of security inevitably
rise and fall in operation. Based on such real world fluctuations, it is argued that
consistent with Martin’s (2000, p. 210) percentage of fluctuations in relation to a steady
state, a zone of tolerance, that is, a preset threshold level to characterise a steady state,
should be established within the system towards ensuring the sequential strategy
continually communicates to offenders that EUoffence > EUlegal + U taste.
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The theory of Defence in Depth, which this study argues needs to be implemented
within an open systems frame, delivers; effective risk based decisions, enhanced
operational effectiveness, and a reduction in overall risks and costs (Trusted Information
Sharing Network, 2008, p. 2). According to Garcia (2001, p. 277) the use of the risk
equation (Garcia, 2001, p. 272) and Pi (systems performance measure) will enable
effective cost-benefit decisions to be made towards implementing security controls
which reduce an organisations risk to an acceptable level. For example, Figure 3.10
highlights from an open systems frame the level of desired security implemented based
on the risk equation and PPS system performance measure. Such parameters can be
achieved whilst being cognizant of maintaining a system’s deterrent value during daily
fluctuations. Based on this approach, uniform with the objectives of other open systems
(Honkasalo, 1998, p. 135) the overall aim of a PPS is to reach a steady state where the
flow of energy is constant and the increase of entropy is at a minimum. This steady state
condition according to Roos (1997, p. 6) implies an exchange of either matter or energy
within the environment, such that there is a balance of inputs, outputs and internal
processes.
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Figure 3.10: implemented security levels diagram, adopted from the literature of
Underwood (1984; Martin, 2000, p. 210; Garcia, 2001, 2006; Pidwirny, 2006; Standards
Australia HB167 Security Risk Management, 2006).

In addition, there are varying states of the facility, which affect the security system
where accordant with the open systems characteristic of equifinality, for a PPS this
desired level of security (steady state) can be reached from different conditions
depending on the changing system parameters. That is, consistent with Figure 2.5 (see
Section 2.2.6.2) a desired Pi can be reached via a symmetric approach to implementing
desired security controls, an initial overshoot where the levels of security are initially
above that which is required for the assessed risk state, or a fake start where the desired
level of security does not meet the required levels of security and therefore further
controls are added to the system to achieve the desired level steady state condition of
the PPS.
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3.5 Conclusion
The chapter presented the second stage of phase one of the study; establishing an open
systems benchmark within a physical security context. This chapter established a
documentary benchmark for considering an open systems approach to Physical
Protection Systems (PPS). For example, Bertalanffy (1950, p. 139) states that “General
Systems Theory is a logico-mathematical discipline, which is in itself formal, but
applicable to all sciences concerned with systems”, where in-line with the available
literature, the study purports that a Physical Protection System (PPS) is a complex open
system, and subjected to the laws and principles of science which govern systems of all
types.

Central to the establishment of an open systems approach to security risk management
within a physical security context is the design, implementation and management of
Physical Protection System (PPS). A PPS aims to provide a level of desired risk
reduction commensurate to a facility’s defined threat, where measures exist to ascertain
such a level of efficacy. Within this open systems frame the processes of analysis and
synthesis within and between the various PPS elements and their constituents’ indicates,
through mathematics, that all constituents within a PPS have a direct relationship with
the systems macro-state. This macro-state is based on a desired level of security risk
reduction, where a desired level of interruption is achieved through incorporating
various measures of constituents through their ability to add to the systems capability to
detect, delay and respond to unauthorised access events. In this chapter it was argued
that through Defence in Depth’s sequential combination the systems “deterrence” set
would be established. The benefit of such a quantitative approach is the establishment
of a security benchmark for considering security decay within an open systems frame.
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CHAPTER 4

PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM DECAY

4.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the third stage of phase one of the study; establishing an open
systems framed benchmark for considering physical security decay. This chapter brings
forward the writings from chapters two and three to establish a benchmark for
considering physical security system decay. Section 4.1 provides a discussion on
physical system degradation, including the laws of thermodynamics. Specifically how
the orderly relationships within Defence in Depth elements and their constituents,
established utilizing systems thinking to achieve an effective macro-state (Pi), can be
impeded by the concept of entropy.

Section 4.2 presents a discussion on entropy and its negative effects on physical system
effectiveness. This discussion highlights how entropy relates to every single physical
activity that human kind engages in, and specifically how it relates to the degradation of
Physical Protection Systems (PPS). Section 4.3 presents the theory of entropic security
decay, the sensitivity within a Physical Protection System (PPS) and the effects of
entropic security decay. Section 4.4 presents the measurement of security decay. Section
4.5 provides a discussion on security decay and risk management, and the effects of
decay on critical path. Section 4.6 presents a discussion on avoiding and countering
entropic security decay. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.

4.1 Physical system degradation
In establishing a benchmark for system degradation/decay, this study draws on the
writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) who argue that all
physical systems, if left to themselves, tend to maximise their entropy, concordant with
the laws of thermodynamics. Entropy is discussed within the system literature and is a
concept derived from a metric defined as a measure of disorder in a system and a
process characterised with: decay, disintegration, running down, becoming disordered
(Bohm & Peat, 2000, p. 137; Herman, 1999, p. 86; Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 42), and in all
irreversible processes, entropy must increase (Bertalanffy, 1968, pp. 41-42). For a
system, as entropy increases (its entropy level) capability decreases, based on the
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argument that systems rely on order and cohesion. Entropy is the combination of the
Greek word “tropos”, which means transformation or evolution, and “energy”. The term
entropy was first used in the middle of the eighteenth century by Rudolf Clausius and is
a quantity to measure the level of evolution of a physical system, but can be used to
measure the ‘disorder” of a system (Vannini, 2005, p. 94).

The literature embodying systems thinking (GST) discusses the concept of entropy and
its negative effects on system sustainability (Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 23; 1968, p. 39;
Keren, 1979, p. 312; Checkland, 1981, p. 83; Styer, 2000, p. 1; Midgley, 2003, p. 182;
Pidwirny, 2006; Morales- Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla & Badillo-Pina, 2010, pp. 7576), where according to Callister (1997, p. 482) entropy increases with increasing
disorder. The principle of entropy introduces into physics the idea of irreversible
processes, such as that energy always moves from a state of high potential to a state of
low potential, tending to a state of equilibrium (Vannini, 2005, p. 93).

In discussing the concept of irreversibility Price (2003, p. 3) explains that as a concept,
irreversibility relates to the thermodynamic arrow, or, arrow of time. The arrow is
concerned with the seemingly irreversibility of many common physical phenomenon.
Physical processes at the microscopic level are believed to be time symmetric. This
approach means that the theoretical statements that describe them remain true if the
direction of time is reversed; however, when physical processes at the macroscopic
level are described this is not the case. The thermodynamic arrow of time considers that
in an isolated system, entropy increases with time. As entropy can be considered a
measure of microscopic disorder, according to the second law of thermodynamics time
is asymmetrical, as it relates to the amount of order in an isolated system. As time
increases, a system statistically moves towards a state of disorder. That is, entropy
evolves in only one direction, towards death and the elimination of any form of
organization and structure (Vannini, 2005, p. 94).

However, the concept of entropy is tremendously difficult to grasp and is a concept
previously discussed within the field of physics (Styer, 2000, p. 1; Lovey & Manohar,
2007, p. 99). In applying the concept of entropy Rifkin (1982, p. 8) explains that the
laws of thermodynamics provide the overarching scientific frame for the unfolding of
all physical activity in the world. Rifkin’s (1982, p. 8) view is supported by Soddy
(cited in Rifkin, 1982, p. 8) who states, “every single physical activity that humankind
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engages in is totally subject to the iron clad imperatives expressed in the first and
second laws of thermodynamics, where according to Rifkin (1982, p. 6) the entropy law
is the second law of thermodynamics.
4.1.1 The laws of thermodynamics
The science of thermodynamics provides a general framework of ideas which facilitates
the understanding of particular systems (Adkins, 1975, p. 2) and was developed as a
means of describing physical systems during the nineteenth century. Thermodynamics
is primarily concerned with the interchange of energy and its expression as either work
or heat (Roos, 1997, p. 5). A thermodynamic system is that portion of the universe
which is selected for investigation (Atkins, 1986, p. 2). For example, according to Oster
and Desoer (1971, p. 221) an electrical network is a non-equilibrium thermodynamic
system.

The science of thermodynamics sets out to describe and correlate the directly observable
properties of substances; the volume of gas, the expansion of a wire; the polarization of
a dialectic wire. These are all macroscopic quantities, properties of materials in bulk.
The laws of thermodynamics enable people to interrelate the macroscopic quantities
without making microscopic assumptions. The avoidance of commitment to any
particular microscopic interpretations means thermodynamics is not limited to particular
applications. However, it is possible to associate particular macroscopic behaviour with
certain general kinds of microscopic change (Atkins, 1986, p. 2).
4.1.2 The first law of thermodynamics
The first law of thermodynamics is a conservation law, the law of conservation of
energy. This law states “all matter and energy in the universe is constant, it cannot be
created or destroyed, only transformed from one state to another, where only its form
can be changed but never its essence” (Landsberg, 1956, pp. 365-374; Rifkin, 1982, p.
7; p. 78; Dillon, 1983, p. 65), where according to Roos (1997, p. 5) work is done in the
process, therefore work, heat and energy are convertible.

In discussing thermodynamics Midgley (2003, p. 171) explains that matter is anything
which has mass (M) and occupies space. Energy (E) is defined in physics as the ability
to do work. Matter may have (a) kinetic energy, when it is moving and exerts force on
other matter, (b) potential energy, because of its position in a gravitational field, or (c)
rest-mass energy which is the energy that would be released if mass were converted into
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energy. The relation between mass and energy is expressed by the equation: E = 2 ,
where c is the speed of light, m is the mass and e is the energy (Vannini, 2005, p. 96).
Mass and energy are equivalent. One can be converted into the other in accordance with
the relation that rest-mass energy is equal to the mass times the square of the velocity of
light. This is the principle of the first law of thermodynamics (Midgley, 2003, p. 171).
4.1.3 The second law of thermodynamics
According to Midgley (2003, p. 173), Gibbs (1902) formulated the second law of
thermodynamics, the law of degradation of energy. This second law (the entropy law)
states “matter and energy can only be changed in one direction, that is, from an
available to unavailable, or from an ordered to disordered state (Landsberg, 1956, pp.
374-385; Rifkin, 1982, p. 6; p. 78). That is, when transforming energy part is lost to the
environment. When energy lost to the environment is distributed in a uniform way, a
state of equilibrium is reached where it is no longer possible to transform energy into
work. Entropy measures how close a system is to its state of equilibrium, and is a
measure of the quantity of energy which is lost to the environment (Vannini, 2005, p.
93). As such, Herman (1999, p. 86) broadly defines entropy as the steady degradation
of a system—where entropy increases within a system, capability decreases—based on
the argument that systems rely on order and cohesion.
4.1.4 The third law of thermodynamics
The third law of thermodynamics is derived from the second law and is the law of
disorder. This law states “within an isolated system entropy cannot diminish. That is,
the dissipation of energy is an irreversible process, since dissipated energy cannot be
recaptured and used again, and that the entropy of an isolated system can only increase
until it reaches a state of equilibrium since isolated systems cannot receive information
or energy from outside” (Vannini, 2005, p. 93). According to Bertalanffy (1977 cited in
Vannini, 2005, p. 98) information is any element which reduces entropy, suggesting
information can take the form of a project, an organisation, a structure, or generally a
system, and was referred to as neg-entropy; negative entropy.
4.2 Entropy
Entropy as a concept is a state function of a system (Roos, 1997, p. 5). A state is a
description of the system in terms of its properties at any instant time. When a system
changes from one state to another the difference in properties depend solely on the
states and not on the manner, or pathway by which the change occurred. According to
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Rifkin (1982, p. 6) in essence, the second law says that everything in the entire universe
begins with structure and value and is irrevocably moving in the direction of random
chaos and waste. For example, the laws of physics state disorder must always increase,
as in classical physics the laws of nature are perfectly time-reversible, where all of the
processes people see occurring do so in one direction only, as reversal would go against
the laws of statistical probabilities (the second law of thermodynamics) (Felder, 2001, p.
1). That is, total entropy of the universe can never decrease, as according to Lovey and
Manohar (2007, p. 99) this law states that transformations of one form of energy into
another in natural process is accompanied by a loss because of increasing entropy.
Entropy is therefore a measure of the extent to which available energy in any subsystem
of the universe is transformed into an unavailable form.

Whilst the second law of thermodynamics states, “all energy in a system moves from an
available to unavailable or from an ordered to a disordered state”, the minimum entropy
state is one where order and concentration are highest and available energy is at its
maximum (Rifkin, 1982, pp. 42-78). As such, an entropy increase results in a decrease
in “available” energy (Rifkin, 1982, p. 35). Whilst entropy in closed systems is always
positive, as closed systems rely on disordered states, where order is continually
destroyed, in open systems the production of entropy is negative (Bertalanffy, 1968, p.
41).

In discussing the positive and negative aspects of entropy Bertalanffy (1968, p. 39)
explains that entropy in a closed system is considered a measure or probability, and
therefore a closed system tends towards a state of most probable distributions
(Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 39). For example, according to Bertalanffy (1968, p. 39) when
considering temperature as an example of a system’s macro-state, the most probable
distribution of molecules having different velocities, is a state of complete disorder.
That is, it is highly improbable to have all the fast molecules, high in temperature on the
right side of a room, and all of the slow moving molecules (low in temperature) on the
left. So the tendency is towards maximum entropy, where the most probable distribution
is the tendency towards maximum disorder.
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4.2.1 Microscopic/macroscopic relationship

In discussing entropy further, Felder (1999, p. 2) explains that it is a relationship
between macroscopic and microscopic quantities within a system, a view supported by
Bohm and Peat (2000, p. 137) who discuss the role and influence of constituents within
a system utilizing temperature as an example. According to Bohm and Peat (2000, p.
137) the temperature of a system defines a macro state, whereas the kinetic energy of
each molecule in the system defines a microstate. In this example the macro state
variable is recognized as an expression of the average of the microstate variables, an
average of kinetic energy for the system. Based on this example, if the molecules of a
gas (microstate) move faster, they have more kinetic energy resulting in the temperature
(macro state) rising (having direct affect on the macro state) (Bohm & Peat, 2000, p.
137).

According to Felder (1999, p. 2) the micro state of a system consists of a complete
description of the state of all constituent element of the system, whereas the macro state
consists of a description of a few macroscopically measurable quantities. As such, for
any macro state of the system there are possibly many different microstates. Therefore
the entropy of a system in a particular macro state can be defined as the number of
possible microstates that the system might be in.
4.2.2 System effectiveness
The science of thermodynamics enables the quantity known as entropy to be measured
objectively in terms of the amount of heat and work that is associated with a system, as
left to itself a physical system tends to maximise its entropy accordant with the laws of
thermodynamics (Lovey & Manohar, 2007, p. 99; Styer, 2000, p. 1). For example,
Bohm and Peat (2000, pp. 138-139) explain the concept of entropy in an isolated system
of interacting particles. Each particle within such a system acts as a contingency for all
others in a way where the overall motion tends to be chaotic. When such systems are
left to themselves they move towards what is referred to as thermal equilibrium, a
condition resulting in zero net flow of heat or energy within the system and regular
suborders vanishing almost entirely. In this state of equilibrium, the entropy of the
system is at its maximum.

Maximum entropy is associated with a systems inability to carry out work, transfer
useful energy from one region to another or in any other way, and generate global
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orders of activity. Motz and Weaver (1989, p. 168) suggests that all systems strive
towards disorder, which when achieved the system will be in a state of equilibrium.
Complete equilibrium in a system results in the death of the system. According to Coole
and Brooks (2009, p. 22), for a system the situation can be represented by the formula:
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(Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 22).
4.2.3 Entropy within an open systems frame
According to Midgley (2003, p. 39) traditionally physics only dealt with closed systems,
as such, physicist argued the laws of thermodynamics only apply to closed systems, in
particular the second law (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 39). For example, as a closed system
moves towards equilibrium energy is converted to work, but as it approaches
equilibrium, the available energy decreases. However, Roos (1997, p. 13) explains that
there are systems which by their nature are not closed. In addition, to maximise work
output from a system a steady state is preferable, where the system is maintained in
pseudo-equilibrium by new inputs and the removal of outputs.

The expansion of physics to include open systems frames has enabled the generalization
of the second law of thermodynamics to include open systems. In open systems there
exists the production of entropy due to irreversible processes, which is also negative.
However, open systems maintain themselves in a steady state which can therefore avoid
the increase in entropy, and may even develop towards states of increased order and
organization (Midgley, 2003, pp. 40-41). In an open system, the system can be
maintained in the pseudo-equilibrium state provided inputs approximately match
outputs. Energy is required to prevent increase in entropy to prevent the system running
down (Roos, 1997).
4.2.3.1 Prigogine’s open systems approach to entropy
The earlier extension and generalization of thermodynamical theory was the work of
Prigogine (Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 26). Prigogine (1987) proposed a way of defining
complex systems, arguing that a wide class of systems existed which he referred to as
dissipative systems, which tended to loos energy over time. This loss energy according
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to Prigogine (1987, p. 98) cannot be regained, as the processes that dissipative systems
went through were irreversible in time-they were path dependent. Prigogine (1987, p.
98) argued that any system which tended to loos energy over time, fairly quickly
reached thermodynamic equilibrium. As such, complex dissipative systems must make
up for their loss of energy by importing new energy from their environment and
exporting accumulated entropy.

Prigogine focused his attention on irreversible thermodynamics and particularly on
specific phenomenon which are far from equilibrium (Dillon, 1983, p. 119). Prigogine
was able to show mathematically and through experiment that in near equilibrium
conditions a natural physical system acts to minimise entropy production (Meara, 2005,
p. 9). According to Prigogine (1950, p. 99) steady states in open systems are 1) not
defined by maximum entropy, but by the approach of minimum entropy production; 2)
entropy may decrease in such systems; 3) the steady states with minimum entropy
production are , in general stable. Therefore, if one of the system variables is altered, the
system manifests changes in the opposite direction.

According to Prigogine (1947 cited in Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 26; 1968, p. 144), the total
change of entropy in an open system can be written as: 7   S +  S. Where  S
denotes the change of entropy by import,  S denotes the production of entropy due to

irreversible processes in the system. The term  S is always positive, according to the

second law of thermodynamics however,  S may be negative, as well as positive.
Therefore the total change in entropy in an open system can be negative as well as
positive.

Nevertheless, according to Midgley ( 2003, p. xxviii) Prigogine’s theory suggests that
while in most of the universe there is movement towards entropy (equilibrium, or the
even distribution of energy) there are islands of structures (negentropic systems) that
concentrate and maintain their energy levels for periods of time and exists in states far
from equilibrium. Prigogine’s (1950; 1987) theory of dissipative structures focuses on
the importance of bifurcations. Bifurcation points are places at which the solution to
various equations may, at a particular point, offer more than one possible solution
(Dillon, 1983, p. 119).
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Prigogine’s (1950; 1987) view is the idea that systems reach points of relative instability
where they may take alternative directions, and even the tiniest influences may have a
major effect on the future direction of the system (Midgley, 2003, p. xxviii). In the
Prigogine analysis bifurcation points are very important, if an equation was describing
some physical condition of the system, at the bifurcation point two options are
presented. If the system proceeds along option A, its structure and functions may be
quite different than if B had been selected. It is considered that in a complicated system
there might well be whole series of Bifurcation points (Dillon, 1983, p. 119).
Prigogine’s (1950; 1987) theory argues dissipative structures are able to circumvent the
second law by being open, or energy-processing in character. They feed throughputs of
energy to sustain order or negative entropy and can remain in a sustained condition of
disequilibrium (Morales-Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla & Badillo-Pina, 2010, pp. 75-76).

Throughout history technologies and institutions have served as transformers of energy;
facilitating the flow of energy from the environment through to human’s social system
(Rifkin, 1982, p. 94). The various technologies and institutions which humans have
developed are a reflection of the kinds of energy environments which they have lived in.
This reflection is because different energy environments require different types of
transformers. Rifkin (1982, p. 263) states “the greatest physicist A.S. Edington, hailed
the entropy law as the supreme law of nature”, where according to Schrodiyer (cited in
Rifkin, 1982, p. 5) every living thing in the world survives by drawing from its
environment negative entropy.
4.2.4 The isomorphism of entropy
In applying the concept of entropy to the state of various systems, the validity of its
isomorphic application must first be considered and established. According to MoralesMatamoros, et al, (2009, p. 72) despite the variety of specific systems and their
complexity, there are universal laws of various phenomena which are essential to our
understanding of systems generally. Schaefer, et al, (1977, p. 12) explains that there are
interdisciplinary properties of General System Theory, including hierarchical structure,
stability, teology, differentiation, approach to and maintenance of steady states, goal
directedness etc. Such interdisciplinary properties means that in many research fields,
the systems approach has turned out to be the optimal and most powerful tool for
systematic analysis (Byeon, 2005, p. 223), where according to Byeon (1999, p. 284)
entropy is a term that whilst originated in thermodynamics is applicable to all systems.
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The concept of entropy has been seen as a foundational concept in many current
research trends, especially in contemporary systems theory. Although the term
originated in the field of thermodynamics, it has both theoretical and mathematical
interpretations, as well as wide spread applications in other disciplines (Byeon, 2005, p.
224). According to Byeon (2005, p. 224) a large number of useful terms and concepts
have been transported into other disciplines from their original discipline. Since its
original inception by Clausius in classical thermodynamics, entropy has witnessed a
series of subsequent incarnations. As such, according to Bailey (1990 cited in Byeon,
2005, p. 224) the term entropy can be used as long as it is qualified by a prefix, as in,
social entropy. This approach enables various isomorphic applications of entropy to be
differentiated from Clausius’ entropy, or Boltzmann’s’ entropy, or biological entropy,
or any other concept which lacks certain prefix.

In considering the isomorphic aspects of entropy, according to Midgley (2003, pp. 7475) there are instances in many sciences where the techniques and general structure
bears an intimate resemblance to similar techniques and structures in other fields. That
is, a one-to-one correspondence between objects which preserves the relationships
between the objects is called an isomorphism. In considering the isomorphic aspects of
entropy, Roos (1997, p. 16) argues that it is scientifically acceptable for one discipline
to borrow concepts from another discipline. Such a process has resulted in important
theoretical innovations. As stated by Atkins (1986, p. 2) “the avoidance of commitment
to any particular microscopic interpretations means thermodynamics is not limited to
particular applications”.

As such, the concept of entropy is becoming increasingly popular and used to discuss
the state of various systems, see Rifkin, (1982; Herman, 1999; King, 2008; and Lovey
& Nadkarni, 2007). For example, the second law of thermodynamics (entropy law) has
been applied to many domains including information security (King, 2008),
organisational systems (Lovey & Nadkarni, 2007), combat systems (Herman, 1999),
communications, biology, economics, sociology, psychology, political science and art
(Rifkin, 1982, p. 263). It is argued by this thesis that a PPS is a complex, open system,
dependent on its elements, each element’s constituents and their interrelationships
through systematic application. Entropy is a concept conceived to discuss the
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degradation, disorder and decay within a system relating to a systems ability to carry out
work.

The study argues due to the isomorphic aspects of science and the literature applying
entropy to open systems, following the path of GST the concept of entropy can be
applied to a PPS to discuss the gradual degradation, disorganisation and decay of and
within a PPS. That is, security decay can be explained in terms of an entropy state. The
theory of entropic security decay recognises that entropy processes exist in PPS, where
we can distinguish both a given entropy state at a particular time, and how the general
processes of entropy increase and decrease over time.
4.3 The theory of entropic security decay
Consistent with the isomorphic principles of science (Bertalanffy, 1950; 1968) this
study discusses and draws on the literature relating to systems theory within an open
systems frame, Defence in Depth, and the science of thermodynamics to present a
theory for explaining and measuring PPS degradation over time. The theory of entropic
security decay was conceived within grounded theory principles, where according to
Strauss and Corbin (1990 cited in Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 266) grounded theories
are those inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon they represent.

The theory of entropic security decay has been conceived, developed and provisionally
verified through systematic data collection and analysis of published literature relating
to the gradual degradation in the efficiency and effectiveness of a security system. This
development was achieved through the identification of the interrelationship between
the concepts of Defence in Depth, the systems approach applied to implementing
Defence in Depth and the science of thermodynamics, specifically the concept of
entropy. In applying this literature, it is argued that the system, mapped out, with its key
performance indicators provides a framework for defining and measuring entropic
decay within PPS.

Congruous with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950, p. 26; 1968, p. 39; Bittel, 1978, p.
1130; Keren, 1979, p. 316; Checkland, 1981, p. 83; Corning, 1995, p. 93; Skyttner,
1996, p. 43; Midgley, 2003, p. 386; Sheard & Mostashari, 2008, p. 296; MoralesMatamoros, et al, 2009, p. 72) this study defined a Physical Protection System (PPS) as
a complex, open system. Such systems have a large number of interacting components
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with non-linear coupling and significant interactions with their environment, depending
on it for resources to maintain its product goal. A PPS transforms energy into (1) a
product or services towards the detecting, delaying and responding to unauthorised
intrusions (2), the product or service results from the exchange of energy between
system constituents, individuals and groups towards achieving the protection goal. In
light of the available literature, this thesis applies the concept of entropy within an open
systems frame to discuss the natural and foreseeable decaying effects on such a system
(PPS).

King (2008, p. 1) initially introduced the concept of entropy into the security literature.
According to King (2008, p. 1) security controls inevitably degrade over time, where
such “security system degradation is the result of such systems suffering from natural
entropy”. Honkasalo (1998, p. 136) explains that degradation measures the irreversible
increase of entropy, which is the amount of usefulness lost. King’s (2008, p. 1)
statements introduce and applies the concept of entropy to the security domain body of
literature. King’s (2008, p. 1) view is abstractly supported by Howlet (1995, p. 222)
who adds, even the best systems will deteriorate over time and use. The isomorphic
application of entropy to a PPS is supported by Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) who
assert, various systems suffer from entropy. The application of the second law of
thermodynamics, specifically the concept of entropy, to a PPS re-introduces the
concepts of degradation and decay into the security risk management literature.

The argument that security controls can degrade over time reducing their commissioned
levels of risk treatment was first considered by Underwood (1984), who referred to this
as decaying security, stating, “Security Decay is the most serious threat to a security
system”, and that “security decay must be expected”, “avoided”, and “countered”
(Underwood, 1984, p. xi). Decay is defined as a “gradual decline” in health, prosperity
or excellence, a process of decline or deterioration (Collins Australian Pocket
Dictionary of English Language, 1994), or less good or less strong (The New Oxford
School Dictionary, 1991), based on these definitions, as a systems entropy level
increases, system decay increases.

System degradation results from entropy production which reduces the efficiency and
effectiveness within a system, impeding it to achieve its output goal (Bohm & Peat,
2000, p. 137). However, according to Denbigh (2009, p. 4) for entropy to have an effect
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on a system it must have initially been considered orderly, where orderliness is capable
of being quantitatively stated. For a system to be defined as orderly, its elements must
be appropriately distributed in space and/or time, where the rule of orderliness states
that a set of three or more objects will display a certain orderliness if they exist in a
linear arrangement, for example objects A, B and C. In this context, the objects obey the
rule as B is to the right of A, and C is to the right of B, etc. In addition, the same objects
will display the kind of orderliness if a relationship also exists between successive
separations AB, BC, AC, etc, resulting in a more comprehensive state of order.

The study argues that entropy relates to a security system as the Defence in Depth
functions must be performed in their sequential order and within a length of time, which
is less than the time required for the adversary to complete their task (Garcia, 2001, p.
6). These functional requirements of Defence in Depth are distributed in space and/or
time according to Denbigh’s (2009, p. 4) entropy rule. The available literature indicates
that the space and time distribution of the defence in depth elements create a
comprehensive state of order in relation to a PPS macro level of effectiveness. The
micro states within Defence in Depth include the constituents within the elements of
deter, detect, delay, and response, which may be considered a linear arrangement
(Denbigh, 2009, p. 4; Garcia, 2001, p. 6) Deterrence (element A) is linear to detection
(element B), which is linear to delay (element C) followed by a linear response (element
D).

Orderliness also exists within a PPS (Denbigh, 2009, p. 4) for example, deterrence.
Deterrence is achieved by altering the cost benefit analysis of a rational choosing
adversary (Singh, 2005). Within a PPS each function of the defence in depth strategy
within this linear relationship must be achieved in their sequential order, achieving
deterrence through systematic application of detect, delay, response (Garcia, 2006, p.
240) and recovery, in this sequential combination. Deterrence is related to an
adversary’s chances of being detected (B), the difficulty in achieving their goal (C), and
the chances of getting caught (D). Therefore deterrence has an orderly relationship with
all other elements within a PPS, being A=BCD.

In addition, another orderliness relationship exists between response (D) and detection
(B). Response is an organisations means of interrupting an adversary before they
achieve their goal; however, for response to be achieved there must be knowledge that
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an attack is underway (detection). Therefore a relationship exists between response and
detection, namely B×D. Further delay is the means by which the facility provides their
response force with enough time to interrupt an adversary. Therefore delay has an
additional kind of orderly relationship with response, C×D. Furthermore, each element
of defence in depth has a vertical relationship with its constituents, which combined
provides the specific capability for that element within the linear relationship.

Coole and Brooks (2009) argued that for the system of Defence in Depth to be effective,
the relationships between the constituents and elements must be orderly and each
constituent must be at its desired level of effectiveness. That is, for a PPS a time
penetration continuum exists (Figure 4.1) based on this integrated systems approach
incorporating the elements of defence in depth linear, orderly relationships, and the
elements constituents vertical orderly relationships.

Figure 4.1 Defence in Depth time penetration continuum (Adjusted from Garcia, 2001,
pp. 6-7).
Such a process is based on the definition of entropy offered by Bohm and Peat (2000, p.
137; Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 42; Herman, 1999, p. 86; Rifkin, 1982, p.8), where
degradation and disorder within and between elements increases, decay increases and
capability decreases.
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4.3.1 System sensitivity
In applying the concept of entropy to Physical Protection Systems (PPS), the available
literature states “a security system is only as good as its parts, when a single part fails,
this failure can cause degradation within the total system” (Konicek & Little, 1997, p.
184: King, 2008, p. 1). Garcia (2006, p. 29) supports this view, stating “system
effectiveness can become degraded through the reduction in effectiveness of individual
components” (microstates). These views are consistent with the literature relating to,
and discussing the principles of systems theory, where according to Waldman (2007, p.
272) if part of a system is changed, the nature of the overall system is often changed as
well. Midgley (2003, p. xxviii) expands on such a view stating, “even the tiniest
influences may have a major effect on the future direction of the system”.

These views are consistent with Lorenz’s (1968) findings, technically termed
“sensitivity to initial conditions”, meaning that any difference in input into a system, no
matter how small, will eventually produce enormous differences in output (Warren,
Franklin & Streeter, 1998, p. 363). According to Jang, et al, (2009, p. 750) for a PPS the
sensitivity value is defined as the change of the Pi according to increments of detection
probability and/or delay time along an adversary’s path. However, this study contends
that response force aspects such as time are also included in this sensitivity value. In
addition, the sensitivity of the system is also related to the location of detection
capabilities along an adversary’s path.

Such sensitivity considerations are consistent with Dillon’s (1983, p. 119) views
suggesting within a complicated system such as a PPS there are a whole series of
Bifurcation points. Such a focus on the relationships between the micro and macro
states within a security system towards maintaining system effectiveness is supported
by King (2008, p. 1) who states “it is the gradual erosion of seemingly minor security
controls which eventually lead to major incidents”. It is this aspect of GST that applies
the concept of entropy to discuss the health of PPS.

Lorenz’s (1963; 1968) work described how small changes occur at a specific point
(point disturbance) in a system, which then expand to the boundaries of the areas for
which they occupy. Consistent with Lorenz’s (1963; 1968) works, entropic decay theory
purports that constituent decay enters the systems at a specific point, regardless of
aetiology, then manifests itself at this specific point in the PPS along an adversary’s
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attack path, then in line with the established relationships between the elements of
Defence in Depth, propagates through the remainder of the system along this attack
path, directly reducing the systems macro-state measure (Pi). Such a scientific, systems
approach to analysing the whole was supported by the early works of Isaac Newton who
stated, “the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of every object
depends on the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of its
component parts (The Open University, 1976, p. 68).
4.3.2 The effects of entropic decay on a PPS
This study’s interpretation of the effects of entropy, specifically from a point
disturbance, is abstractly supported by Howlet (1995, p. 220) who explains that a poorly
maintained security system will have many unexplained alarms leading to the guard
force losing their confidence in the system and eventually ignoring a true alarm as just
another false alarm. As such, this study contends that consistent with Lorenz’s (1968;
Warren, et al, 1998, p. 363; Midgley, 2003, p. xxviii; Howlet, 2005; Waldman, 2007;
Jang, et al, 2009, p. 750) works, the original decay, located within the detection element
(point disturbance), expands to the boundaries of the detection elements key
performance indicator, resulting in a failure to effectively detect the threat. This failure
to detect the threat, due to the interrelationships between the defence in depth elements,
results in the system becoming disordered ultimately resulting in this point disturbance
propagating through the remainder of the defence in depth system.

Drawing on the assumption that an immediate response to an event exists, either by
guards or law enforcement, It is argued that such decay propagation, manifested in high
nuisance alarm rates impedes on the human factor within the system reducing the
effectiveness of the alarm assessment (PA) key performance indicator. As this
breakdown in the various subsystem key performance indicators propagates throughout
the remainder of the system it removes the probability of guard force communication
(PC) performance indicator, resulting in the guard force never being dispatched,
meaning the delay time becomes diminished. Based on the notion of an integrated
system, subject to entropy, It is proposed that the macro-state effect of this point
disturbance results in the adversary not being interrupted, therefore achieving their
desired goal, resulting in the adversary defeating the defence in depth system due to
decay manifested in the first element.
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For example, to be effective, a detection capability must ensure its sensors are correct
for their application, installed correctly, have a low nuisance alarm rate and be difficult
for the threat to defeat (Garcia, 2006, p. 14). For the transmission system to be effective
it must be able to successfully transmit an alarm from the sensor to the security control
room, where factors such as corroded wires could impede this capability (Adams, et al,
2005, p. 2). For the assessment system to be effective the video images containing the
alarm source must provide quality of detail so that a person can accurately determine the
cause of an alarm. For the entry control subsystem, the software must correctly receive
electronic information from the installed entry control devices, compare this
information to data stored in a data base, and generate unlock signals to the portal
locking device when data comparisons match (Garcia, 2006, pp. 14-17). In addition, the
systems mean times for both delay and response must be maintained at their
commissioning levels of effectiveness. That is, all of the various system subsystems
must be at their commissioned level of effectives to maintain the systems commissioned
macro-state performance measure (Pi) over time.
4.3.3 Entropic security decay defined
The starting point in evaluating the validity of entropic security decay in a PPS must
include a theoretical definition of the concept. Based on the available literature it is
argued that conforming with the concept of entropy the constituents of a PPS move
from an available to unavailable state or from an ordered to a disordered state. Such
entropy production impedes on a systems capability to achieve its macro-state output,
therefore reducing the effectiveness of the “whole” system. Whilst the concept of
entropy is becoming increasingly popular and used to discuss the state of various
systems see Rifkin, 1982; Herman, 1999; Lovey & Nadkarni, 2007; King, 2008), as a
concept entropy is tremendously difficult to grasp. Entropy is a concept previously
discussed within the field of physics (Styer, 2001, p. 1; Lovey and Monahar, 2007, p.
99) where its meaning is difficult to define and not well understood outside of academic
circles. Such definitional ambiguity has lead to ubiquitous usage and minimal general
understanding. Whilst various definitions and understandings are applied to entropy, a
central theme or common thread is how various components of a system relate to one
another towards producing a coherent whole. Where according to Bohm and Peat
(2000) entropy is characterised by terms including disorganisation, disintegration and
decay, whilst Herman (1999, p. 86) adds steady-degradation.
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This study argues that the concept of entropy provides a framework for explaining and
measuring the gradual degradation of a physical protection system after its
commissioning. For example, according to Aslakse (2004, p. 272) the condition or state
of an element within a system is represented by the ability of that element to support
interactions with other elements, which have some form of internal structure of their
own. If left to themselves, that is remained closed, each element will decay or fail. As
such, if a system is to continue in some form of operating state there needs to be
processes and maintenance to achieve this. It is argued that such a view is what
Underwood (1984, p. xi) refers to when he wrote, decay occurs when building fabric
and hardware deteriorate and frequently, when human frailties accumulate.
4.4 The measurement of security decay
In considering the measurement of security decay, Thompson (2002, p.1) explains that
entropy is an idea born from classical thermodynamics and is therefore a quantitative
entity rather than something intuitive, defined via an equation. This view is supported
by Dillon (1983, p. 183) who points out that mathematics is a significant and important
aspect of science and therefore, it is only natural that mathematical techniques will be
employed. That is, according to Lindsay (cited in Dillon, 1983, p. 183) physics is
quantitative in the sense that it aims to answer the question how much, rather than
merely “how”.

As the expression of quantity requires numbers, physicist’ use mathematics to deal with
the numbers and the various operations which may be performed by them. Mathematics
provides the simple means of expressing functional relations between symbols to which
operational significance can be attached, and from such relations logical deductions can
be drawn (Dillon, 1983, p. 183). For example, according to Thompson (2002, p.1) the
specific definition of entropy via an equation comes from Clausius (1865) who defined
entropy by the equation:
7  M/
(24)
Where S = the entropy, Q is the heat content of the system, and T = the temperature of
the system.

The benefits of such a quantitative approach are emphasised by Martin (2000, p. 210)
who states “when conducting research one of the first things to do is to establish a base86

line, that is a steady state”, where according to Martin (2000, p. 210) the amount of
change can be considered as a percentage of a preset threshold level. Such an approach
is supported by Lorenz (1968, p. 290) who considered that once the initial state of a
system is known, then any change in this state , beyond its preset threshold level, can be
regarded as its measure of error. Accordant with Coole and Brooks (2009, p. 23) the
study argues that entropy can be quantitatively measured for a Defence in Depth system
by drawing on the EASI equation:
P(I) = P(D1)

P(C1)

%&
P (R/A1) + ∑!" (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏'!&
(1

P(Di))
(25)

This equation was used to establish the systems commissioning, or operational level
macro-state (Garcia, 2001) in chapter two. Congruous with the premises of systems
theory EASI quantitatively demonstrates the various mathematical relationships among
the constituents and elements performance measures within PPS. The elements key
performance measures are the cumulative sum of the various subsystems within a PPS,
where any changes in these inputs have an overall effect on the output (probability of
interruption). Therefore, accordant with the principles of systems theory, changes in the
microstates have a direct effect on the macro-state of the PPS. For example, Table 4. 1
indicates the direct effects on the macro-state of the PPS with small changes in the
microstates when calculating the probability of interruption using EASI adversary path
analysis. For Table 4.1 probabilities are numbers between 0 and 1, however it is
common practice to convert such probabilities to a percentage. Therefore Table 4.1
represents the probability of interrupting an adversary as a percentage.
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Table 4.1: Adversary path comparison table (Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 24).

100%
80%
60%
Series1
40%
20%

4
on

Co
nd
iti

on

2
Co
nd
iti

on
Co
nd
iti

on
Co
nd
iti

3

0%
1

PROBABILITY OF
INTERRUPTION

ADVERSARY PATH COMPARISON
TABLE

For Table 4.1, condition 1 presents a Pi of 90% (very high chance of interruption) after
entering the microstate data from condition 1 Table 4.2. However, condition 2 indicates
a much lower Pi after making small changes in the systems microstates as a result of a
detection sensors reduced effectiveness due to decay resulting in a higher nuisance
alarm rate and by slight increases in response time due to decay in the facilities response
capability. This condition indicates a Pi of just 53% (medium chance of interruption)
after entering the microstate data from condition 2, (Table 4.2). Condition 3 (Table 4.1)
indicates how the probability of interruption can be further reduced with a change in the
facility’s probability of communication due to decay in the communications system.
This condition shows Pi of just 28% after entering the microstate data from condition 3
(Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Physical Protection System microstate data (Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 24).
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With small changes in the systems microstates through correcting the detection fault,
slightly increasing the facility’s mean delay time and correcting the communication
systems degradation, condition 4 (Table 4.1) shows an increased Pi of 84% (high
chance of interruption) after entering the condition 4 microstate data from Table 4.2.
These examples emphasise that the macro-state of the Defence in Depth system is
recognised as an expression of the average of the microstate variables collectively,
where sensitivity changes in microstates (Defence in Depth constituent elements)
directly affect the macro-state. These results from an EASI analysis are concordant with
Lorenz’s (1963) findings indicating that small differences can, over a long period of
time, build to produce a large effect. For example, the first half of the EASI equation
interlinks the probability of alarm (P/A) with the delay and response aspects of the
system. However, the second half of the equation considers the probability of nondetection (PND), therefore, as probability of detection decreases, the probability of nondetection increases.

Consistent with the quantitative aspect of entropy, and the sensitivity of the systems
macro-state to changes within the various micro-states, this study argues that once a
systems state has been established, based on the security risk management requirements,
then any change within the various key performance indicators, and the systems macrostate, beyond a preset threshold level, quantitatively represent both the amount of decay
and its location within the PPS. In considering this assertion, Tester and Modell (1997,
p. 82) point out that entropy meters do not exist. According to Tester and Modell (1997,
p. 82) a change of state is defined by a change in the value of at least one property,
where Pitzer (1995, p. 30) highlights that entropy is an extensive property, where the
entropy of a system is equal to the sum of the entropies of its parts. That is, the entropy
of as system is a macro-state.

In considering the entropy of and within a PPS, Pitzer (1995, p. 26) explains that when
measuring a quantity a standard must initially be chosen. Then there needs to be a
means of comparing the measurement of the object of interest with this standard. Based
on the available literature, specifically drawing on Clausius’s (1865) reasoning, it is
argued algebraically that entropic security decay within a PPS can also be represented
through

Clausius’s

(1865)
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entropy

equation:

7 M−

(26)

Where S = the measure of system entropy (entropic security decay); Q = the initial
commissioning state of a PPS (Pi); and T = the current analysed state after a defined
period of time (Pi).
4.5 Security decay and risk management
In applying the concept of decay into the security risk management literature, this study
argues that such decay within a PPS reduces the effectiveness of risk controls which
increases facility vulnerability. This view is supported by Garcia’s (2001, p. 272)
vulnerability equation, highlighting vulnerability through the formula:
Vulnerability = 1 – ()
(27)
Such increase in vulnerability increases a facilities security risk state. Such a view is
uniform to Standards Australia HB 176 (2006, p. 62) which states “it is also important
to consider that a small change in control effectiveness may have a substantial effect on
vulnerability”. This premise is congruous with the definition of entropy offered by
Bohm and Peat (2000, p. 137; Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 42; Herman, 1999, p. 86; Rifkin,
1982, p.8), where degradation and disorder within and between elements increases,
decay increases and capability decreases. For example, Somerson (2003, p. 13) explains
that where strategies in place are insufficient to deter, detect, delay, respond to and
where necessary recover from risks, then a higher opportunity vulnerability exists for an
organisation. That is, based on the Normal Distribution, as control shrinkage occurs, the
population samples with the capabilities to penetrate a facility would increase, rather
than the desired decrease as decay manifests. In addition, for the defined threat the
situation becomes more compounding, as demonstrated by Figure 4.3.

The concept of decay is one of “gradual” degradation, where, as stated by King (2008,
p. 1), “it is the erosion of seemingly minor security controls which eventually leads to a
security incident resulting in a loss event”. That is, congruous with McCrie (2004, p.
16) the result of decay interlinked with a facility’s risk rating and the effectiveness of its
security controls can be summarized through the equation:
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For example, Figure 4.2 indicates that as the constituent’s key performance indicators
decay gradually, the system as a whole decays, reducing the macro-state effectiveness
measure below its commissioning measure. Such decay is congruous with the data from
Tables 4.1 and 4.2. However, perceptually the system may appear to maintain its steady
state. It is argued that this premise is supported by the writings of Howlett (1995, p.
219) who states “from the time of taking a system into use it will start to deteriorate. No
system, however well designed, can be completely reliable without proper maintenance.
If left without attention, it will become unserviceable. However, the operator may not be
aware of it, but the system will not perform as intended”. This “subtle” degradation
results in the system performing below the level of risk control considered necessary for
a specific security risk context. That is, in relation to the normal distribution of a
defined threat’s capabilities, the systems effectiveness may be below its defined threat.
In addition, as the system is perceived to be degraded by potential adversaries it can be
argued that the deterrence element of Defence in Depth is also degraded (see Figure 4.2)
leading to the perception by opportunistic offenders that the benefits outweigh the costs
leading to a decision within the rational choice framework to attempt a penetration.
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Figure 4.2 Effects of decay on implemented security levels (Adopted from Underwood,
1984; Martin, 2000; Garcia, 2001, 2006; Pidwirny, 2006; HB 167, 2006).
Consistent with the principle of equifinality (Figure 2.5,see Section 2.2.6.2), Figure 4.2
indicates the effects of decay on the systems commissioning level of effective security
when utilizing the Pi and Risk Equation to establish cost benefit based levels of
security. Adjusted from Underwood (1984; Martin, 2000, p. 210; Garcia, 2001, 2006;
Pidwirny, 2006; Standards Australia HB167 Security Risk Management, 2006).
4.5.1 The effects of entropy on the critical path
The study operationally defined security as “a stable condition stemming from a
systematic process which effectively combines people, equipment and procedures,
within a security context, to restrict unauthorised access to either people, information or
physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to attacks which
may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets manifested by a malevolent human
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adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of unauthorised access”. When considering the
concept of entropic decay in relation to such a definition Garcia (2001, pp. 242-247)
explains there are many possible paths for an adversary into a facility, however it is the
critical path which characterises the effectiveness of the overall protection system in
detecting, delaying and responding and interrupting an adversary.

The critical path is defined as the most vulnerable path, that is, the path with the lowest
probability of interruption (Pi). However, the theory of entropic security decay
considers that constituent degradation along the other alternative paths into a facility
may result in effectiveness regression so they become the critical path. That is, the
alternative paths effectiveness in detecting, delaying and responding to an adversary’s
actions are lesser than those calculated measures for the critical path.
4.6 Avoiding and countering entropic security decay
Systems are subject to dynamic behaviour which includes growth, unstable growth,
stagnation, cyclical instability and decay (Bittel, 1978, p. 1135). In addition, open
systems exist in a dynamic relationship with their environment, receiving various inputs
which are transformed in some way and then export outputs (Byeon, 1999, p. 285). The
receipt of inputs in the form of matter/energy and information enables open systems to
offset the natural entropy processes (Laszlo cited in Byeon, 1999, p. 285). That is, due
to natural entropy, survival of the system would not be possible without continuous
inflow, transformation and outflow (Byeon, 1999, p. 285). Consistent with Hankasalo
(1998, p. 131), like any other open system, a PPS needs low-entropy input where lowentropy means both ordered materials and available energy, and it must be able to emit
high entropy output into its environment. For example, a physical system which is
totally isolated from all information and energy inputs (closed) will quickly degrade,
just as will the classical thermodynamic closed system (Byeon, 2005, p. 283).

According to Byeon (1999, p. 287) non-equilibrium thermodynamics suggests that open
framed systems are able to circumvent the effects of the second law of thermodynamics
(the thermodynamic arrow of time) through their feedback processes. That is, certain
systems have the property of feedback, that is, a portion of their outputs or behaviour is
fed-back as input to affect succeeding outputs (Midgley, 2003, p. 73). According to
Midgley (2003, p. 73) man-made system possess many of the properties possessed by
natural systems, where simple notions such as wholeness, segregation and summativity
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have meaning for both types of systems. This feedback process is aimed towards the
irreversible aspects of the laws of statistical probabilities, by importing negative entropy
(negentropy) into the system above that amount of entropy production (S), therefore
reversing the effects of natural entropy upon the system. From a thermodynamic view
point, a PPS where the appropriate feed-back mechanisms are in place would be
negentropic, where transfers of information and energy/matter from the external
environment can decrease entropy production so that total system entropy may remain
constant, or even decrease over time.

The available literature suggests that a PPS should be designed, implemented and
managed as a system. In applying an open systems frame to the discussion of decay
within a PPS this study contends that for a PPS to be managed as a system, the
necessary open systems feedback must be included within the risk management cycle.
Where feed-back is achieved during the monitor and review process. As such, the
concept of security decay should be considered an important component of security risk
management. Such a view is supported by the writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p.
99) who assert that various systems suffer from entropy, therefore organisations must
understand that for a system to operate efficiently they must continually invest in
resources to maintain system adequacy to reduce natural entropy. Underwood (1984, p.
249) supported this view, stating “After an attack the immediate reaction is often to
increase the originally established security resources. However, usually this is not
necessary, as all which may be required is the re-establishment of the intended level of
protection”.

To some degree, such security decay is recognised by Standards Australia HB167
(2006, p. 87), which incorporates a monitor and review stage in the risk management
process. Standards Australia HB167 (2006) suggest that the monitor and review stage is
a critical component in security risk management, based on the argument that security
risk environments are dynamic rather than constant, sometimes discretely changing and
other times, dramatically over short periods. According to Robinson (1999, p. 58) for
systems it is also important to know when a process is not fully satisfying the
performance criteria, to plan for corrective action. Therefore the security risk
management cycle has to in some form incorporate the effects of decaying risk
reduction strategies (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3 Security risk management cycle (Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 25).
It can be argued the monitoring and review stage of the security risk management
process should aim to energise or put-back energy into the system to eliminate entropy.
That is, it is at this stage where a PPS engages in the necessary feedback mechanisms to
maintain the system in a steady state, and detect micro changes within the systems
constituents to ensure an appropriate level security is maintained to ensure the necessary
level of risk reduction.

4.7 Conclusion
This chapter completes phase one of the study; the establishment of a systems framed
security decay benchmark. The chapter applied the concept of entropy within systems
theory literature to discuss how the output goal of a Physical Protection System (PPS)
can be impeded by the effects of natural entropy characterised by terms such as
disorganisation, disintegration, decay and steady-degradation. It has been argued in this
chapter that the concept of entropy within a system approach has isomorphic application
encompassing all systems (see Section 4.2.3), and without the appropriate feedback
mechanisms which characterise open systems, a system is either closed or becomes
closed.

Closed systems inevitably move towards a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. That is,
accordant with the laws of thermodynamics, closed systems attain a time-independent
equilibrium state resulting in the death of the system. However, by importing
negentropy from their environment, open systems can reach a time-independent state
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where the system remains constant as a whole, referred to as a steady state, that is, a
state encompassing very little change over time (see Section 4.6). For a PPS the
objective is to commission a system which implements measures that combine to deter,
detect, delay and respond to adversary threats based on a defined threat, where such a
system maintains its commissioned level of risk treatment over time, that is, it is able to
circumvent the effects of natural entropy to ensure it constantly achieves it output goal.

Phase one of the study presents the argument that the concept of entropy provides a
framework towards measuring the gradual degradation of a Physical Protection System
(PPS) after its commissioning. Study Phase 1: Security decay textual benchmark; the
theoretical foundation of security decay, lead to the proposition that security decay
could be defined as:
The gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents), or the
gradual degradation in the relationship between the microscopic and
macroscopic quantities within a security system.
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CHAPTER 5

MATERIALS AND METHOD
5. 0 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology and supporting literature drawn on to achieve
phases two, three and four of the study. The chapter presents the study design (Section
5.2) and a number of supporting theories (Section 5.3) which provide the research
design’s scientific frame. This presentation includes a description of the Delphi method
used for conducting research that draws on expert groups and the concept of expertise
and expert opinion which underpins the Delphi method. In addition, the literature
describing the use of interview techniques in qualitative research is presented. Section
5.4 presents a potential alternative methodology and explains the reasoning supporting
the choice of a qualitative design. Furthermore, Section 5.5 presents the study’s target
population (N=6) with a discussion on the difficulties in establishing a valid security
expert sample, and how participants for the study were selected based on Section 5.3.

This chapter also presents Section 5.6 materials, explaining the informed consent
process and interview questionnaire. Section 5.7 discusses the research procedure and
ethics, and Section 5.8 presents how the study’s collected data was analysed in a two
stage process facilitating the interpretative design of the study. Section 5.9 presents the
concepts of reliability and validity and their underpinnings in qualitative research. This
discussion is facilitated through a description of the safe guards within qualitative
research which aim to ensure research findings are considered both reliable and valid,
and how these techniques have been employed within this research design towards
establishing truthfulness in this study’s interpretation of collected data. The chapter is
summarised with a conclusion in Section 5.10.
5.1 The theory of entropic decay
The theory of entropic security decay was conceived based within grounded theory
principles, where according to Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 23) such theories are “those
which have been inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon they represent”.
A theory is a set of concepts used to define and/or explain some phenomenon, where
such concepts form the basic units of analysis when researching into specific
phenomena. Theories consist of plausible relationships produced among concepts and
sets of concepts (Silverman, 2002, p. 77), where in the development of grounded theory,
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concepts, categories and themes are identified and developed whilst the research is
being conducted (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 23-25).

Theory building occurs in an ongoing dialogue between pre-existing theory and new
insights generated as a consequence of research (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 266).
The theory of entropic security decay was inductively conceived within the principles
put forward by Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 23), where researchers’ do not begin with a
theory then seek to prove it, rather they begin with an area of study and what is relevant
to that area is allowed to emerge. As such, the theory of entropic security decay was
inductively conceived through the conceptual review of literature relating to a systems
approach towards security risk management, the argument that security controls degrade
over time and the application of systems degradation literature, specifically the concept
of entropy. This study aimed to evaluate and expand this inductive theory utilizing a
qualitative research approach.
5.2 Study design
A qualitative approach was adopted to achieve the outcomes of this study. Such a
design enabled the study’s sub-questions and research question to be responded to
through the gathering of security expert’s knowledge and experience within their
respective security domains as it related to the concept of security decay. Security
experts’ “expertise” within their discipline specific areas provided the research data
towards establishing whether they through their experience, supported the various
premises presented within the theory. An interpretation of such support required a
consensus of security expert’s opinions relating to the factors associated with each of
the research sub-questions, underpinned by their deep thoughts, feelings and emotional
insights.
The choice of a qualitative research methodology is supported by Morrison (1998 cited
in Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2005, p. 22) who states, “for people multiple
interpretations and perspectives exist in relation to events and situations”. “Therefore
“reality is multi-layered and complex”. As such, researchers should therefore examine
phenomenon through the eyes of participants rather than themselves. Cohen, et al,
(2005, p. 24) explain that such research designs enables the investigation of knowledge
which is considered “commonsense”, “taken for granted” assumptions from lived
experience. This approach is achieved by way of “reflexivity” that is, imputing meaning
retrospectively, by the process of looking back on the past.
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5.3 Research theories
To explore the theory of entropic security decay required participants who intuitively
understand this theory’s basis and where necessary, were able to move their previously
established positions relating to security decay based on new, incoming information.
This exploration required a specific depth of knowledge from professionals who had
extensive expertise in the security industry. It was therefore argued that a panel study in
the form of a Delphic poll was the most appropriate methodology for such a
contemporary, rigorous query of expert’s opinions relating to the concept of security
decay.
5.3.1 The Delphi Methodology
The Delphi technique is a viable research methodology for building theory, specifically
the generation of grounded theory (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 27). It is therefore
argued the Delphi methodology is more appropriate than a traditional survey
questionnaire for evaluating theory inductively derived at utilizing grounded principles.
Such an argument is based on the literature of Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 19).
According to Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 19) traditional surveys require researchers
to select a sample size suitable for averaging and detecting statistically significant
effects in a population.

Their focus is towards random statistical sampling of a

population of interest, towards generalizing their results to a larger population. In
contrast to this focus, a Delphi study aims to arrive at an answer to difficult, technical
questions through purposive panels of chosen experts.

As Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 19) explain, Delphi study results do not depend on
sample sizes and statistical power, but rather group dynamics towards arriving at a
consensus among experts. The Delphi approach has been supported by studies which
have consistently shown that for questions requiring expert judgment, the average of
individual responses (survey results) is inferior to results produced by group decision
making processes.
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5.3.1.2 Delphi methodology benefits
Delphi studies build theory (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 27), specifically, data
gathered during Delphi studies can be analysed as part of an inductive process for the
generation of grounded theory (Eggers, Ohio & Jones, 1998, p. 58). This characteristic
of the Delphi technique was of significant importance for this study as the theory of
entropic security decay was inductively conceived by drawing on grounded theory
principles. Because Delphi studies solicit information from experts who have a wide
range of experience, they extend the empirical observations from which initial theory is
based, strengthening the grounding of the theory and increasing the likelihood that the
resulting theory will hold across multiple settings (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 27).

As a research methodology, Delphi originated from a series of studies by the RAND
Corporation during the 1950s (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 16), referred to as project
DELPHI (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963, p. 458). Delphi is a carefully designed, systemic
iterative research method towards providing information for better decision making.
This method is utilized for structuring anonymous group communications from
geographically dispersed individuals who have special knowledge to share relating to
complex and important issues which can be collated for judgment. Delphi employs
sequential individual interrogations interspersed with information and opinion feedback
(Ribbens & Cole, 1989, p. ii; Eggers, Ohio & Jones, 1998, p. 54; Okoli & Pawlowski,
2004, p. 16).

As a research methodology Delphi is based on the premise that several heads are better
than one when formulating conclusions from incomplete evidence and that experts,
within a controlled intuitive process, will make such conjectures based upon rational
judgment and shared information as opposed to simply guessing (Eggers, et al, 1998, p.
54). This premise is supported by a series of studies conducted by Dalky (1969) which
found that when anonymous and controlled feedback was provided to members of a
decision making group, more accurate decisions were produced than when such groups
engaged in face to face discussions.
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According to Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafson (1975, p. 10) Delphi is used towards
the achievement of various objectives, including:
1. To determine or develop a range of possible program alternatives;
2. To explore or expose underlying assumptions or information leading to
judgments;
3. To seek out information which may generate a consensus on the part of a
respondent group;
4. To correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of
disciplines;
5. To educate the respondent group as to the diverse and interrelated aspects of the
topic.
This study drew on these Delphi objectives to gather security expert’s knowledge and
experience as it related to the concept of security decay. The strength of these objectives
in explaining contemporary issues is supported by Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 16)
who state “researchers have applied the Delphi method to a wide variety of situations as
it does not attempt to be representative of any population through statistical sample but
rather is a group decision tool”, to consider opinions for solving research problems
utilizing a group of subject matter experts (Schmidt, 1997, p. 764). The purpose of a
Delphic Poll is to gather a consensus of expert opinions relating to a topic under
investigation using several rounds of questionnaires or interviews (Sproull, 1995, p.
242), and can be used to notify study participants of recent scientific advances.

Delphi as a research methodology facilitated the identification, evaluation, and
clarification of factors pertaining to the concept of security decay from a systems
approach, and established positions by drawing on the current knowledge of the study’s
participating experts (Delbecq, et al, 1975, p. 84). This approach is supported by
Schmidt (1997, p. 764) who explains that Delphi has been used in fields such as “public
administration (Preble, 1983), medicine (Spiby, 1988), technology diffusion (Gray &
Nilles, 1983), social work education (Ruskin, 1994), and operations management”
(Malhotra, Stelle, & Grover, 1994). Delphi is used in situations where complex issues
are to be understood which do not lend themselves to precise analytical solutions
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(Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 55). A specific strength of the Delphi technique is that it can deal
with very technical issues (Effective Engagement, N.D., p. 2).

Such strength characteristics of the Delphi technique provided significant benefits for
this study as the concept of security decay within the framework of the theory of
entropic security decay is a concern framed by very technical literature. That is, Delphi
studies encourage innovative thinking towards a research problem (Sproull, 1995, p.
242) and play a vital role in research projects where developing consensus among
experts in a particular discipline field is critical (Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 64). Such a
philosophy was considered significant in achieving the aim and objectives of this study
due to the contemporary nature, and scale of the subject matter and the dearth of
dedicated published literature surrounding the concept of security decay generally, and
from a systems approach.

According to Sproull (1995, p. 242) Delphi research designs are based on a number of
assumptions, including:
 Experts are the best sources of opinions,
 Expert opinion will be even better if experts respond independently and
anonymously,
 Opinions will be even better if respondents are allowed to modify their
responses after receiving feedback on how the rest of the group responded
 Several rounds of questionnaires and feedback of results will bring about a
consensus of opinions.
5.3.1.3 Delphi methodology disadvantages
Nevertheless, Delphi polls do have some disadvantages. As Sproull (1995, p. 242)
advised, Delphi is a time consuming and costly research methodology. Delphic polls
usually require 3-5 rounds of interviews or questionnaires. Sproull’s (1995, p. 242)
concerns were considered in establishing this study’s procedure, and cognisant with
these disadvantages, due to budgetary and time constraints this issue was overcome by
conducting only two (2) rounds of interviews, following the pilot study. Conducting
only two (2) rounds of interviews produced some limitations within this study’s
findings (see Section 10.3).
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In considering such limitations Delbecq, et al, (1975, p. 106) explains that some Delphi
studies do stop after a second round, in particular if an additional round is not required
or further clarification is not important. Concordant with Delbecq, et al, (1975, p. 106) it
was not considered necessary to conduct further additional rounds of panel interviews.
It was considered more appropriate to analyse, reflect and interpret the data gathered
across this study and based on this study’s outcomes, make future recommendations
towards refocusing the research enquiry, adding additional, objective insights.
5.3.2 Expertise
Based on its methodology and underlying principles, the selection of experts is critical
to the results of a Delphic poll. The use of experts’ opinions provides a particular study
with the benefit of relatively fast utilization of the expert’s compressed knowledge
(Erricsson, Charness, Feltovich & Hoffman, 2006, p. 749). According to Erricsson, et
al, (2006, p. 749), the core aspect of an expert’s role consists of providing experiencebased knowledge which novice individuals could themselves attain if they had enough
time to undertake the necessary learning. The overall objective is to obtain the most upto-date and reliable consensus of opinions from a study’s expert panels (Okoli &
Pawlowski, 2004, p. 16). However, experts should be selected using a defensible
selection method (Sproull, 1995, p. 242). In considering the above, according to Eggers,
et al, (1998, p. 55) the term “expert” and how it is used is a controversial issue. Walton
(1992 cited in Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 54) contends there are three ways to distinguish
experts from lay people:
 Experts are people with sufficient knowledge and experience to have
mastered the advanced skills of a particular domain of knowledge or
experience;
 Experts are proficient in their actions and have specific ways of applying
their knowledge to a task in their area of expertise;
 Experts are also proficient at identifying problems in their areas and then
being able to tell if identified problems are solvable, then experts solve
them.
This view is supported by Delbecq, et al, (1975, p. 88) who consider the key points in
selecting an expert is to identify the desirable knowledge and qualifications of potential
participants. For example, according to Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 135) studies have
shown that a large, organized body of domain knowledge is a prerequisite to expertise.
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That is, experts have a greater quantity of domain-relevant knowledge than do novices.
In addition, the knowledge of experts is organized in ways that makes it more
accessible, functional, and efficient. Also, experts knowledge is extensively crossreferenced with a rich network of connections among concepts resulting in richer
processing, whereas, novices have fewer and weaker links among concepts (Bedard &
Chi, 1992, p. 135). Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p, 11) add, occupational expertise is
based on case and episodic knowledge accumulated over extensive periods of time, and
involves both positive and negative instances. Weiten (2002, p. 223) explains, the
episodic memory system is constructed of chronological, or temporally dated
recollections of personal experience. That is, episodic memory is a personal record of
things a person has done, seen or heard.

It is argued that significance in defining an expert is the concept of knowledge, where
knowledge can be discussed in terms of its quantity or its structure (Bedard & Chi,
1992, p. 135). According to Novak and Gowin (1984 cited in Brooks, 2007, p. 3)
knowledge is constructed, through the expansion of existing concepts. As new
knowledge is gained, it changes a person’s understanding of their existing knowledge.
According to Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 135) such knowledge may be based on previous
knowledge (built upon) and individual’s experience, and an individual’s interaction
within their environment. Such a large organized body of domain knowledge influences
the perceptual processes and strategies of problem solving. A view which is supported
by Rennie and Gribble (1999 cited in Brooks, 2007, p. 4) who point out, knowledge can
be considered a perceptual understanding towards a subject matter and may not be
necessarily concrete or fact. Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p, 11) add, episodic
knowledge is associated with isolated pieces of knowledge or incidents which, when
brought together by cognizant individuals, build up a more coherent domain specific
picture.

Stake (2010) supports the application of knowledge to the concept of expertise.
According to Stake (2010, p. 13) professional work depends on science, but each
profession has its own separate body of knowledge. It is therefore considered that
professional knowledge differs from scientific knowledge, although overlaps exist.
Professional knowledge is the lore gained from working with others having similar
training (scientific knowledge) and depth of experience. What especially characterises
professional knowledge is a focus on the fact that how knowledge is applied varies with
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the situation, that is, congruous with Walton (1992 cited in Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 54)
experts draw on their expertise (episodic knowledge) to solve problems. For example,
Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 136) found, in problem solving, the greater amount and better
organization of an expert’s knowledge compared to novices, results in two very
different styles of problem solving.

Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 136) point out these differences have been shown to exist in
problem representations, problem solving strategies and the quality of decisions. For
problem representation, representations consist of a person’s interpretation or
understanding of the problem. Such an interpretations are based on people’s domain
related knowledge and their organisation of this knowledge. People represent problems
by classifying them as a particular type, where classification is based on a person’s
solution procedures attached to each type of problem. However, to classify a problem
one needs to pick out the most relevant features, or must infer additional aspects about
the problem, given the explicitly stated features. Both these feature-identification
processes are more efficient and superior among experts.

In addition, such identified differences are more salient in ill defined problems, where
the problems structure lacks definition in some respect. In solving ill defined problems
experts spend considerable amounts of time developing problem representations by
adding many domain-specific and general constraints to the problem, as if they are
modifying the problem from an ill defined to a well defined problem. However, novices
attempt to solve the problem without defining it (Bedard & Chi, 1992, p. 136).

Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 12) explain that in problem solving, the situation can
be summed up as; novices seek logical, fairly consistent all purpose rules to guide their
behaviour. Advanced beginners start to employ experience problem solving processes.
Competent level practitioners exercise greater authority in problem solving, they set
priorities and make plans, they determine what is important and that the order of priority
may change. Proficient practitioners may no longer consciously think about
adjustments, for them intuition or “know-how” becomes important. These practitioners
notice similarities between events, with greater analysis and decision making with more
flexible observance of rules. However, experts have an intuitive grasp of situations,
where their performance is fluid and qualitatively different.
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According to Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 12) the knowledge of experts contains
fewer rigid classifications of areas of data, with mastery of understanding of the
interrelationships and linking between the different areas of knowledge. Expert’s store
solutions and use them again, they learn from their mistakes, and tend to portray what
they are solving in familiar elements. These elements describe the operations to be
performed and allow the expert to find an optimal solution under conditions of
uncertainty. Bussing and Herbig (2003, p. 145) suggest professional expertise includes
the intuitive knowing how, and less the theoretical thus formalised knowing what.

Based on the available literature, according to Erricsson, Charness, Feltovich &
Hoffman (2006, p. 3) an expert is defined as a person widely recognised as somebody
with extensive knowledge or ability based on factors including; research, experience,
occupation, or education and training within a specific area of focus (domain) beyond
that of the average person, sufficiently that others may rely upon that individual’s
opinion. Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 10) add, domain experts are defined, in
serious professional fields, by their reasonably skilled peers with whom they work. This
study drew on this literature to establish its target sample of participants congruous with
Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 136) as security decay is at present an ill defined problem.
However, experts have an intuitive grasp of solutions, “intuitive knowing” stemming
from their knowledge and experience (Cornford & Athanasou, 1995, p. 12).
5.3.2.1 Security Expertise
This study required an expert with domain specific episodic knowledge and experience
within the security profession. However, in establishing a security expert Phinney and
Smith (2009, p. 2) argue that the knowledge domains of security are relatively
unknown. For example, Brooks (2007, p. 1) advices, “security is a multi-disciplined
industry, constructed from knowledge stemming from a multitude of disciplines”. That
is, according to Brooks (2007, p. 2) security practitioners provide a wide range of
services in areas including security management, human resources, risk management,
crisis management, investigations, information technology and computing, physical
security and security technology.

For example, towards defining security through the presentation of security knowledge
categories Brooks (2007) conducted a study to establish:
 What are the knowledge categories of security;
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 What are the subordinate concepts of security
 What is the expert knowledge structure and subordinate concepts of security as
measured by expert interviews;
 Can security be defined through knowledge categorization and supporting
concepts?
Brooks’s (2007) study results presented security categories which included (N = 14)
categories across many associated industries (Table 5.1), within many occupations.
Table: 5.1 Security knowledge categories
Security knowledge categories
Security category descriptors

Criminology

Emergency/contingency
planning

Fire science

Facility management

Industrial security

Investigations
Risk management
Security management

Physical security
Safety
Security technology

Information and
Computer
Security principles
Security law

Accordant with Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafson (1975, p. 88); Cornford &
Athanasou, 1995, p. 10; Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 22); Erricsson, Charness,
Feltovich & Hoffman (2006, p. 3); and Brooks (2007) for this study, security experts
were defined based on their biographical information relating to their qualifications,
length of years of experience, and tenure in government positions, and advice they
provide across the various security discipline categories established by Brooks (2007).
In accordance with Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 10), security experts were
selected through peer nomination based on their revered reputations across these
categories and have been peer nominated (defined) as experts.
5.3.3 Interviews
This research enquiry adopted a qualitative approach, responding to this study’s subquestions and research question through the gathering of security expert’s knowledge
and experience by employing a semi-structured interview questionnaire. Interviews are
a systematic means of discussing with people an area under investigation towards
collecting data and constructing knowledge in research. The use of interviews in
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research considers that knowledge is something generated between people, often
through conversation. Interviews enable research participants in a study to discuss their
interpretations of the world in which they live, and to express how they regard issues
under investigation from their personal experience (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 267).

Interviews differ in their openness of purpose, their degree of structure, and the extent to
which they are exploratory or hypothesis testing, and whether they seek description and
interpretation (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006). To respond to this study’s questions semistructured interviews were conducted to gather data from security experts via direct
verbal interaction drawing on an interpretative analysis (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 268).
Semi-structured interviews can also be referred to as in-depth interviews, or focused
interviews (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 56). Such interviews focus on participants’
subjective responses to a known situation in which they have been involved, and which
has been analysed by the researcher prior to the interview.

Based on the outcome of such interviews researchers are able to support or reject
previously formulated ideas relating to their focus of inquiry (Cohen, et al, 2005, p.
273). Semi-structured interviews are very common in qualitative research. They draw
on an interpretative theoretical framework emphasising a belief that meanings are
continually constructed and reconstructed during interaction. In this research
methodology, participants’ become constructors of knowledge in collaboration with
their interviewer (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 57). That is, the interview
methodology facilitates for interviewers to bring in their own knowledge of an area
under investigation, enabling them to probe for deeper views and opinions of the
interviewee (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 273). In drawing out security expert’s intuitive
knowledge relating to the concept of security decay, it was argued that such a process
underpinned by the available literature was an excellent means of explaining such an ill
defined problem.
5.3.3.1 Disadvantages of interviews
According to Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 72) interviews as a research methodology
do have their disadvantages. First, interviews are resource intensive, that is, they take a
great deal of time and expense to collect data. Second, in-depth interviewing is difficult
to do well. However it is argued that these disadvantages were overcome by various
advantages interviewing provides towards achieving research goals. These advantages
108

included the fact that semi-structured interviews are an excellent means of discovering a
person’s interpretations of their relevant experiences. In addition, they allow for new
understandings and theories to be developed during the research process.

It was this strength of the interview technique which the study sought to draw on
towards establishing whether security experts support the premises and principles
underpinning the theory of entropic security decay. In addition, according to
Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 72), participants generally find the interview process
rewarding. Consistent with this view, during the interviews all participants reported that
they did enjoy the process and found the subject matter under investigation very
interesting. As such, it is argued that this research methodology enabled participants’
(interviewer and interviewee) to discuss their point of view with regards to the concept
of entropic security decay where concordant with the writings of Cohen, et al, (2005, p.
267) experts’ were able to offer their deep thoughts and feelings either supporting or
refuting the premises underpinning the theory of entropic security decay.

5.4 Potential alternative methodology
An alternative means of collecting data relating to the concept of security decay may
have been facilitated through the use of a psychometric survey questionnaire (attitude
test) in the form of a rating scale. There are three types of scales that have been utilized
in the construction of such attitude tests, including Guttman Scaling, Thurnstone scales
and Likert Scales (Kline, 2000, pp. 91-95). For example, a Likert scale is a survey
rating scale which measures attitudes, opinions and motivations by asking study
participants to indicate whether they agree or disagree with each statement in the
questionnaire (Martin, 2000, pp. 223-224). In designing a scale Loewanthal (2001, p. 3)
suggests a multi-item measure is needed where there is an underlying central conceptual
entity with a number of facets which may not be tapped by a single question.

However, the variables and factors underpinning the theory are still under investigation
at the conceptual stage. Until further research is carried out, factor analysis showing that
specific constructs or factors are correlated with the phenomenon under investigation is
limited in its validity. Nevertheless, according to Loewenthal (2001, p. 31) a good
means of sourcing items to be included in psychometric measures is through qualitative
interviews. This approach is based on the premise that in qualitative research, data
analyses is carried out concurrently with data collection. That is, with qualitative
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studies, a constant interplay exists between collection and analysis which produces a
gradual growth in understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Walliman,
2005, p. 188).
5.5 Participant sample
In determining a suitable research sample, Best (1989, p. 10) highlights that it is not
possible to study an entire population. As such, according to Okoli and Pawlowski
(2004, p. 19) many research methodologies are focused towards random statistical
sampling of a population of interest, with the aim of generalizing their results to a larger
population. In considering a valid research population Lin (1976, p. 146) explains that
the total group of people (cases) who meet certain criteria of interest set by researchers
is referred to as its research population. Such a focus requires researchers to select a
sample size suitable for averaging and detecting statistically significant effects in a
population (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 19). In discussing the selection of a suitable
participant sample for a research study Martin (2000, p. 219) suggests that a
representative sample is one where the extent of the sample truly represents the
population under investigation. Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 93) add, that such samples have a
measure of randomness and therefore a degree of generalizability.

However, in considering the issue of a statistical sample representing the security
industry, Brooks (2007, p.1) explains that security as a profession is a multi-disciplined
industry. This eclectic mix has resulted in a profession which lacks clear definition,
potentially the result of its diversity and inter-disciplinary structure, as security draws its
breadth of knowledge from many disciplines. For example, as Brooks (2007) study;
mapping the knowledge structure of security, highlighted fourteen (14) security
knowledge categories including: criminology, emergency/contingency planning, facility
management, fire science, industrial security, information and computer security,
investigations, physical security, principles, risk management, security law, security
management, technology and threats. In addition, Brooks (2007) reported a list of
supporting subordinate security concepts (N=2001). Brook’s (2007) views are
supported by Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 181) who adds that due to its diverse
tasks, security is both difficult to define and practice. That is, security practitioners
provide a significant range of professional services.
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In addition to definitional concerns, Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 191) highlight that
researching in the security domain is tremendously difficult given that the industry often
shrouds itself in secrecy. Many of the practitioners within the security industry often
decline to be researched by academics even though they wish to draw on a body of
knowledge towards stronger professional standing. This very aspect of the security
industry was experienced during the study, where some security “expert” practitioners
declined to participate irrespective of its research focus and abstract nature of the
interview questionnaire. These combined issues impede the successful poling of a
statistically representative security expert sample. Furthermore, when considering the
suitable size of a research sample Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 93) explain that no clear
answer exists, therefore consideration of statistical analysis, that is, the research
methodology, is what drives the selection suitable sample size.

In considering the issues effecting a valid security industry statistical sample and the
writings of Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 93), Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 16) point out that
the Delphi method does not attempt to be representative of any population through
statistical sample. Rather it is a group decision tool to consider individual’s opinions
towards solving research problems utilizing a group of subject matter experts (Schmidt,
1997, p. 764), using several rounds of questionnaires or interviews (Sproull, 1995, p.
242). More specifically Rundblad (2006, p. 2) explains that a suitable participant sample
size for qualitative research designs using interviews requires very few participants.

In addition, when considering an appropriate sample size for grounded theory
Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 51) suggest that sample size is determined on
theoretical as opposed to statistical grounds. It is the representativeness of concepts not
of persons which is crucial. Such a view is faithful with Silverman (2002, pp. 138-250)
writings who explains that participants for qualitative research generally stem from
purposive sampling, as researchers seek out specific groups and individuals to evaluate
the processes under investigation (Silverman, 2002, pp. 138-250).

Based on the available literature, participants’ for this study consisted of peer nominated
security experts (N=6) selected and solicited to participate who were employed to
provide security category knowledge advice across the varied security related
occupations. Their selection was based on their meeting such criteria, where based on
their extensive knowledge or ability, their experience, occupation and/or education and
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training others rely upon them for professional opinion within the multi-disciplined
security industry and they were considered by their peers (peer revered) as experts.
These experts formed a non-probability (purposive) sample, enabling the full scope of
their professional experience and judgement of the issue to be explored. Purposive
sampling is supported by Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 102) who state “such samples are
selected when researchers target a particular group based on very specific research
needs”.
5.6 Materials
Accordant with the requirements of informed consent, an information letter was
prepared (Appendix A). The letter presented the aims and benefits of the study. In
addition, the letter briefly discussed the premises underpinning the theory of entropic
security decay and explained the workings of a Delphi poll. In addition, potential risks
and discomforts were presented to participants, where it was anticipated that there
would be no foreseeable risks and discomforts within the study. The explanation letter
also explained that there was no penalty for withdrawing from the study as participation
was voluntary. Conforming to Edith Cowan University ethical requirements, an
independent contact person was nominated and their contact details were provided to
participants as part of the research letter. The last page of the research letter was an
attached informed consent acknowledgement slip, where participant’s informed consent
was formally recorded.

A semi-structured interview questionnaire was prepared (Appendix’s B & C) consisting
of open ended questions supplemented with closed questions. The questionnaire sought
to obtain participants’ deep feelings, concerns and experience (Cohen, et al, 2005, p.
148) associated with decaying PPS. Questions were drawn from the conceptual
benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Participant’s responses were written on the survey
questionnaire using a pen, with additional writing pad materials provided to ensure
answers were not limited to available space on the questionnaire. The interviews were
transcribed into word documents (Appendix D) for validity checks and analysis.
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5.7 Research procedure and ethics
5.7.1 Procedure
To achieve the research goals a sequential multiple phase methodology was applied
(Lin, 1976, p. 5) incorporating a Delphic Poll, employing semi-structured interviews to
gather data from security experts through direct verbal interaction (Cohen, et al, 2005,
p. 268). This research process required the repeated individual interviewing of
participating experts. Congruous with Eggers and Jones (1998) individuals
identified/nominated as experts were contacted by telephone or email and solicited to
participate in the study. Once contacted, potential participants were informed about the
objectives of the study, the nature of the panels, the obligations of participants, the
length of time the Delphi process was going to take (1-2 hours), and the information
which would be shared among the study’s other participants (Delbecq, et al, 1975, p.
88). Those who respond favourably were sent the research letter explaining the research
methodology and premises formed. This study then followed a multiple sequential
phase process towards achieving its desired outcomes. These steps and activities are
outlined in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Study procedural steps.
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Given the difficulty in conducting research in the security domain, research data was
recorded manually by the interviewer during the interview process. This method is
considered suitable when the potential exists for participants to constrain their answers
when faced with mechanical means as manual recording appears less threatening to
participants (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 281). For answers where interpretation was
subjective, clarification was asked during the interview to increase internal validity.
5.7.2 Ethics
In moving into the data collection phase of the study, it must be acknowledged that
ethics are an essential aspect of scientific research. The concept of ethics stems beyond
specific principles or abstract rules applied to a research design. They are about the
issues or potential problems each research situation presents (Davies & Dodd, 2002, p.
281). According to Davies and Dodd (220, p. 281) within a research framework, ethics
exist in researchers’ actions, and in their ways of doing and practicing their research,
they are always in progress, never to be taken for granted, flexible and responsive to
change.

In the pursuit of an ethically robust study congruous with Forshaw (2004, p. 48) ethical
approval for conducting the study was gained from Edith Cowan University’s ethics
committee. In addition, all participants solicited to take part in the study were given
information pertaining to what they were agreeing to participate in to ensure the
protocols of informed consent. All participants were informed that there was no penalty
for refusal to participate (Forshaw, 2004, p. 47), and no undue pressure was placed on
any participants if they declined to participate in the study (Forshaw, 2004, p. 45), as
this did occur. In addition, all interviews were conducted without any time limits, and
no financial or other material benefits were offered to individuals for their participation
in this study.

For some participants there was a legal obligation to protect their identity and keep their
data/personal information confidential. In-light of this to ensure the confidentiality of
participant’s data and identities, participants were not asked to supply their names or
other identifying details outside of research data requirements. All participants who
agreed to participate in the study were interviewed utilizing the pre-established semistructured interview questionnaire which had been submitted to Edith Cowan
University’s ethics committee for prior approval.
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5.8 Analysis
An essential part of research is data analysis to measure, make comparisons, and
examine phenomena relationships towards generating explanations (Walliman, 2004, p.
301). In qualitative research data analysis is predominately interpretative (Cohen, et al,
2005, p. 282), where according to Patton (2002, pp. 453-454) qualitative analysis is
typically inductive in the early stages, where the final, confirming stage is deductive.
Conforming with Patton (2002, p. 453) and Liamputtong (2006, p. 265) the study was
evaluated through the use of an interpretative analysis, where stage one of the analysis
initially drew on an inductive methodology, where at the completion of all interviews,
responses were analysed (Gillham, 2000, p. 69), inductively identifying themes
(Krippendorff, 2004 cited in Liamputtong, 2006, p. 259) using line-by-line analysis of
panel members responses. The inductive analysis was aimed towards generating natural
units of meaning, looking for explanations and/or constructs which provide the data
patterns and themes (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 72). This analysis focused on the
themes of important messages inherent in the participant’s responses, such messages
stems from the interviewee’s perspective of research subject matter, being security
decay (Liamputtong, 2006, p. 111).

Stage two of the study’s analysis subjected the inductive analysis to a deductive
analysis. This analysis was achieved using informed intuition to deductively connect the
inductive data (participant’s responses) with the literature benchmark, and interpreted
by comparing participant’s responses with the textual data, and considered in relation to
this study’s research sub-questions, establishing a chain of evidence towards making
inferences in relation to responding to this study’s research question.

The deductive analysis was achieved drawing from a benchmark (Chapters 2 and 3)
conceived in phase one of the study from the literature stating that security is applied
within a systems approach (Underwood, 1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997; Garcia, 2001, p. 6;
Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164), where such systems are only as good as their parts
(Konicek & Little, 1997, p. 184: Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164; Garcia, 2006; King,
2008, p. 1). This literature was combined with literature published from systems theory,
specifically how the macro state of any system is directly related to the sum of its
microstates (Bertalanffy, 1950; Churchman, 1968; Bittel, 1978; Checkland, 1981;
Waldman, 2007). This literature is supported by research conducted by Lorenz
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(Butterfly Effect, see, Lorenz, 1963; 1969; Peirce, 2000), and literature supporting the
isomorphic application of entropy to discuss the irreversible processes suffered by a
system without the appropriate feed-back mechanism (Bertalanffy, 1950; Bittel, 1978;
Keren, 1979; Prigogine, 1987; Pidwriny, 2006; Morales- Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla &
Badillo-Pina, 2010, p. 75-76).

This synergy of literature brought together knowledge from laws, theories and concepts
across multiple textual documents. This process identified major and minor themes
towards developing a benchmark for framing the deductions in response to this study’s
research sub-questions and research question, by comparing the messages and themes
stemming from the questionnaire with those stemming from the theory’s document
benchmark (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 283). According to Silverman (2002, p. 229) such
textual data are in principle reliable sources for analysis, where in-line with Patton
(2002, p. 453) such a conceptual review provides a framework for data to be
deductively analysed.

The aim of the analysis was to establish a level of theoretical validity for the study
where, congruous with the literature from Sections 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 it was argued
that by comparing the themes inherent in the security experts responses stemming from
the semi-structured interview questions, to those inducted themes in the theory’s
embodying literature suitable evidence to respond to the study’s research question could
be drawn. To strengthen the reliability and validity of the deductive analysis closed
questions were also employed to provide confirming data, establishing a chain of
evidence of whether a consensus among the panels was achieved, aiding the
interpretative analysis. The closed questions provided additional evidence supporting
the interpretations and conclusions drawn for this study’s research sub-questions, and
provided the supporting data to enable an interpretation of consensus amongst the
research panels, in-line with the methodological principles of the Delphi technique.

5.9 Reliability and Validity
Qualitative research, in its broad sense, embodies that research which produces findings
not arrived at through statistical analysis or other means of quantification. Rather,
qualitative research draws its findings through the use of analytical procedures utilized
to interpret data stemming from observations and interviews (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.
18). That is, qualitative research does not seek to measure a phenomenon under
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investigation, rather, it seeks to understand, represent or explain it (Pyett, 2003, p.
1170). However, faithful to the quantitative research philosophy, validity and reliability
are two factors which must be considered when designing such studies, analysing
results, and judging the quality of a study (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). As Creswell and
Miller (2000, p. 124) explain, a consensus exists amongst qualitative researchers that
qualitative inquires’ need to demonstrate their research studies are credible.

In quantitative research the terms reliability and validity are treated very separately, yet,
these terms are not viewed so separately in qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003, p.
600). However, according to Bashir, Afzal and Azeem (2008, p. 35) both paradigms
seek to find the same result, “the truth”. For example, both qualitative and quantitative
researchers need credibility in their research, where according to Bashir (2008, p. 35)
validity and the norms of rigour which embody quantitative research are not fully
applicable to qualitative research. Golafshani (2003, p. 604) explains that from a
qualitative researcher’s perspective, reliability and validity are entwined and
conceptualised as trustworthiness, rigour and quality.
5.9.1 Reliability
Whilst the term reliability is a concept utilized when discussing the testing and
evaluation of quantitative research (Bashir, et al, 2008, p. 39) it is also considered in
qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). In quantitative research, reliability aims
to ensure proposed research is creditable, dependable, consistent and trustworthy, where
according to Cohen, et al, (2005, p148) it assumes research methods used can be
employed to duplicate the sample with results being consistent. In applying the concept
of reliability in qualitative research, Patton (2001 cited in Golafshani, 2003, p. 602)
argues, in such a study, reliability is more a consequence of validity. Patton’s (2001)
view is supported by Silverman (2002) and Seale (1999, p.468) who state, reliability in
qualitative research is framed around an examination of trustworthiness. As such
Lincoln and Guba (1985 cited in Bashir, 2009, p. 39; Golafshani, 2003, p. 601) note, in
qualitative research a demonstration of validity is sufficient to establish reliability.
5.9.2 Validity
The issue of validity has been an enduring issue in the debate relating to the legitimacy
of qualitative research (Maxwell, 1992, p. 279). In a focused discussion on the topic
Maxwell (1992, p. 279) highlights that if qualitative studies cannot consistently produce
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valid results, the policies, programs or predictions based on such studies cannot be
relied on.

In discussing the issue of validity in various research designs, Loewenthal (2001, p. 17)
describes two specific types of validity which need to be considered when employing
questionnaires, these are face and content validity. Face validity is suggested to be
present when questionnaire items appear to measure what they are intended to measure,
and can be gained by asking the questions to judges who are members of a target
population and agree that the questions intuitively represent what they are purported to
measure. Accordant with Loewenthal (2001, p. 17) to establish a measure of face
validity within the study’s research questionnaire, a professional security academic
reviewed the semi-structured interview questions prior to their being tested in a pilot
study (Face validity).

Once face validity was established, a level of content validity was pursued. Content
validity is said to be present when particular test items actually represent what they are
intended to measure (Loewenthal, 2001, p. 17). Content validity can be assessed by
conducting a pilot study, which will enable actual observations of typical responses to
researcher’s questions (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 121).

Furthermore, congruous with

Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 121) open-ended questions were supplemented with closed
questions to enhance the reliability of the research design.

In addition to face and content validity, the available literature argues that to ensure
reliability and validity in qualitative research an examination of truth is crucial
(Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). Maxwell (1992, p. 284) explains, validity is not a sole
product of a particular methodology rather validity pertains to the data, accounts, or
conclusions drawn by employing a particular method in a particular context for a
particular purpose. That is, validity in qualitative research is defined as how accurately
an account represents participants’ realities of the phenomenon under investigation,
“truth” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 1). In the pursuit of truth in qualitative research two
specific types of qualitative validity are descriptive and interpretative validity (Maxwell,
1992, pp. 285-291).
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5.9.2.1 Descriptive validity
Descriptive validity according to Maxwell (1992, pp. 285-286) relates to the factual
accuracy in which participants responses to a situation or question are presented. For
example, if a researcher reports that a participant made a particular statement during an
interview, is this report correct? That is, did the participant really make that statement,
or did the researcher miss-hear, miss-transcribe, or miss-remember their words? These
issues of descriptive accuracy relate to what the researcher reports to have heard or
seen.
5.9.2.2 Interpretative validity
Interpretative validity refers to the accounts of meaning drawn from an interview or
observation. That is, interpretative accounts are grounded in the language and words of
the participants studied and rely as much as possible on participants own words and
concepts. Interpretative validity in qualitative research seeks to ensure inferences made
from statements stems from the participants’ perspective and not the researcher’s
perspective (Maxwell, 1992, pp. 288-291). Maxwell‘s (1992) views on validity are
supported by Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 125) who explain that for qualitative
research validity refers to both the data and the inferences drawn from it.
5.9.2.3 Truth
In qualitative research methodologies, descriptive and interpretative validity aim to
establish truth. Truth is established through judgements in quality, where according to
Seale (1999, p. 472) such judgements involve the objective establishment of trust,
which is provided through the application of certain methodological procedures.
According to Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 1) these methodological procedures include
the application of one or more of the following techniques: triangulation, peer-review,
external audit and thick description. This study through the Delphi methodology
employed a number of these methodological procedures providing multiple layers of
validity and reliability (truth) into the research design.
5.9.2.4 Triangulation
Throughout the study the principle of triangulation was employed, a methodology
aimed towards establishing a level of validity and reliability in research findings
(Golafshani, 2003, p. 603) through linking concepts and indicators which are checked
by recourse of other indicators (Atkinson cited in Seale, 1999, p. 473). According to
Patton (2002, p. 247) the term triangulation works in a metaphorical sense, drawing into
conscious the world’s strongest shape-the triangle, and is used as an analogy with
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surveying and navigation where different bearings give a correct position (Silverman,
2002, p. 233). That is, a position on a map is discovered by taking bearings as two landmarks, creating lines which will intersect at an observers’ position. In a research
context, triangulation used from this analogy purports a single fixed reality can be
known objectively through the use of multiple social research methodologies, increasing
a study’s validity (Blaikie cited in Seale, 1999, p. 473).

Triangulation aims to cancel out biases from any one research method by employing
other, additional methodological measures (Seale, 1999, p. 473), drawing confirming
data from multiple forms of evidence rather than a single incident or data point. These
data points include theories, observations, documents and interviews (research
participants) to locate major and minor themes towards establishing objective findings
(Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 3). Patton (2002, p. 247) explains that triangulation can
occur in several forms. For this study, both theory and data triangulation was achieved
drawing on a variety of textual sources to establish a benchmark (Chapters 2 and 3)
within the conceptual review of literature which was drawn on to frame stage two of the
study’s analysis. In addition, investigator triangulation was established utilizing three
participants per interview panel, where inferences were drawn based on the sum of each
participant’s responses, underpinned by the Delphi methodology. Furthermore,
triangulation was achieved across the study by utilizing three panels, including the pilot
panel, providing confirming data from multiple participants (researchers) and across
multiple panels.
5.9.2.5 Audit trail technique
Triangulation was also pursued by means of the audit trail technique, where researcher/s
provide clear documentation relating to all research decisions and activities enabling
collected data to be externally evaluated for truthfulness. In achieving an audit trail,
member checking was also employed within this study, where research data and their
interpretations are shown to participants towards strengthening the credibility of data
and narrative accounts. In this methodology participants add to the study’s credibility
(truthfulness) by having the chance to react to both the data representations, and the
final interpretations. Finally, collaboration was included in this study’s design between
research participants and researcher during data collection and analysis phases, actively
involving participants as co-researchers. Collaboration is closely entwined with member
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checking, and occurs in many forms, such as building participant’s views into the study
design.
5.9.2.6 Validity lens
These combined procedures shift the validity lens from researchers to persons external
from a study answering questions such as, are the findings grounded in the data or are
inferences logical (Creswell & Miller, 2000, pp. 3-5)? In addition, for this study both
audit trail and member checking was conducted by research supervisors from Edith
Cowan University as part of this thesis’s formal requirements.

In final consideration of the debate encompassing reliability and validity in qualitative
research, Seale (1999, p. 465) warns a variety of conceptions exist, with competing
claims determining what counts as good quality research. However, this debate has
limitations to practicing social researchers, who are, in reality pursuing a craft
occupation which is learned “on the job” through apprenticeship like conditions,
encompassing trial and error. Therefore, this ongoing debate should encourage a degree
of methodological awareness, which, should be employed at a level below where it
would create anxieties that ultimately would hinder practice. Rather this debate should
attempt to guard against obvious errors. Conforming to Seale (1999, p. 465) the study
employed a number of techniques towards establishing a level of trustworthiness to
satisfy concerns of reliability and validity in its design and research findings.

5.10 Conclusion
This chapter presented the methodology and supporting literature drawn on to achieve
this research design and its outcomes. Section 5.2 presented the study design, where
Section 5.3 presented the supporting theories providing the scientific frame of the study.
This included a description of the Delphi method used for conducting social research,
and the literature describing and supporting the use of interviews in qualitative research.
Furthermore, Section 5.4 presented an alternative methodology and the reasoning
supporting a qualitative approach. Section 5.5 presented the study’s target population
(N=6) and how participants were selected for participation.

This chapter also presented Section 5.6 materials, explaining the informed consent
process and interview questionnaire. Section 5.7 discussed the research procedure and
ethics considerations, and a discussion on the safe guards within qualitative research.
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Section 5.8 explained the study’s data analysis process, underpinning the study’s
interpretative design. In considering the study’s research design, Section 5.9 discussed
the concepts of reliability and validity in qualitative research and the various tools
which will be applied across the study to ensure the study produces reliable and valid
results.
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CHAPTER 6

PILOT STUDY
6.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the initial participant based research data analysis and
interpretation in responding to the study’s research questions. The pilot study consisted
of security experts (N=3) solicited as part of a purposive sample. This chapter presents
the analysis of the pilot study’s panel member’s interview questionnaire data. Based on
this analysis, responses are then compared against the reviewed literature (Chapters 2, 3
and 4) towards interpreting the results in relation to the various research sub-questions
and this study’s overarching research question. The aim was to establish whether the
pilot panel support the premises underpinning entropic decay theory. In addition, this
chapter identifies and explains recommended changes to the semi-structured
questionnaire to increase both the depth of data collection and validity of this study.

6.1 Pilot study
In their pre-pilot work researchers identify specific topics central to the area or
phenomenon under their investigation (Gillham, 2004, p. 25). These topics are then
subjected to a pilot study, which is a small scale version of the researchers proposed
research methodology (Martin, 2000, p. 136). The aim of such a process is to conduct a
complete trial of the proposed methodology, and to iron out potential problems prior to
commencing the resource intensive formal study (Martin, 2000, p. 136). As Martin
(2000, p. 136) explains, when conducting a pilot study researchers’ sometimes find that
what previously looked good on paper just did not work. That is, a pilot study becomes
the guide for the future research methodology.
6.2 Participants
Participants’ for the pilot study consisted of peer nominated security experts (N=3) (see
Section 5.5). These experts were selected and solicited to participate in this study based
on the criteria that they are employed to provide security category knowledge advice
across the varied security related occupations. Their selection was based on their
extensive knowledge or ability, their experience, occupation and/or education and
training others rely upon them for professional opinion within the multi-disciplined
security industry and they were considered by their peers (peer revered) as experts,
forming a non-probability (purposive) sample.
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Participant one has worked within the security industry and specifically around Physical
Protection Systems (PPS) for approximately twenty (20) years within the corrections
environment. He holds a Bachelors Degree in Security Science from Edith Cowan
University (ECU). This participant provides advice on the operational effectiveness of
PPS and facilitates training in the operating of such systems, including all components
within the system which contribute to achieving the overall design goals of specific
systems.
Participant two has worked within the security industry and specifically around PPS for
fifteen (15) years within the corrections environment. This participant holds a Bachelors
Degree in Security Science from Edith Cowan University (ECU) and in his professional
capacity, provides advice on the operational effectiveness of PPS and on a daily basis
monitors for effectiveness.
Participant three has worked within the security industry and specifically around PPS
for over twenty (20) years with both customs and within the corrections environment.
This participant holds a Bachelors Degree in Business Management and in his
professional capacity provides supervision and advice relating to the daily management
of both staff operating PPS and the management of the maintenance reporting of PPS.

6.3 Pilot Panel interview questionnaire analysis
The theory of entropic security decay is framed around a functional, operational
definition of security where security is defined as “A stable condition stemming
from a systematic process which effectively combines people, equipment and
procedures, within a security context, to restrict unauthorised access to either
people, information or physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay
and respond to attacks which may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets
manifested by a malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of
unauthorised access”. This definition is focused towards the integration of all
heterogeneous security centred measures towards the establishment of a “systems”
approach in implementing effective security controls. In-line with Patton (2002, p.
454), (Section 5.8), this analysis was achieved by drawing on an inductive process,
discovering themes categories which emerge from the collected interview data.
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To achieve the pilot study each panel member was met individually. The aims and
benefits of the study were discussed with each participant, and their voluntary status
established. Conforming with Section 5.7.2 Ethics, each panel member was asked to
complete the informed consent documentation (Appendix A). After informed consent
was established in writing, the interviews took place, taking approximately 1 hour and
30 minutes each for the first round, and approximately 30-40 minutes for the feedback
interview. For some panel members the feedback process was achieved utilizing e-mail
and telephone interview due to their professional commitments.

6.4 Interview Questionnaire Analysis
6.4.1. Question One: Security’s organisational role
Questions one of the semi-structured interview questionnaire (Appendix B) asked panel
members to state what, from their experience, the role of security is within an
organisation, that is, the systems purpose. This question related to the functional
approach towards security, discussed in Section 2.1.3 Security defined, and sought to
consider the validity of this thesis’s functional, focused approach to security. This
approach sought to validate the removal of attached disciplines such as safety from the
security function at the tactical level of management to enable a concentrated approach
towards discussing, explaining and defining security decay functionally and across all
three levels of organisational management (strategic, tactical and operational).

In response to this question, member one stated that security relates to the protection of
assets, including procedural controls, physical components and electronic aids. The aim
is to implement measures to deter, detect, delay, and respond to organisation specific
threats. Panel member two responded with a similar theme stating “security’s role is the
protection of assets”, adding, “Security is the practice of ensuring the protection of:
human, physical or proprietor (information) assets, in a holistic manner to minimize the
gaps in the protection of assets”. This holistic approach is achieved by physical means,
technologies and procedural controls. This theme was also reported by panel member
three, who responded “to safe guard resources including: people, property and
information.
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For this panel a consensus was reached that security at the “tactical level” of
management, relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and
electronic measures which aim to protect an organisation’s assets which includes
people, information and physical property through their ability to deter, detect, delay
and respond against organisation specific threats.
6.4.2 Question two: Security’s organisational purpose
Question two sought to establish whether the pilot panel viewed security’s role as a risk
reduction role, in-line with Section 3.4, Security and Risk Management. This question
considered the strategic role of the system, where it is argued that as the operational and
tactical aspects decay, so does its strategic aspect.

To this question all panel members agreed that security is a risk reduction role, where
panel member one stated “without effective controls people would conduct acts against
the organisation”. In addition, panel member two added that security’s role is also a
deterrent role. A consensus was reached amongst the pilot panel that security is a risk
reduction role and a deterrence factor towards preventing security related incidents.

6.4.3 Question Three: Security’s body of knowledge
Question three asked panel members how they apply security’s body of knowledge
including theories, principles and specifically Defence in Depth. Panel member one
responded that the theory of defence in depth is how he employs security’s body of
knowledge, stating “all elements need to be holistically implemented utilizing
technology, physical components, people and procedures”. Panel member two added,
regardless of context, that is, the protection of people, information and assets, defence in
depth is the salient strategy. In addition, panel member three stated that Defence in
Depth within a cost benefit process where the benefits must achieve a prescribed value,
is how he employs security’s body of knowledge. A consensus was reached amongst the
pilot panel that Defence in Depth, applied holistically in a manner which includes all
elements is the salient and consistent strategy/means of employing the security body of
knowledge.
6.4.4 Question Four: The systems approach to security
Question four asked panel members if they supported a systems approach to
implementing effective security. All panel members provided an affirmative response to
this question, achieving a consensus, with all panel members reporting that they support
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a systems approach towards achieving security risk reduction. This consensus is
consistent with the literature reviewed in Section 3.1 (Chapter 3), an open Systems
Approach to physical protection. The systems approach was recommended by many
published security professionals. It is the systems approach to security risk reduction
which frames this research’s approach to understanding security decay.

6.4.5 Question Five: Defining systems
Question five explored panel members understanding of a system in relation to Sections
2.2.9, the systems approach to physical protection, Section 3.1, an open systems
approach to physical security, and Section 3.2 defining a Physical Protection System
(PPS). This question asked panel members to explain their understanding of a system.
To this question panel member one stated “a systems approach relates to how risks can
be holistically reduced through the interrelation of all security controls, together”. For
this question panel member two responded, a system relates to how separate
components are combined together to achieve an overall goal. Panel member two
suggested that for security, this relates to the separate security components and theories
combined to create a more robust security strategy. However, panel member three
considered that a system considers the combination of people, processes and resources
to achieve a purpose.

A consensus was achieved amongst the pilot panel that, a systems approach to security
relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the
separate components which combine together to achieve an overall goal. A common
theme in panel member’s responses was how separate components combine and
interrelate to achieve a goal. The panel member’s views’ pertaining to this question are
accordant with Sections 2.2.9, 3.1 and 3.2 (Chapters 2 and 3) of the study and indicates
that consistent with this literature the panel have a good understanding of what
constitutes a system.
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6.4.6 Question Six: A micro-macro relationship
Question six asked panel members if they consider the relationships between a system’s
micro state and its macro state. This question aimed to establish whether it could be
interpreted that panel members, accordant with Sections 4.3.1, System sensitivity,
support the argument that security systems effectiveness can be become degraded
through the reduction in effectiveness of individual components (microstates). In
addition, Section 4.3.3, Entropic decay defined, specifically considers such
interrelationships between the systems microstates and its macro-state.

Panel members one and three both stated that they do consider this relationship;
however, member two expanded on this response, stating “yes”, there exists a serious
relationship between all components of a defence in depth system, where each
component is useless without its interrelations”. A consensus was reached amongst the
pilot panel that in considering a system, a serious relationship exists between the
systems microstates and macro-state, and that this serious relationship does exist within
a Defence in Depth system, where each component within the Defence in Depth system
is useless without its interrelationships.

6.4.7 Question Seven: System interrelationships
In considering the systems approach in detail, specifically the various relations between
the microstates and macro-state question seven asked panel members what they think
this involved. Panel member one stated that he considered the relationships between the
systems micro states and its macro-state involves the interrelations between the various
individual components which make up a security program towards the achievement of
the systems overall output goal. For this question panel member two stated “this
involves specifically the interrelationships within the system”. In addition, panel
member three stated “this involves the breaking of the system down into its micro
component parts to evaluate it with regards to the systems macro purpose”.

This question relates to the literature discussed in Sections 2.2.5, Different Types of
Systems, and Section 3.1.3, Systems Performance. A consensus was reached amongst
the panel that this involves the interrelationships between the various individual
components within the system, where it was reported that such consideration requires
the system to be broken down into its component parts (microstates) for evaluation
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(analysis), then combined (subjected to a synthesis process) for purpose evaluation
(macro-state).

6.4.8 Question Eight: The Butterfly metaphor
A concept termed the “Butterfly Effect” is a significant principle within systems
literature (Lorenz, 1963; 1968; Peirce, 2000, p. 5), and is used in this research to explain
how decay propagates through a Defence in Depth System. As such, question eight
asked panel members if they agree with the principle that small changes within a
specific part of a system can lead to a large change at the output of the system.

Panel member one responded “yes”, that he does agree with the principles underpinning
the “Butterfly Effect”. Panel member two also supported the application of this
principle to security, and stated “There was a nexus between every single component
within a defence in depth system, and if there is a small change, this changes the whole
system”. Panel member number three also supported the use of the “Butterfly”
metaphor, stating “A small bit of change in any system has an overall change down the
track through the system”. A consensus was achieved amongst the pilot supporting this
premise of systems theory relating to the principle of the “Butterfly Effect”.

6.4.9 Question Nine: Physical security and key performance indicators
In considering the systems approach towards security risk reduction it is argued within
the systems literature that “the ultimate aim is to discover those components whose
measures of performance truly relate to the measures of performance of the whole
system”. As such, question nine asked panel members that, based on their understanding
of a systems approach and their industry experience, what they believed the key
performance indicators are within a Physical Protection System (PPS).

In response to this question panel member one responded that the initial focus for the
systems key performance indicators is the detection system, specifically, the probability
of detection is a key performance indicator. In considering this key performance
indicator, panel member one states “the system must be set to minimize false alarms”.
In addition, after detection panel member one considered the delay aspects of the system
are the next key performance indicators, where this overall key performance indicator
must be linked to your response time and capabilities over all key performance
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indicator. Panel member one considered that response times across the facility must be
tested for both their time of arrival and efficacy against the systems defined threat.

For this question panel member two responded that a system’s key performance
indicators relates to the security time line, which starts at the commencement of the
attack. As such, the first system key performance indicator is the detection function of
the system. According to panel member two, after detection the next key performance
indicator is the accurate assessment of the alarm source, then a key performance
indicator relating to the communication of a genuine alarm event to a response force
must be included. Once successful communication has occurred, panel member two
considered the next key performance indicator is the systems delay time, followed by
the response forces arrival time. Panel member two stated “in establishing these two key
performance indicators the delay time must exceed the response forces arrival time key
performance indicator”.

In his response to this question, panel member three responded that the systems key
performance indicators relate to the percentage of error in the system. The key
performance indicators start with the detection function, then accurate alarm
assessment, then successful communication followed by physical barrier delay time in
relation to actual response time.

A consensus amongst the pilot panel was achieved listing the PPS key performance
indicators in sequential order as: The initial detection of an unauthorised intrusion, the
accurate assessment of such an alarm event, then communication of an intruder at a
location to a responding person/group. Following the detection sub-system, the next key
performance indicators are the sum delay time impeding the progression of the intruder,
and the responding forces arrival time to interrupt the intruder, and where required the
response forces ability to neutralize the threat based on the systems defined threat.

6.4.10 Question Ten: Key performance indicators and system effectiveness
Question ten asked panel members if, based on their experience, they believe the key
performance indicators of a PPS are related to the systems overall effectiveness. Panel
member one responded that he did believe the key performance indicators of a PPS are
related to the PPS’s overall effectiveness. Panel member one stated, “Each component
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of the system is given score, and then, the overall system is given a score. Once this
overall system score has been achieved it provides a benchmark of the system for future
audits”. For this question both panel members two and three agreed that the key
performance indicators of a PPS are related to the PPS’s overall effectiveness. All panel
members responded positively to this question, providing a consensus amongst the pilot
panel, that they believe the key performance indicators of a PPS are related to the
systems overall effectiveness.
6.4.11 Question Eleven: Security decay
Question eleven asked panel members if, based on their experience, do they believe that
security systems decay. This question related to Section 4.1, Physical System
degradation, which postulates that, based on the available literature, all physical
systems, if left to themselves’, move towards a state of decay. That is, maximize their
entropy. All panel members responded yes to this question, providing a consensus
within the panel that, based on their experience, the panel believe, in-line with this
research’s literature review, security systems suffer from decay.

6.4.12 Question Twelve: Understanding security decay
Question twelve explored each panel members understanding of Security Decay in
relation to the literature review and asked panel members what their understanding of
Security Decay is. For this question panel member one stated that decay relates to many
facets of the PPS. These facets include a failure to maintain systems at their operational
level in order to deliver the required output for the system. This includes failures
towards engineering controls maintenance, where failures to maintain these controls to a
standard and monitor the systems maintenance to such standards causes technical based
system decay.

Furthermore, panel member one considered that a lack of system spare parts and
adequate redundancy processes for spares triggers extended time lags between systems
faults being reported and proper repairs being carried out; to re-instate commissioning
levels of operation, leading to decay. Panel member one considered that such time lags
leave the security system vulnerable to technical attack during these periods.

In

addition, panel member one considers decay to be related to the people component of
the systems as well, stating that a failure to maintain system commissioning levels of
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training over time, beyond initial contractual obligations, leads to decay throughout the
PPS overall effectiveness.

Panel members two and three were asked whether they agree with panel member one’s
views relating to the concept of Security Decay, where a consensus was achieved with
panel members two and three supporting panel member one’s views relating to Security
Decay. Furthermore, Panel member two responded that Security Decay relates to the
slow continuing degradation of components of a security strategy, which ultimately
makes redundant that specific component as it relates to the system as a “whole”.
During the feedback process panel members’ one and three reported that they supported
panel member two’s view towards the concept of security decay. A consensus was
reached amongst the panel with regards to panel member two’s views, with panel
members’ one and three agreeing with panel member two’s views relating to these
aspects of security decay.

Furthermore, panel member three stated that any specific single part of the system can
decay, where this decay affects the rest of the “system”. During the feedback process
panel members one and two reported that they agree with panel member three’s views
relating towards security decay. A consensus amongst the pilot was achieved, that inline with the heterogeneous aspect of a PPS, any specific single part of the system can
decay, and based on the systems interrelationships, this decay affects the rest of the
system.
6.4.13 Question Thirteen: An experience approach to Security decay
Question thirteen sought to achieve an evidence based approach, exploring real world
examples of a time when panel members’ had experienced security controls degrading.
This question asked panel members to provide an example of a time when they
experienced security decay.

For this question both panel members one and two responded that they had experienced
system degradation, which had impeded the key performance indicator relating to the
probability of accurate assessment. According to panel member one, he experienced a
time when decay, manifested in the security systems lighting sub-system, had lead to a
diminished ability to reliably assess (discriminate) alarm events initiated by the systems
intrusion detection system. Panel member one reported that this specific decay
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ultimately impacted on their ability to guarantee an effective interruption based on the
theory of Defence in Depth.

Panel member two reported that he had experienced a time when specific sub-system
degradation had also impeded the key performance indicator relating to the probability
of accurate assessment (discriminate). According to panel member two, system
degradation within the detection sub-system’s performance resulted in a very high
nuisance alarm rate. This high nuisance alarm rate lead to control room operators
assuming that all incoming system alarm inputs were false alarms, ignoring them. This
ultimately diminished the probability of accurate assessment key performance indicator
through procedural breakdown, meaning the remaining system was worthless.

During the feed-back process panel member three was asked if he had experienced such
decay manifestation and whether he identifies with panel member’s one and two’s
experience. Panel member three identified with this experience, establishing a
consensus that specific component decay can negatively impact on one of the systems
key performance indicators. This provides a consensus amongst the panel that decay
does occur, and can manifest in individual components, affecting specific key
performance indicators, which, based on the PPS interrelations, affects the systems
macro-state output product.

Furthermore, during the feedback process panel member one stated that if the key
performance indicators are not maintained then the overall PPS is vulnerable, and in
some cases worthless. This view is compatible to Section 4.5, Security decay and risk
management, where the result of decay interlinked with Section 3.4.2, Defining risk, is
the direct change in vulnerability state, purporting that Vulnerability = 1 – Pi, indicating
a systems framed mathematical link between system effectiveness and system
vulnerability. Panel member one’s statement supports such a mathematical relationship,
stating that as system performance decreases, vulnerability increases.
6.4.14 Question Fourteen: A systems approach to security decay
Question fourteen related to the systems approach to implementing effective security
controls and asked participants how security controls degrade within a systems
approach. According to panel member one, if one component fails, its key performance
indicator is reduced and such individual component failure reduces the effectiveness of
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the response force key performance indicator, ultimately reducing the overall protection
process. Panel member two stated “the systems approach relies on all components
working correctly where component change due to decay changes the whole system”.
Furthermore, panel member three responded that consistent with the systems approach
which combines people, procedures, technology and physical components into a system,
the effects of the environment on the system contributes to decay, where changes in
aspects such as the degradation of components, routines and procedures due to
environmental influence contributes to decay.

A consensus was achieved with regards to how decay occurs in a system from a
causation focus. According to panel member three, decay is the result of whole system
pressure on the various heterogeneous components, stating that environmental effects
on systems contributes to their decay at the component level. In addition, total system
degradation can occur when people change their procedures affecting the humantechnology coupling. This view of decay may explain how from a systems approach,
how various influences on different aspects of the system can manifest and impact on
the systems macro-state output.

6.4.15 Question Fifteen: Error propagation in Physical Protection Systems
Question fifteen related to the interrelationship aspect of systems thinking, and asked
participants if they agree with a premise within the theory of entropic security decay
that the concept of decay within a PPS occurs within the individual constituents, within
the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system from this point. This aspect of
security decay was discussed in Section 4.3.2, the effects of entropic decay on PPS.
Panel member one supported this aspect, stating “if one process was not working
properly this degradation affects the overall process down the line”. In addition, panel
member one stated “such degradation also affects the deterrence aspect of the system”.
For this question both panel members two and three responded that they agree with this
premise, within the theory of entropic security decay, that decay within a PPS occurs
within the individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the
system from this point.

During the feedback process, a consensus was reached amongst the panel, supporting
the argument that decay does occur within a PPS at the component level, within the
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system individual constituents, which then propagates through the remainder of the
system from this entry point, or point disturbance.

6.4.16 Question Sixteen: The Butterfly effect
Question sixteen related to aspects of systems decay discussed in Sections 2.2.4,
Butterfly Effect, and 4.3.1, System Sensitivity, specifically an effect referred to as the
“Butterfly Effect”. This effect considers how small changes within a system can result
in large changes at its macro output.

To this question, panel member one responded that he agreed with this premise within a
systems approach to implementing effective security controls. For example, according
to panel member one, he had encountered the result of this effect during a security audit.
According to panel member one, he had inspected a high risk work place, where to
reduce specific risks the organisation had installed staff emergency duress buttons to be
activated if staff felt threatened. However, during the audit he discovered that
individuals on staff, in the locations the duress buttons had been installed, did not know
either about them or how to use them. Panel member one reported that for him, this
experience supports the application of the butterfly effect to PPS. Since staff did not
know about the system or how to use it, there would not have been any response to
assist them should the need have arisen. Panel member one stated this experience
supports his earlier statement that decay in security training ultimately leads to more
holistic security decay.

Panel member two responded that he agrees with the premise that small changes within
a system, specifically a security system, can result in large changes at the system’s
macro output. According to panel member two, he experienced a time where individual
staffs reduced alertness levels and vigilance stemming from ongoing boredom had
resulted in the systems key performance indicators becoming reduced in their
effectiveness, specifically reducing the capacity and effectiveness of the system’s
response force.

Panel member three also reported that he agrees with this principle within systems
theory. Panel member three reported experiencing a time where high numbers of system
faults resulted in staff losing their confidence in the system. This lost confidence
resulted in the overall system becoming vulnerable, weakening the overall protection
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system. Panel member three provides the example of PTZ camera faults diminishing the
capability for staff to accurately assess alarm causes, leading to decay in this area of the
system (probability of assessment). Based on these responses, a consensus was achieved
amongst the pilot panel that this aspect within the systems literature does relate to PPS.

6.4.17 Question Seventeen: The effects of security decay
Question seventeen asked panel members, what they consider the effects of decay are.
To this question panel member one responded that decay is similar to an apple rotting,
where its effects result in whole system not working properly, directly impacting on
individual sub-system key performance indicators. However, panel member two
focused on the strategic goals of the system, stating “decay ultimately diminishes the
security objective”. According to panel member two, security decay increases the
vulnerability of the asset being guarded/secured. This increased vulnerability modifies
the risk equation, where likelihood ratings become elevated and risk factors become
increased.

Panel member two’s views were supported in panel member three’s response.
According to panel member three, decay degrades the effectiveness of the “system”;
therefore the risks associated with the asset being protected are increasing rather than
being decreased. A consensus was reached amongst panel members that, in-line with
previous responses, decay at the component level results in the gradual degradation of
systems individual key performance indicators, reducing individual subsystem’s
commissioning key performance indicator scores. This aspect of security decay was
discussed in Section 4.4, The Measurement of Security Decay. Furthermore, a
consensus was reached amongst the panel that decay at the macro-level results in a
diminished security objective, where the risks being treated/reduced are increased due to
the effects of decay which force changes to the facilities risk equation where likelihood
and vulnerability ratings become elevated diminishing risk reduction.

6.4.18 Question Eighteen: Correcting security decay
Question eighteen related to security systems management and asked panel members if
they believed that once decay had set in, whether its effects, both at its point of
manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are reversible. Panel member
one responded that he believed the effects of decay could be reversed; however,
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qualified this with the belief that this process of reversal was dependant on the
availability of resources and how far the system had decayed. For this question panel
member two agreed with panel member one, reporting that he did believe the effects of
decay could be reversed, however, according to panel member two, this would require a
full systems audit to facilitate locating the point of decay within the system. For this
question panel member three responded that he did believe the effects of decay could be
reversed through proper maintenance of the systems components. All panel members
responded yes providing a consensus within the panel that the effects of decay can be
reversed, once decay was located.

6.4.19 Question Nineteen: Avoiding security decay
In considering the ability to reverse the effects of security decay, question nineteen
explored whether panel members’ opinions whether decay could be avoided. All panel
members agreed that decay could be avoided through active monitoring of the system.
For example, panel member one stated “decay could be avoided through proper
maintenance, with systems components maintained at agreed operating levels in a
timely manner”.

In addition, panel member one considered that decay could be avoided through proper
planned maintenance, scheduled redundancy management, ongoing education and
awareness training relating to the system holistically, so that individuals understand the
system fully. For this question panel member two considered that decay can be avoided
at the initial stage (design stage) of the security project through the implementation of
an effective system, which is actively monitored and reviewed utilizing a systems based
auditing process. However, panel member three considered that security decay is
inevitable to a point, as a system has a life span. Therefore after a period of time
processes must be put in place to reduce decay.

Furthermore, it was established that decay, to a point, can be avoided through full
systems based audits which focus on individual system aspects/components and their
interrelationships. In addition, it was agreed that decay up to a point, could be reduced
through the designing of an effective and suitable system from the beginning, where
factors such as environmental and budgetary influence can be considered when systems
would be designed to minimize decay.
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6.4.20 Question Twenty: Security decay and risk management
It is argued in the literature that security is a risk reduction role and a consensus
amongst the pilot panel was achieved supporting that security is a risk reduction role.
As such, question twenty asked panel members if they believed the concept of decay
has a place in the risk management formula.

All panel members responded affirmatively, stating that the concept of security decay
has a place in the risk management formula, specifically in the monitor and review stage
of the risk management formula. These responses provide a consensus that the concept
of security decay should be considered in the monitor and review process of the risk
management formula. This finding is in-line with the discussion from Section 4.6
Avoiding and countering entropic security decay, where Standards Australia HB 167
(2006, p. 87) incorporates a monitor and review stage in the security risk management
process.
6.5 Interpretation
Security is a multi-disciplinary industry (Brooks, 2007, p. 1) and Physical Protection
Systems (PPS) are heterogeneous, where such parts are brought together to achieve an
output goal. To achieve this output goal a PPS aims to (A) deter, (B) detect, (C) delay
and (D) respond to security events. Congruous with Section 4.3, the theory of entropic
security decay, the sum of detect, delay and response (BCD) leads to A. In addition, for
an adversary, Detect (B) (Action) and Delay (C) (Interaction) leads to Response (D)
(Consequence). These interrelations are achieved utilizing people, procedures, and
technology and physical properties. These combined phenomena draw on many
heterogeneous categories with varying domain specific specialization, achieved by
putting resources through a process to achieve an output function. Figure 2.6, Section
2.2.6.2, Open systems, and Figure 3.6 Section 3.2 Defining a physical protection
system, indicate this process. Such a process is accordant with the principles of General
Systems Theory (GST) which provided the scientific systems frame for the study.

6.5.1 Research sub-question one.
General Systems Theory (GST) is a meta-disciplinary approach towards understanding
systems of all types, regardless of purpose or make up, and provides the skeletal frame
of enquiry towards discussing, explaining and defining the phenomenon of security
decay. As such, based on the heterogeneous nature of Physical Protection Systems
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(PPS) research question one stems from GST’s approach and seeks to investigate
whether security experts support such a systems framed approach to implementing
effective security controls accordant to the principles of GST.

In responding to the study’s research question, sub-question one asks: Do security
experts support the systems approach to implementing effective security controls?

The aim is to interpret whether panel members support a General Systems Theory
(GST) approach, as it applies to physical security, to implementing effective security
controls. Congruous with Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation will be
achieved by drawing on the conceptual review of literature as an existing benchmark to
deductively test and affirm the research data in response to the sub-questions. This
interpretation will be framed around the core principles underpinning GST as they apply
to physical security, and will involve comparing the inductive analysis from panel
interviews with the literature drawn from the study’s benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4).
6.5.1.2 Research sub-question one Interpretation
All panel members responded “yes” that they support a “systems approach” to
implementing effective security. Their response is accordant with the writings of
Underwood (1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997, p. 59; Garcia, 2001, p. 6; Fisher & Green,
2003, p. 164). For example, according to Fisher and Green (2003, p. 147) every security
program must be an integrated “whole”, where Underwood (1984, p. xi) adds, and seen
as a “whole”. In exploring the panel’s understanding of a systems approach, the pilot
panel reported that a systems approach to physical security relates to how risks can be
reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the separate security components
which combine together to achieve an overall design goal. For example, member two
stated “a system relates to how separate components are combined together to achieve
an overall goal”. Furthermore, according to member three, it includes people, processes
and resources which combine to achieve a purpose. Such a viewpoints are congruous
with Bertalanffy (1968, p. 19) who considers a system to be “a set of elements standing
in interaction”.

Congruous with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950; 1968) the pilot panel reported that
within a systems approach, a serious relationship exists between the systems microstates and its macro state. Uniform with the systems literature the panel considered that
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each component within a system is useless without its interrelationships, where all panel
members responded “yes” when asked if they consider the relations within a system.
For example, member two stated, “A serious relationship exists between all components
of a defence in depth system, where each component is useless without its interrelations.
This viewpoint is consistent with Midgley’s (2003) who states “the systems approach is
focused strongly towards the interrelationships within, where,

it is these

interrelationships which tie the system together”.

Consistent with Midgley’s (2003) viewpoint the panel reported that a systems
interrelations involve the relations between the various individual components which
collectively make up a security program towards the achievement of the systems overall
output goal. For example, members two and three stated;
“this relates to the interrelationships between the carious individual
components which make up the whole security program and the
achievement of the system’s overall goal or output function”. Where
member three stated, “such interrelations involve breaking the system down
into its micro component parts to evaluate it with regards to the systems
macro purpose”.
Such viewpoints are congruous with the writings of Bittel (1978, p. 1130) who
considers the systems approach to be “sets of interrelated components that function
together within constraints towards a common purpose”.

In considering the panel’s support towards a systems approach, Checkland (1980) stated
that all physical systems are created for a specific purpose. In determining the systems
purpose within a physical security context, the pilot panel agreed that from a functional
perspective, security, therefore the “security system’s” purpose, relates to the reduction
of an organisation’s risk. It was argued that such reduction is achieved through the
holistic implementation of procedural, physical and electronic measures which combine
to protect an organisation’s assets which includes people, information and physical
property through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to adversary threats.
For example, member one stated “I employ the theory of Defence in Depth where I
consider that all elements need to be implemented within a holistic approach including
procedures, barriers and electronic systems”. Member one’s view was supported by
member two who stated “I see Defence in Depth as the salient strategy towards
protecting any asset including information, physical or people”. Consistent with this
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consensus, the panel reported that the salient approach to reducing security risk
concerns was the employment of the theory of Defence in Depth, as a “system”.

The panel’s consensus conforms to the writings of Smith (2003, p. 8) and Standards
Australia (HB 167: 2006), Security Risk Management, which states, “In addressing
security risk concerns, the key elements of organisational, community and individual
security controls are those components which contribute to the management of risk
through their ability to deter, detect, delay, respond to and recover from adversary
attack”. In addition, member two stated that “as well as a risk reduction role, security
(the system) has a deterrent role”. A view supported by panel member one who stated
“without the controls people would conduct acts against the organisation”.
Furthermore, in applying security’s body of knowledge towards achieving an effective
security state, all panel members supported the view that the parameters achieving
defence in depth (levels of detect, delay and response) must be based on a defined
threat, that is, based on risk.

In responding to sub-question one, one of the underpinning principles of systems
thinking is found in the writings of Chruchman (1968, p. 43) who stated “within a
systems thinking approach, the ultimate aim is to discover those components whose
measures of performance are related to the measure of performance of the whole
system, where a systems performance is proven by providing objective evidence of its
effectiveness”. Accordant with this principle the pilot panel reported that they believe
the key performance indicators within a PPS are related to the systems overall
effectiveness. For example, members three and one stated;
“the systems key performance indicators relate to the percentage of error in
the system”, where according to member one “each component of the system
is given a score”. “Once the overall systems score has been established, it
provides a benchmark of the system for future audits”.

This approach indicates support towards the quantitative aspect of systems theory and
specifically the quantitative approach to security decay, where the panel reported that
within a systems approach to physical security the key performance indicators for a PPS
in their sequential order are: the initial detection of an unauthorised intrusion, the
accurate assessment of such an alarm event, the communication of the event to a
responding force/group. Following the detection sub-system, the remaining key
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performance indicators are the sum of delay time impeding then adversary’s
progression, and the responding forces arrival time to interrupt the intruder, and where
necessary, the response forces ability to neutralize the threat, based on the systems
defined threat. The panel’s views relating to PPS key performance indicators are
compatible to the writings of Garcia (2001, p. 6) who states “the performance measures
of a PPS, within a systems approach, are a complex configuration of detection, delay
and response elements, where the best effectiveness measure (macro state) for a PPS is
one which combines these functional elements into a “whole” (Garcia, 2001, pp. 242249).

The panels viewpoint towards the systems key performance indicators is compatible
with the writings of Barton and Haslet (2007, p. 145) and Holton (cited in Barton and
Haslet, 2007, p. 145) who state, “in science, analysis must precede synthesis, based on
the argument that without a previous analysis, attempting synthesis does not lead to
truth”, where Ritchy (1991, p. 10) considered that every synthesis is built upon the
results of a proceeding analysis, where every analysis requires a subsequent synthesis in
order to verify and correct results. To this aspect of science Barton and Haslet (2007,
pp. 147-148) explain that systems thinking involves, and provides a distinct means of
framing this dialectic where systems thinkers recognize that individual (analysis) events
are part of a pattern (synthesis) of events.

Congruous with the writings within the study’s documentary analysis the pilot panel
agreed that based on the interrelationships within PPS which achieve its macro-state
output, small changes within a specific part of a system can lead to a large change at
their output. For example, member two stated that “I believe there is a serious nexus
between every single component within a defence in depth system, and if there is a small
change, this changes the “whole” system”. Such a viewpoint is uniform to Waldman’s
(2007, p. 272) who stated, “as part of a system changes, the nature of the overall system
changes”. Waldman’s (2007, p. 272) standpoint was depicted by member three who
stated “a small bit of change in any system has an overall change down the track
through the systems”. This aspect of systems interrelations is what Lorenz (1968, p.
306) referred to as the “Butterfly Effect”, which describes how error propagation occurs
within a system.
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It is argued that the panels support towards applying the “Butterfly” principle to
physical security is considered in the writings of Konicek and Little (1997, p. 18;
Garcia, 2006, p. 26; and Standards Australia HB167, 2006, p. 62). For example,
Konicek and Little (1997, p. 18) state, “a security systems is only as good as its parts,
when a single part fails, this failure can cause degradation of the total system. In
addition, Garcia (2006, p. 26) states, “System effectiveness can become degraded
through the reduction in effectiveness of individual components”, where according to
Standards Australia HB167 (2006, p. 62) a small change in control effectiveness may
have a substantially magnified effect on vulnerability. In considering the Butterfly
principle, according to Churchman (1968, pp.42-43) Lorenz’s (1963; 1968) works are
considered in many variations of systems theory, where the systems approach is based
on the premise that as individual measures of performance of constituent components
increase, so does the holistic measure of performance of the total system.
6.5.1.3 Research sub-question one deductions
The panel reported that they support a systems approach to implementing effective
security. For example, all panel members responded “yes” to this question. Analysis of
the interview process indicates that the pilot panel’s views relating to the
implementation of effective security controls are congruous with the underpinning
principles of General Systems Theory (GST) applied to the theory of Defence in Depth.
That is, the panel recognise the systems purpose, its functions and its architecture within
a GST frame. In addition, accordant with the GST approach the panel comprehends the
various interrelations, organisation and orderly aspects which achieve the systems
output goal. Furthermore, the panel understand how, based on the systems interrelating
aspects, small changes in one area of a system are associated with changes throughout
the remainder of the system, and how these changes directly affect the various subsystems and “whole” systems macro-state (key performance indicators). Based the
available data, it is argued that the evidence supports an interpretation that the pilot
panel do support a systems approach within a GST frame to implementing effective
security controls.
6.5.2 Research sub-question Two
Research sub-question two directly relates to the premises of Underwood (1984) and
McClure’s (1997) writings, where according to Underwood (1984, p. xi) “security
decay” is the most serious threat to a security systems, and “security decay” must be
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expected. Research question two asks, “Do security experts support the argument that
security systems can suffer from decay”?

In response to research sub-question two, the aim is to interpret whether panel members
support the argument that “security systems” suffer from decay. Congruous with Patton
(2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation was achieved by drawing on the
conceptual review of literature as an existing benchmark to deductively test and affirm
the research data in response to this research question. The interpretation was framed
around the panel’s understanding of, and real world experience (evidence) relating to
decay within Physical Protection Systems (PPS). This interpretation will be achieved by
comparing the data analysis of the panel interviews to the embodying literature
presented in the conceptual review of literature (chapters’ two and three).
6.5.2.1 Research sub-question Two Interpretation
Congruous with the works of Underwood (1984, p. xi; Howlet, 1995, p. 222; McClure,
1997; King, 2008, p. 1) the panel reported that they believe “security systems” suffer
from decay, with all panel members responding “yes”, where member three emphasized
“yes definitely”. The results of this question are accordant with King (2008, p. 1) who
applied Lovey and Manohar’s (2007, p. 99) and Styer’s (2000, p. 1) views to explain the
decay of physical protection systems, stating that security controls inevitably degrade
over time as a result of natural entropy.

In responding to sub-question two, the pilot panel provided their understanding of
security decay. For example, member one stated;
“security decay relates to a failure to maintain security systems at an
operational

level

required

to

deliver

their

commissioned

output

capabilities”. This depiction was supported by member two who stated
“decay relates to degradation, that is, the slow continuing degradation of
components of a security strategy which ultimately makes redundant that
specific component as it relates to the system as a whole”.
These combined views towards security decay are uniform to the Australian Pocket
Dictionary of English Language (1994) which defines decay as “a gradual decline” in;
health, prosperity or excellence, a process of decline or deterioration, and the New
Oxford Dictionary (1991) which defines decay as being less good or less strong.
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Furthermore, within a General Systems Theory (GST) frame, the pilot panel spelt out
that security decay relates to the slow, continuing degradation of, or decline in
effectiveness of individual components which, based on their interrelations, affects the
system as a whole, reducing its macro-state (Pi). That is, the systems approach to
physical security relies of the effectiveness of each component interrelated with the
effectiveness of other interrelated components to achieve a macro-state output goal (Pi).
For example, according to panel member three “any specific part of the system can
decay, where this decay affects the rest of the system”. This viewpoint is consistent with
Konicek and Little (1997), Garcia (2006) and Standards Australia HB 167, 2206).

In discussing their understanding of security decay, the pilot panel considered that
security decay was as heterogeneous as the Physical Protection System’s makeup. That
is, a PPS combines and integrates as a “whole” people, procedures, physical measures
and technologies to protect an organisation’s assets, where decay relates to a failure to
maintain such systems at their operational levels of effectiveness to deliver the required
output goal. The pilot panel reported a number of real world examples where, based on
their understanding, they have experienced aspects of security decay. For example, the
pilot panel reported that security systems suffer from decaying training standards. This
aspect of security decay relates to the systems approach which interrelates the categories
of detect, delay and response to achieve the systems desired output goal through the
utilization of people, procedures, technology and physical properties into a collective
“whole”. That is, a systems approach relies on an effective coupling of people,
procedures and technology and this aspect of decay focuses on a gradual degradation in
the effectiveness of this coupling impeding the achievement of the systems output goal.

Furthermore, panel member three suggested that either environmental effects, or
changes to security operating procedures within PPS contributes to their decay.
According to member three, changes in aspects such as component degradation,
routines and procedures contributes to “total system decay”. This response is uniform to
an example offered by Broder (2006, p. 30) who states that he observed procedural
decay to bypass perceived excessive access control strategies. According to Broder
(2006, p. 30) to overcome perceived excessive access controls at a computer department
of an airline, staff took to propping doors open for simplicity of movement during
working hours.
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In addition, the pilot panel reported that within a systems approach, if one component
fails, its key performance indicator is reduced, and such component failure reduces the
effectiveness of the response force key performance indicator, ultimately reducing the
overall protection process. Panel member two stated,
“the systems approach relies on all components working correctly, where
component change, due to decay changes the whole system”.
The panel’s responses and views are congruous with the systems literature stemming
from Waldman (2007, p. 272) who stated, “If a part of a system is changed, the nature
of the overall system is often changed as well”, where Midgley (2003, p. xxvii) points
out, even the tiniest influence may have a major affect on the future of the system.
6.5.2.2 Research sub-question two deductions
In response to research sub-question two, the evidence indicates that a consensus
amongst the expert panel supporting the argument that security systems do suffer from
decay was reached. It is indicated that such decay relates to a failure to maintain
security “systems” at their “operational levels of effectiveness” to deliver the required
output goal (risk reduction).
6.5.3 Research sub-question Three
Research question three directly related to the premises of Coole and Brooks (2009),
and focused on the heterogeneous aspects of the Physical Protection “System” (PPS) in
response to writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1). Lovey
and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) stated “all physical systems, if left to
themselves, tend to maximise their entropy, in-line with the laws of thermodynamics”,
where according to Pitzer (1995, p. 30) entropy is an extensive property, where the
entropy of a system is equal to the sum of the entropies of its parts. That is, the entropy
of as system is a macro-state, where according to Konicek and Little (1997, p. 184)
when a single part of a security system fails, such failure can cause degradation within
the total system. As such, research question three asks “Do security experts support that
security

decay

lies

within

the

systems

elements,

constituents

and

their

interrelationship”?

Conforming to Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation was achieved by
drawing on the conceptual review of literature as an existing frame work to deductively
test and affirm the research data in response to this question. This interpretation was
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framed around the panel’s understanding of how security decay occurs and the effects
of its occurrence manifest, within a General Systems Theory (GST) frame.
6.5.3.1 Research sub-question Three Interpretation
A consensus was reached congruous with the conceptual review of literature indicating
that security decay occurs at the component level (constituent) and that this affects
specific sub-system key performance indicators. For example, member three stated
“any specific single part of the system can decay, where this decay affects the rest of the
system”. Member two identified that “Security Decay relates to the slow continuing
degradation of components of a security strategy, which ultimately makes redundant
that specific component as it relates to the system as a whole”. Such a viewpoint was
also offered by member one who stated “one subsystem process not working properly
affects the overall process down the line”

Furthermore, member one explained that decay relates to many facets of the PPS, which
includes failures towards engineering controls maintenance, where failures to maintain
these controls to a standard and monitor the systems maintenance to such standards
causes technical based system decay. Member one states,
“a lack of system spare parts and adequate redundancy processes for
spares triggers extended time lags between systems faults being reported
and proper repairs being carried out to re-instate commissioning levels of
operation, leading to decay”.
Panel member one considered that such time lags leave the security system vulnerable
to technical attack during these periods. Member one’s views are consistent with the
writings of Howlet (1995, p. 220) who stated “a poorly maintained system will have
numerous unexplained alarms and the guard force may lose confidence in it and
eventually ignore it”. In such a case according to Howlet (1995, p. 220) they may treat a
genuine alarm as just another false alarm. This view was expressed by member three,
stating “eventually staff will lose confidence in that specific system”. In addition,
Howlet’s (1995, p. 220) writings support panel member three’s example of CCTV
decay, where panel member three gave an example of such decay within the mechanical
aspects of a PTZ camera, where such degradation means that specific cameras cannot be
used for assisting with alarm assessment purposes. According to Howlet (1995, p. 220)
slow degradation of a CCTV monitor is not normally self evident.
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The pilot panel reported that they believe the phenomenon of decay occurs within a
PPS’s individual constituents, and that such degradation at the constituent level, based
on the orderliness interrelations, propagates throughout the remainder of the system. As
member one stated “with one sub-system process not working properly it affects the
overall process down the line, where it also affects the deterrence aspect of the systems
as well”. These responses are congruous with the literature stemming from Bertalanffy
(1950; 1968; Konicek & Little, 1997; Waldman, 2007, and Garcia 2006, Mosely and
Coleman, 2000, p. 101, and Broder, 2006). Such a view point is also congruous with
the Gestalt approach to deterrence discussed in Section 3.1.1(Chapter 3). For example,
member three reported that he agrees with the application of the “Butterfly Effect” to a
PPS, member three states;
“high faults in one system affects the whole system where eventually staff
will lose confidence in that specific system. This results in that specific
aspect of the system becoming vulnerable within the system, weakening the
overall system”.
These collective views are true to the early works of Isaac Newton who stated, “The
extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of every object, depends on,
the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of its component parts”
(The Open University, 1976, p. 68).

The “Butterfly” metaphor has been used to articulate the interrelated aspects of specific
systems. For physical security within a systems approach to security decay, it is argued
that however decay is manifested in one component, its effects expand to affect that
components effectiveness within the specific sub-system, and that this component
degradation propagates throughout the remainder of the system, from its point of entry,
based on the systems interrelationships. This view was supported by panel member two
who explained that during a security review that he had conducted, he observed the
capacity of the response force had degraded stemming from decayed training processes,
and a lack of alertness and vigilance due to boredom, adding to the response forces
arrival time and ultimately reducing the probability of interruption key performance
indicator.

Panel member one supported member two’s views, who considers decay to be related to
the people component of the systems as well. Member two stated,
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“a failure to maintain system commissioning levels of training over time,
beyond initial contractual obligations, leads to decay throughout the PPS
overall effectiveness”.
For example, according to member one system degradation in security training leads to
decay at the systems macro output level. Member one stated “during security auditing
in a high risk work place I found that individuals in the work place did not know of the
existence of, or understand, how to use the staff duress system”. As such, should the
requirement for external assistance eventuate, the response would be negatively
impacted against, as staff may have to use alternative means for notifying the
requirement for a security response, ultimately adding to the overall response time.

These views relating to security decay are compatible to Section 4.3.2, the effects of
entropic decay on PPS. Section 4.3.2 purports the original decay within a PPS expands
to the boundaries of that specific subsystem component, resulting in a failure within this
specific part of the system. Based on the system interrelationships between the Defence
in Depth elements individual failure results in the system becoming disordered,
ultimately resulting in this point disturbance propagating through the remainder of the
defence in depth system. In considering this aspect of security decay, all panel members
supported the application of the “Butterfly” metaphor to PPS, where according to
member one “decay is like an apple rotting, with its effects resulting in the whole system
not operating properly as per their individual key performance indicators
commissioning scores, ultimately resulting in operators losing confidence with the
system”. The loss in system confidence by operators was an outcome reported by
Howlet (1995, p. 220).

According to member two decay results in a diminished security objective, ultimately
increasing the vulnerability of the asset being guarded/secured. Member two stated,
“decay alters the risk equation, where likelihood becomes elevated and the risk factors
become increased”. Such a view was also reported by member three, who stated “decay
degrades the effectiveness of the system, increasing the risks associated with the asset
being protected rather than decreasing them”. These views are congruous with equation
28 (Section 4.5).

In addition, member one stated, “one sub-system process not working properly affects
the overall process down the line, where it also affects the systems deterrence aspect as
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well”. The affects on the system’s deterrence aspect was presented in Figure 4.2
(Section 4.5), where according to Walker (1988, p. 11) the psychological aspects
governing offenders needs to persuade them that it is not worth trying an attempt
against an asset because if they try, they will fail or be caught, in-line with Winoto’s
(2003, p. 2) rational choice formula. Whilst the pilot panel reported that they believe
security system decay is inevitable to a point, they argued its affects could be countered
or avoided through full system based audits which focus on individual system
aspects/components and their interrelationships.
6.5.3.2 Research sub-question three deductions
It is argued that the available evidence indicates the pilot panel support the argument
that security decay lies within the systems elements, constituents and their
interrelationships. That is, all pilot study members supported that decay occurs at the
constituent level, manifests, then expands to incorporate and affect specific sub-system
key performance indicators, then expands to the specific defence in depth element for
which it is located, then propagates throughout the remainder of the defence in depth
system from that point, ultimately affecting the systems macro-state key performance
indicator (Pi) based on the systems interrelations congruous with the writings of
Bertalanffy (1950; 1968).

6.6 Pilot study Security decay preliminary item bank
Consistent with the writings of Loewanthal (2001, p. 3) Table 6.1 presents the pilot
panel’s preliminary pool of variables and factors associated with the concept of security
decay. This item bank is underpinned by the panel’s thoughts feelings and experience
with degradation within Physical Protections Systems (PPS). Table 6.1 highlights the
pilot panel participant’s real world experiences and explanations relating to security
decay.
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Table 6.1 Pilot study Security decay preliminary item bank

Decay
Categories
Technical

People

Physical

Conditions

PPPS Components
Phenomenon

Poor maintenance, failing
to
maintain
systems
technical components at
operational levels. This
includes both scheduling
and fault repairs.

Decay manifests in
individual key
performance
indicators.

Specific sub-system key
performance indicators not
maintained.

Decay manifests in
individual key
performance
indicators.

Poor system
management/supervision.

Poor monitoring
leads to small
changes in work
practices.

Consequence

Specific
element
interrelations
not
achieved,
significantly
reducing the macrostate output key
performance
indicator.

Various sub-system
KPI’s are reduced
due to lack of
conscientiousness
which
propagates
through
the
remainder of the
system.

People changing their
procedures.

This decays the
human-technology
coupling as
personnel don’t
fulfil their duties
based on the desired
KPI’s.

Failure to maintain training
standards overtime.

Decay relating to the
technology-human
coupling which is
required in a
complex system.

Total
system
effectiveness
degraded.

This decay
propagates through
the remainder of the
system.

Degradation of
specific sub-system
key performance
indicators.

Decays individual
components,
impacting on their
sub-systems KPI’s.

Degradation of
whole system
performance based
on system
interrelationships.

Slow continuing
degradation which contuse
as it remains undetected.
Individual components
decay.

Environmental effects on
individual components.

(Adjusted from Gillham, 2000, p. 68).
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6.7 Adjustments to semi-structured survey questionnaire
Pilot studies enable researchers’ to ascertain what worked well and what changes could
be made to enhance the effectiveness, and depth to the study. The semi-structured
interview questionnaire relating to the theory of entropic security decay was subjected
to a pilot study to ensure that prior to engaging in the formal research component of this
study the questionnaire was subject to test conditions congruent with those which the
formal study would be subjected. As a result of this pilot study, in-line with Martin
(2000), and (Gillham, 2004), a number of changes were recommended and implemented
to enhance the semi-structured interview questionnaire effectiveness in drawing out
responses which would contribute towards answering this study’s sub- research
questions and overarching research question.

The following changes were made to the research questionnaire:

The first change to the research questionnaire was the removal of the alphabetical
sequencing and bulleted sub-questions to incorporate a simpler numerically sequenced
interview questionnaire. It was considered that this change would facilitate a simpler
interview questionnaire to administer and report findings. Based on the numerical
sequencing of the interview questionnaire, question three’s (3) wording was slightly
changed to: Can you tell me how you apply security’s body of knowledge, including
security methodologies and concepts? If participants do not mention the application of
the theory of defence in depth, then the question; do you use the theory of defence in
depth will be asked. Table 6.2 displays the remaining changes that were incorporated
into the semi-structured interview questionnaire:
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Table: 6.2 Semi-structured interview questionnaire changes

Question No.

Question wording changes

5

Can you please explain to me your understanding of a system? Do you
consider the relationships between the components and the goal of the
system?
Do you support a systems approach towards security? Yes/No.

6

What do you think the systems approach towards security involves?

7

According to the principles of systems theory small changes within a
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of the
systems. Do you agree with this premise? Yes/No Can you explain
why?

9

Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance
indicators of the systems are related to the systems effectiveness? Can
you explain how?
What is your understanding of security decay;

4

11
13

In considering the argument that security controls decay, how do you
think this occurs within a systems approach to security?

14

The concept of security decay argues that decay within a PPS occurs
within the individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects
propagate through the system from this point. Based on your
experience, do you support this premise Yes/No, why, why not?

15

Do you feel this applies to a PPS? Yes/No. Can you give me an
example where you have come across this?

16

Based on your experience, what do you consider the effects of decay
are?

17

Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at the point of
manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are
reversible? Yes/No. How do you think so? Or, why don’t you think so?

20

Based on your experience, is there any facet of security decay which
you can add to the research enquiry? This may include factors
associated with either the cause of decay or impacts from it.

6.8 Conclusion
This chapter presented the Pilot study with the aim of conducting a complete trial of the
proposed methodology to both establish the feasibility of continuing into the main study
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phase and to identify and rectify potential problems prior to commencing the resource
intensive formal study. The findings from the pilot study were that the pilot panel
reported support towards the three sub-research questions, where it could be interpreted
that the panel support the argument that Physical Protection Systems (PPS) suffer from
decay, and that such decay is manifested at the component level which then expands to
that components specific sub-system, affecting this sub-systems key performance
indicator. Then, based on the interrelationships within the system, propagates
throughout the remainder of the system, therefore negatively impacting on the “whole”
systems key performance indicator, and ultimately decreasing the implemented level of
risk treatment.

The pilot study demonstrated the viability of the study, supporting the progression into
the main study with minor changes to the semi-structured questionnaire. As such, this
chapter presented a number of changes which were made to the semi-structured
interview questionnaire towards enhancing data collection practices and processes, and
towards drawing out deeper research data framing the concept of security decay.
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CHAPTER 7
ANALYSIS: PANEL ONE
7.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the first stage of phase three of the study, research panel one (n=3)
interview questionnaire analysis. The aim of this chapter was to produce a gradual
growth in experienced based knowledge towards developing a deeper understanding of
entropic security decay. To achieve a successful outcome, an inductive analysis was
conducted with research participant responses providing an analysis suitable for
deductive evaluation in Chapter 9 (Phase 4). As previously stated, to-date there is dearth
of knowledge relating to the gradual degradation of security systems. The variables and
factors underpinning the theory of entropic security decay are still under investigation,
at the conceptual stage.

This chapter is broken into a number of sections, providing participant responses to the
interview questions (N=20).

Section 7.1 presents this study’s research panel one

participant’s biographical information, establishing each participant as a security expert
within their respective security domains. Section 7.2 presents the interview data
inductive analysis which will be drawn on in phase four of the study to achieve the
required deductive analysis enabling responses to the study’s research question. Section
7.3 provides a reflection of themes and core principles which evolved from this panel
interview data that will be taken forward to research panel two (Chapter 8). Section 7.4
concludes the chapter, presenting a summary of achievements.
6.1 Participants
Participants’ for this research, in-line with Section 4.4 participant sample, consisted of
peer nominated security experts (N=6) divided into two research panels, research panel
one (n=3) (this chapter) and research panel two (n=3) (Chapter 8). These experts were
selected and solicited to participate in this study based on the criterion that they are
employed to provide security category knowledge advice across the varied security
related occupations. Their selection was based on their extensive knowledge or ability,
their experience, occupation and/or education and training others rely upon them for
professional opinion within the multi-disciplined security industry and they were
considered by their peers (peer revered) as experts, forming a non-probability
(purposive) sample.
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7.1.1 Research Panel One
Panel member one
Panel member one is a client relationship manager for a large security engineering
organization. Panel member one holds an electrician’s qualification, electrical
technician’s qualification and a Diploma of Applied Science. His area expertise and
duties include security risk management and the design of technical, physical and
procedural security controls to reduce various organisation identified risks. Once
strategies have been identified, panel member number one leads the implementation of
large scale security engineering projects to achieve client’s risk reduction needs. Panel
member one has over twenty (20) years experience in security risk management, and the
technical design and implementation of capital works security projects.

Panel member two
Panel member two is the coordinator capital works projects for a correctional
department. His duties and focus is the security aspects of capital works project
management within the justice portfolio. He provides advice and project management
services towards building, refitting and maintaining effective security infrastructure to
ensure his organisation can meet its business needs. Panel member two served in the
Australian Defence Forces for nine (9) years, has worked in customs in the area of
strategic assessments (one year) and has been with the corrections department for
approximately eleven (11) years. Panel member two holds a Bachelors Degree in
Security with a minor study area in Management from Edith Cowan University in
Western Australia.

Panel member three
Panel member three is the state-wide security manager for a correctional Department,
whose region covers 2.5 million squared kilometres. This position provides security
services advice towards maintaining the Department’s Security Directorates business
component. The position means that panel member three is required to implement and
coordinate both physical security audits and procedural audits. In addition, the manager
reports on security practices and emerging technologies and is required to ensure
ongoing development of security risk management processes. Panel member three has
been in this role for five (5) years, prior to this he worked in the security and emergency
unit within the Corrective Services for approximately twenty (20) years.
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7.2 Research Panel one interview questionnaire analysis
The theory of entropic security decay is framed around a functional, operational
definition of security where security is defined as “A stable condition stemming
from a systematic process which effectively combines people, equipment and
procedures, within a security context, to restrict unauthorised access to either
people, information or physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay
and respond to attacks which may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets
manifested by a malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of
unauthorised access”. This definition is focused towards the integration of all
heterogeneous security centred measures in the establishment of a “systems”
approach in implementing effective security controls. In-line with Patton (2002, p.
454) this analysis will be achieved by drawing on an inductive process (Section
4.7), discovering themes categories which emerge from the collected interview data.

To achieve the data collection phase of the study each panel member was met
individually. At the beginning of the interview the study’s aims and benefits were
explained to each participant, and their voluntary status was established. Concordant
with Section 5.7.2 Ethics, each panel member was asked to complete an informed
consent form. After informed consent was established in writing, the interviews took
place, taking approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes each for the first round, and
approximately 30-40 minutes for the feedback interview. As with the pilot panel, due to
some panel member’s professional commitments, some second round interviews were
conducted utilizing e-mail and telephone interviews. However, where possible second
round interviews took place in a face-to-face exchange.

7.2.1 Question One: Security’s organisational role
Question one of the semi-structured interview questionnaire (Appendix C) asked panel
members to state what, from their experience, the role of security is within an
organisation, that is, the systems purpose. This question related to the functional
approach towards security, discussed in Section 2.1.3 Security defined, and sought to
consider the validity of this thesis’s functional, focused approach to security. This
approach sought to validate the removal of attached disciplines such as safety from the
security function at the tactical level of management to enable a concentrated approach
towards discussing, explaining and defining security decay functionally and across all
three levels of organisational management (strategic, tactical and operational).
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In response to this question, panel member one stated that security depends on context;
however, for him security primarily relates to the protection of people, not occupational
safety and health, although this does come into it, rather the safety of people from
malicious people. In addition, it also encompasses asset protection, secure containment
and incident management. Panel member one stated that security is embodied within a
triangle (Figure 7.1), interlinking management, technology with the built environment.

Figure 7.1 Panel member one’s security management diagram.
To this question, panel member two stated that security relates to the protection of
assets, including people, information and physical, integrated to assist the organisation
achieve its specific business objectives. In considering this approach, panel member
three stated that security for him is about the secure containment of offenders
(institutional approach), approaching security from an organisational context, and states
this is achieved through the provision of physical, procedural and dynamic
(intelligence) security measures in a balanced and holistic manner.

During the feedback process (round two) panel members supported each other’s
responses. Therefore, for this panel, a consensus was achieved that security relates to
the protection of an organisations assets, including people, information and property to
achieve organisational specific business objectives, that is, context specific. For this
question within the research panel a consensus was also achieved, supporting the pilot
panel’s results. The research panel supported that security at the tactical level of
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management, relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and
electronic measures which aim to protect an organisation’s assets which includes
people, information and physical property through their ability to deter, detect, delay
and respond against organisation specific threats in order for an organisation to achieve
its business objectives.

7.2.2 Question two: Security’s organisational purpose
Question two sought to establish whether research panel one viewed security’s role as a
risk reduction role in-line with Section 3.4 Security and risk management. All panel
members responded “yes” to this question. Panel member one stated “without
knowledge of risk there is no baseline for security”. In addition, panel member two
stated “security’s role is to mitigate known or perceived risks”. During the feedback
process the panel supported the interpretation that a consensus was reached within the
panel that security is a risk reduction role. The research panel supported the pilot
panel’s views that security is a risk reduction role at the strategic level of management.
Furthermore, the research panel supported the pilot panel’s view that security also has a
deterrent role for any organisation towards preventing security related incidents.

7.2.3 Question three: Security’s body of knowledge
Question three asked panel members how they apply security’s body of knowledge
including theories, principles and specifically Defence in Depth. Panel member number
one responded that it does depend on the security context; however, Defence in Depth is
an absolute underpinned by security risk management, that is, you need to understand
the context. Furthermore, panel member one stated that security must be very
functional. To this question, panel member two stated that he employs Defence in Depth
along with crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and risk
management. According to panel member two, all these aspects need to be interrelated.
Panel member two stated that security intelligence (SYNT) needs to be integrated with
risk management to ascertain how Defence in Depth will be achieved. In addition, panel
member two states that Defence in Depth is achieved across a site based on the access
control requirements, considering different zoning contexts. Panel member three also
reported that he employs Defence in Depth and CPTED, stating “security incorporates
procedural, physical, technical, intelligence and risk management in a balanced
approach”.
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For this question a consensus was achieved, in-line with the results from the pilot study,
that Defence in Depth coupled with CPTED and risk management applied holistically,
based on a hierarchical system of access control is the salient and consistent
strategy/means of employing security’s body of knowledge, and that the employment of
such a body of knowledge must be very functional.

7.2.4 Question Four: Defining systems
Question four explored panel members’ understanding of a system in relation to Section
2.2.2 Defining systems and Section 2.2.3 the systems approach, and asked panel
members to explain their understanding of a system. To this question panel member one
stated a system approach is a “top down process”. A systems approach considers strong
interrelations between the components in achieving their and the system’s objective,
and the interrelationship between the design stage and the operator interface. According
to panel member one, a systems approach requires a structure with good interactions
between components (highly interrelated) which is seen as a “whole”. Panel member
two responded that a system ties together a group of elements and constituents which
maintain a role towards an overall outcome, where all aspects are interrelated. Panel
member three’s views were similar, stating that systems are components linked, that is
physical and procedures linked to achieve a goal.

In addition, the research panel supported the pilot panel’s consensus that a systems
approach to security relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach,
interrelating the separate components which combine to achieve an overall goal. For
this panel a consensus was reached that a systems approach is a top down process
(systems purpose) which ties together the separate components/constituents that have a
defined role, which are interrelated with other aspects to facilitate the achievement of
the systems overall goal. The panel’s views and understanding were accordant with
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 (Chapter 2) and indicates that accordant with this literature, the
panel have a good understanding of what constitutes a system.

7.2.5 Question Five: The systems approach to security
Question five asked panel members if they supported a systems approach to
implementing effective security. All panel members provided an affirmative response to
this question, achieving a consensus, with all panel members reporting that they support
a systems approach towards achieving security risk reduction. However, panel member
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one stated “as long as systems are designed properly to manage the security risks they
are intended to manage”. This consensus is consistent with the literature reviewed in
Section 3.1 (Chapter 3), an open systems approach to physical security, where such an
approach was recommended by many published security professionals. It is the systems
approach to security risk reduction which frames this research’s approach to
understanding security decay. It is therefore interpreted that a consensus exists amongst
the panel supporting the systems approach to security and specifically, security risk
management.

7.2.6 Question Six: Defining the systems approach to security
Question six asked panel members what they believed the systems approach to security
involves. Panel member one responded the systems approach is a holistic approach that
recognises the main contributions to the security solution. This approach includes the
built environment, the technology, physical security aspects, procedures and
management processes, and how each of these elements are implemented, recognising
the importance of each other and how the interactions compliment and influence each
other (Figure 7.1). According to panel member one, each element is configured or
implemented to support each other, recognising the Swiss cheese approach (Figure 7.2)
towards achieving holistic security. The Swiss cheese model proposes that under normal
circumstances the holes in each slice of cheese will be covered up by subsequent layers
of controls, where the summation of these controls represents the effectiveness of the
system in managing an attack against the system.

Figure 7.2 The Swiss cheese approach to security (Standards Australia; HB 167, 2006,
p. 60).
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Panel member one’s views were supported by panel member two, who stated “the
systems approach to security is the same as the systems approach with any organisation
aiming to achieve business objectives”. According to panel member two, the Physical
Protection System (PPS) broken down into its component parts relies on the other
components within the system, where if one component is broken, or removed, this
changes the whole system. For example, Defence in Depth relies on all its elements to
be integrated and at their measure of effectiveness. To this question, panel member
three focused on the design aspects of a systems approach, stating for him, the systems
approach is about having sound security practices in place before an event occurs,
across all body of knowledge domains.

The panel reached a consensus that the systems approach to security is a holistic
approach, which achieves its objective through the integration of separate security
components/ constituents, being physical, technical and procedural, each with a defined
role, that are implemented in a manner where their interrelations compliment and
influence each other to reduce security related risks in a preventative manner.
Specifically, panel member one utilized the Swiss cheese analogy to emphasise the
systems approach to achieving holistic security. During the feedback process both panel
members two and three supported this analogy, with panel member three stating “this
model was a good example”.

7.2.7 Question Seven: System sensitivity
Question seven related to a premise within systems theory that small changes within a
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of systems, and asked panel
members whether they agree with this premise and explain their reasons.

Panel member one responded to this question stating that he does agree with this
principle. According to panel member one, due to the reliance on each element, small
changes can have a domino effect on each of the other elements that combines to the
systems base structure. These changes may be small, but if not considered in a holistic
manner or without clear understanding of why an element was implemented or
structured in the first place, you can change the basic premise of why and how it
supported other elements within the system. Once again, panel member one drew on the
Swiss cheese model, stating that you can actually move the “holes” so that it now aligns
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with another hole (Figure 7.3). If you do this with several or many small changes you
can create a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to recognise.

Figure 7.3 The Swiss cheese model where the holes line up, creating a system
weakness.
To this question panel member two stated, “It comes down to a cause and effect”. By
one small element changing, results in a larger-more-macro change, stimulating a chain
reaction through the system. A consensus was reached within the research panel
supporting both this principle within systems theory, and that it applies to PPS. In
addition, a consensus was reached supporting panel member one’s Swiss cheese
analogy of how small changes in a PPS can lead to a weakness within the “system”,
based on the interrelations, which can be difficult to recognise.

7.2.8 Question Eight: Physical security and key performance indicators
Question eight related to an aspect of systems theory which focuses on those key
performance indicators that are directly related to the “whole systems” key performance
indicator, where it is argued within the systems literature that “the ultimate aim is to
discover those components whose measures of performance truly relates to the
measures of performance of the whole system” (Churchman, 1968, p. 43). As such, this
question asked panel members within their understanding of a systems approach, what
they believe the key performance indicators are within PPS.

Panel member one responded that key performance indicators are those items that you
can use to monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each element of a
system. Panel member two stated that key performance indicators give you a measure,
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where you set the goals in an organisation to ensure you are achieving what the system
is designed for, it is a monitoring process. According to panel member one, if the key
performance indicators are not being met, this could strongly suggest that a specific
element is not delivering the full capacity of the outcomes for which it was specifically
designed. Panel member one stated “if an element is not delivering required
performance it may not be supporting other elements within the total system in the
manner for which it was intended to, designed and implemented”. According to panel
member one, shortfalls in elemental performance is very likely to have an impact on the
whole of the systems performance, therefore if “whole of system key performance
indicators” are correctly identified, structured and monitored, these will be directly
influenced by elemental key performance indicators.

In considering this approach, panel member three stated “the key performance
indicators for a PPS are the core elements of Defence in Depth”, where according to
panel member two “the elements of PPS become the key performance indicators”. For
this panel, a consensus was achieved that the key performance indicators for a PPS at
the tactical level of management, were based on the Defence in Depth elements, starting
with detection as an element, that is, the systems probability of detection, then the
probability of successfully transmitting the alarm actuation, followed by a measure of
accurate assessment (discrimination) of the alarm cause, then a probability of
communicating that alarm source (probability of communication) to the appropriate
response component of the system. Once detection has been achieved the next key
performance indictors include delay aspects measured against the response capability,
based on the mean averages, become the systems measures.

In his initial response panel member one provided a list of key performance indicators
which he believed related to “whole of system effectiveness”. However, a consensus
was reached within the research panel that these represented operational key
performance indicators which make up, and achieve the tactical level key performance
indicators. That is, they contribute to ensuring and achieving the elements of Defence in
Depth tactical level key performance indicators. The pilot panel responded through
consensus that constituent performance measures across the built environment,
management processes, and technology provide the operational level key performance
indicators, for example, key performance indicators such as probability of detection,
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nuisance and false alarm rate, vulnerability to defeat provide detection system key
performance indicators.

7.2.9 Question Nine: Key performance indicators and system effectiveness
Question nine asked panel members, in relation to their responses to question eight, do
they believe the key performance indicators of systems are related to the systems
effectiveness, and explain their answer. In answering this question, panel member one
responded “yes”, stating the key performance indicators should be related to system
effectiveness. The key performance indicators are a measure of whether an element and
therefore a “system”, is delivering the outcomes and functionality for which it was
designed. Panel member two supported this approach, stating “this is your means of
ensuring elements are achieving your design goals”.

To this question panel member two added that key performance indicator reduction at
the micro-level reduces key performance indicator reduction at the macro-level. “As
panel member two stated “The overall key performance indicator provides a strategic
level of monitoring effectiveness”. Panel member one supported this approach, stating
“this directly determines or impacts on the elements effectiveness as a single element
performing its required function and effectiveness in supporting other elements in its
functions within the total system”. These responses were also supported by panel
member three, who stated “I do believe the systems performance indicators are related
to the systems overall key performance indicator”. We select individual components
from their individual key performance indicators, then, combine them together into a
“designed whole”. It is interpreted, in-line with the responses from the pilot panel, that
the panel support that the key performance indicators of the systems are related to the
systems effectiveness.
7.2.10 Question Ten: Security decay
Question ten asked panel members if, based on their experience, do they believe that
security systems decay. This question related to Section 4.1 (Chapter 4), which
postulates that all physical systems, if left to themselves (become closed) move towards
a state of decay, that is, maximize their entropy. All panel members responded
positively to this question, providing a consensus that based on their experience, they
believe, consistent with this research’s literature review, security systems decay.
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7.2.11 Question Eleven: Understanding security decay
Question eleven asked panel members what their understanding of security decay was.
For this question, panel member one responded “security system decay is the
degradation in the performance of an element of the security solution ... Both as a single
element performing a specific function, and the elements role in supporting other
elements in their function within the total system”. To this question panel member three
responded that security decay goes right across all aspects of a security program, across
dynamic (intelligence), physical, technology and procedural security. For example,
according to panel member three, all technology decays, as technology decays it
constantly false alarms, then staff ignore them, where ultimately they lose confidence in
it (the system) and their work practices decay.

In explaining his understanding of security decay, panel member one states “decay may
not be a major failure of this system, but more incremental decrease in performance that
occurs over time”. To this point, panel member two believed that decay could be
gradual or rapid over time. For example, procedural decay can occur rapidly. Panel
member one added, “decay may however occur incrementally and continue over an
extended period to the point it has a significant impact on performance and
effectiveness”. This aspect may be compounded further where this decay occurs over
many or all elements within a system, which can lead to major failure. However, panel
member two states that decay is something you can have an element of control over,
that is, the rate of decay. There are elements of decay you can have control over such as
training and awareness, whilst some things decay, they can be brought back up to
commissioning levels. Nevertheless, for engineering or built environment there is a life
span.

According to panel member one, decay may be the degradation of a detection
technology “probability of detection” (lack of testing and maintenance), degradation of
the alarm gathering notification communication systems reliability, that is, increase
communications alarm failures (lack of routine maintenance), degradation of daily
testing procedures, degradation of control room operator’s knowledge of correct
procedures, and the degradation of the physical environment.

A consensus was achieved within the research panel that decay embodies all aspects,
constituents and elements within PPS. That is, consistent with the pilot panel’s results,
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any single part of the system can decay, and based on the systems interrelationships,
this decay affects the rest of the system.

7.2.12 Question Twelve: An experience approach to security decay
Question twelve sought to achieve an experienced based approach, exploring real world
examples of a time when panel members had experienced security decay. This question
asked panel members to provide an example of a time when they experience security
decay. Panel member one responded that there are many practical examples where he
has come across security decay as a security consultant, both elemental and/or systems
decay. For example, panel member one experienced a lack of maintenance in perimeter
detection systems sterile zones (weeds and other feral growth), triggering increased
nuisance alarm rates, causing lack of confidence and increasing operator’s
complacency. According to panel member one, a lack in electronic system maintenance
causes these same outcomes. Furthermore, panel member one stated “poor or total lack
of daily testing procedures resulted in a failure to identify systems not working”. In
addition, a lack in ongoing formal training where new training in how to operate
systems occurs for new staff by handed down experience rather than from formal
training processes, meaning incorrect procedures or bad habits are passed on. Also, a
lack of ongoing training for qualified staff leads to decay.

Panel member one also reported having experienced physical deterioration of physical
elements, which are not maintained, reducing their effectiveness of the element as a
barrier, or what-ever function it performs. Furthermore, changes to the built
environment, or adjacent areas without considering the perimeter detection and
surveillance systems, and changes to systems aspects to suit personal preference,
without consideration to, or reference to, initial design considerations and integrated
response requirements. Panel member two also reported experience with fluctuations in
staff competencies leading to security decay. According to panel member two, staff
competency’s fluctuations alters key performance indicators, where decay occurs in
relation to the reduction in competencies and capabilities of the people component
within PPS. Panel member two states that most agencies work at the lowest common
denominator where system key performance indicators are based on the lowest standard,
this includes training. Panel member two states “system key performance indicators
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increase with competency increase, and of course decrease as those competencies
decrease”.

Both panel member one and two’s responses relating to staff competencies was also
reported by panel member three, who provided a situation involving staff’s lack of
familiarization/awareness with procedural security during perimeter alarm checks as an
example of security decay. This very aspect was also reported by panel member one.
According to panel member three a system they had commissioned incorporated a
microphonic detection technology into the cowling on top of a barrier. Often staffs donot test this system properly, where decay relates to improper testing around its
designed requirement, in-line with their procedures, resulting in technical decay as it is
not known if the system is working based on its design configuration. Also, during staff
testing, they do not test all aspects such as alarm preset positions and field of view
objectives for closed circuit television cameras.

According to panel member three, he has experienced environmental impact on physical
structures leading to security decay, for example, a high security fence (barrier) they
had installed. The plinth was not designed to move water; therefore water sat at the base
of the fence and due to high salt content within the environment, premature physical
decay of the barrier occurred. According to panel member three, such decay needs to be
considered at the design stage of a security project.

Each participant’s examples were put to the other panel members during the second
round interviews. A consensus was reached with all aspects of the each participant’s
examples of security decay, showing that decay occurs within each aspect of the PPS.
For example, Figure 7.4 indicates the interrelated aspects of people, technology and
physical engineering which combine to achieve a PPS, where decay can occur in each
aspect, and based on the systems interrelations, affect another aspect of the system.
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Figure 7.4 The interrelated aspects of a Physical Protection System.
7.2.13 Question thirteen: A systems approach to security decay
Question thirteen asked panel members that in considering the argument that security
controls decay: how did they think this occurs within a systems approach to security. To
this question panel member one stated “decay within a Physical protection System
(PPS) occurs within its individual elements and propagates through the system”.
According to panel member one, decay occurs at the base element level over time. This
decay at element level occurs through many causes and the effect can result in major
system breakdown. Once again panel member one draws on the Swiss cheese model of
Defence in Depth, where failure can occur across the “system” if not planned,
implemented and individual elements integrated correctly.

Panel member one’s views were also reported by panel member two, who stated “decay
occurs at the elemental level”. According to panel member two, the efficacy of the
system decays as small changes occur, changes start small, however, spread when not
detected and managed. Panel member two stated that systems are delivered
(commissioned) based on a desired benchmark and are commissioned against this
benchmark including physical, procedural and electronic aspects. According to panel
member two, what changes initially is procedural security, where decay occurs when
staff no longer maintain initial personnel based key performance indicators, where this
initial decay propagates throughout the remainder of the system. Panel member three
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also reported similar views stating “as one component decays, this affects other aspects
of the security system; and its deterrence aspect as well”. For example, according to
panel member three, multiple false alarms can propagate through the rest of the system,
then complacency sets in, alarm inputs are not discriminated (assessed) or reported,
ultimately affecting the response aspect of the system. Any aspect of decay affects the
rest of the system.

A consensus was reached within the panel, that within a systems approach to security,
decay starts in one aspect of the system; however, this can manifest simultaneously
across several constituents, then based on the systems interrelationships propagates
throughout the remainder of the system, ultimately affecting the systems response
element and its output goal.

7.2.14 Question fourteen: Error propagation in Physical Protection Systems
Question fourteen asked panel members whether they support the premise that security
decay within a PPS occurs within individual constituents, and its effects propagate
through the system from this point. To this question a consensus was achieved, with all
panel members supporting this premise, where this occurs based on the systems
interrelations. In addition, panel member one stated that consistent with his previous
answer, a “system” is a combination of elemental inputs, the system is very much
dependant on the correct operation of the effectiveness of each of these elements in
performing their function and supporting functions of other elements. Therefore, small
decay/changes in the elements, particularly where it occurs across many/all elements
can have a major impact on “system” output at the macro level.

7.2.15 Question fifteen: The Butterfly effect
Question fifteen asked panel members if they feel an effect referred to as the “Butterfly”
effect, which suggest that small input changes within a system can result in large
changes at the macro output, applies to a PPS, and could they provide an example. All
panel members responded affirmatively, agreeing that the “Butterfly” effect does apply
to PPS. For example, panel member one provided a substantial list of examples where
he had experienced the “Butterfly” effect within PPS. Panel member one stated “I have
seen a PPS that was reviewed that had contribution degradation in:
1. High nuisance alarm rates due to poor performance in detection technologies
due to lack of maintenance in perimeter zone.
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2. Incorrect technical maintenance causing high false alarm rates
3. Poor or complete lack of maintenance of physical elements, leading to decline in
this reliability of physical barriers.
4. Changes in CCR, adding technology, moving equipment etc, degrading their
operational effectiveness of this area.
5. Poor physical attribute (lighting and air conditioning) providing inappropriate
outputs conditions for maintaining concentration and focus, degrading this
operational efficiency in the CCR.
6. Standard operating procedures (SOP), other procedures being modified without
reference to holistic system requirements (To address minor elemental issues),
degrading the performance of the operational system.
7. Poor communications structures between CCR staff, security management and
operational staff contributing to degradation of overall “system”.
8. Poor or lack of formal CCR operational training specific to the subject, (training
by operators handing down through word of mouth) leading to a lack of true
understanding of how to use the “systems” effectively.
9. Incorrect incompletion of both daily tests of PPS zones.
10. Degradation in support systems functional operational or technical performance,
affecting ability to discriminate alarms, this includes operation of lighting
system controls, maintenance of lighting-lamp failure affects the performance of
CCTV surveillance cameras”.
Each of the above may have only minor degradation or degradation that is not
significant in its own sphere, the accumulated impact of this above, however, presented
significant risk. In this instance, it was clear that the input changes or performance
degradation with each element had this potential to result in large change or
performance degradation without evaluation in consideration of the total PPS.

For his example, panel member two stated that he has seen how procedural decay
stimulated through poor operator training has lead to the “Butterfly” effect. According
to panel member two, system training has a macro level output throughout the system,
however, over time, the training level set at the systems commissioning is allowed to
decline, then the level of staff competency declines, affecting the remainder of the
system. Furthermore, panel member three stated “small system changes can have a
significant impact at a much higher level and change the strategic direction of an
agency”.
7.2.16 Question sixteen: The effects of security decay
Question sixteen asked panel members what, based on their experience, did they think
the effects of decay were. To this question panel member one stated “the effects of
decay were as heterogeneous as the system itself”. Panel member two stated that decay
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disrupts an organisation’s ability to achieve set goals and objectives as it disrupts each
component or element within the system. Such views were supported by panel member
three, who added that decay leads to a breakdown in system reliability, increases the
risks of significant events occurring and can impact on the strategic and operational
direction of agencies due to political encumbrance if events are realized. In addition, for
this question the research panel supported the pilot panel’s findings that decay at the
component level results in gradual degradation of a system’s individual key
performance indicators, reducing sub-system key performance indicators.

It is therefore suggested that a consensus exists that decay occurs at the
component/constituent level, then, degrades system key performance indicators,
reducing sub-system key performance indicators. Such decay ultimately affects the risk
reduction aspects of the system, bearing a strategic impact on an organisation.

7.2.17 Question seventeen: Correcting security decay
This question asked panel members if, once decay has set in, did they think its effects,
both at the point of manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are
reversible. The consensus within the group for this question was that reversing the
effects of decay depended on what the decay related to. The panel agreed that
procedural decay could be prevented and reversed through management, that is,
ongoing monitoring and reviewing of the people component. However, physical and
technical decay can only be controlled/delayed, through processes. The research panel
agreed that all physical and technology components have a life cycle, where eventually
they will decay beyond a repairable state.

It was considered that with proper

maintenance decay can be slowed and managed. Nevertheless, panel member two stated
“decay can only be countered if it is understood”. In response to the pilot panel’s
findings that decay could be reversed once located within the system, the response from
the research panel were that as previously stated it depends on what type of decay it is,
where you can reverse some aspects of decay.

7.2.18 Question eighteen: Avoiding security decay
Question eighteen asked panel members if they believed decay within a PPS could be
avoided. In response to this question panel member one stated that the majority of decay
can be avoided; however, decay is like risk, you can mitigate some decay, and you can
accept some decay and you can reduce the impact. The responses to panel member
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one’s views were in-line with previous responses, that is, procedural decay can be
avoided, through intense management strategies with regular audits and implementing
the necessary corrections. Nevertheless, for technical and physical decay, the consensus
was that it can be managed and its effects delayed through proper monitored
maintenance.

7.2.19 Question nineteen: Security decay and risk management
Question nineteen asked panel members if they believed the concept of decay had a
place in the risk management process. For this question panel member one responded
that it belongs in the monitor and review process; however, there was a danger in not
considering decay outside this sphere. Panel members two and three responded that
security decay needs to be considered in your security context planning, where
according to panel member three, consideration of decay should start at the assessment
of risk stage, where decay is considered at the design stage and considered as a risk. A
consensus was reached amongst the research panel that security decay should be
considered as a “system”, at the design stage, against its consequences, with a view to
countering it where practicable as a risk treatment, towards designing out decay, then
continually assessed for in the monitor and review stage. Such views supporting the
consideration of security decay in the monitor and review stage are congruous with the
pilot panel’s findings and consistent with Standards Australia HB 167 (2006, p. 87),
which incorporates a monitor and review stage in the security and risk management
process.

7.2.20 Question twenty: Exploring security decay
Question twenty asked panel members if, based on their experience, is there any facet of
security decay which they could add to the research enquiry. To this question panel
member two stated that decay relates to the “whole” system and its interrelations, linked
into your planning processes where, in-line with question nineteen, you should as best
as practicable, consider future proofing within the system to minimize decay onset.
Panel member three added that he believed security decay will always be managed
against the level of recurrent funding available.

To this point, during the feedback process, panel member two responded that panel
member three’s views relate to the initial security project scope, stating “when you put
your capital submission forward, you must, at a strategic level, indentify whether the
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system you are putting in is achievable, and that you can maintain the system you are
putting in”. According to panel member two, panel member three’s recurrent funding
submission is required at the design stage. Panel member two’s views suggest that
decay should be planned for at the design stage of PPS. This view is consistent with all
panel members’ responses to question nineteen, where it was agreed that security decay
should be considered as a risk, and countered, prior to system implementation. That is,
decay should be budgeted for as an ongoing aspect of the security project.

7.3 Reliability and validity
Congruous with Section 5.9 this chapter incorporated reliability and validity controls.
These controls included the principle of triangulation where three participants were used
to construct the research panel. This provided data inputs from multiple participant
sources where in-line with the underpinning principles of triangulation it is argued
where consistent views were reflected and where consensus was achieved a higher level
of confidence can be inferred towards supporting the core themes and principles
evolving from the panel. Triangulation was also used to establish consensus support to
each panel member’s thoughts and feelings relating to security decay. In addition,
member checking was incorporated into the panel design, where during the second
round feed-back process each panel member was presented with a transcript of their
interview responses. Furthermore, each panel member was asked whether they
supported the interpretations drawn from the data, and were provided with the
opportunity to respond to these interpretations. This aimed to establish a level of trust
towards the inductive analysis prior to moving forward to the deductive analysis phase.

7.4 Reflection
Reflecting back over research panel one’s interview data a number of themes and core
principles have evolved towards developing an understanding of security decay within
an open systems frame. According to this research panel, security starts at the strategic
level of management incorporating a top down process, where the systems purpose is
established based on an organisation’s risk reduction requirement, establishing a
systems base line. Risk management then steers the establishment of a systems
parameters at a tactical level of management, holistically integrating: technology,
physical controls, the built environment, and procedural risk control aspects, which all
have a defined role that are combined into an integrated “whole”, where each
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component: functions, interacts, compliments and influences other functions towards
achieving organisational goals. These controls are selected based on the theory of
Defence in Depth and Crime Prevention through Environmental Control, where these
security controls are summative, that is, their combination based on planning and design
specifications provides the measure of risk reduction.

Physical Protection Systems (PPS) are commissioned against a benchmark, based on the
risk reduction requirements. A consensus response from research panel one was that this
summative, integrated “whole” suffers from decay across all constituent aspects,
including: technological controls, the built environment, physical environment, physical
controls, procedural and management aspects within Physical Protection Systems (PPS).
This decay is caused by many factors relating to the management of the PPS. Research
panel one agreed that procedural decay within PPS can be reversed or avoided through
professional management strategies, whilst physical and technical decay aspects can be
controlled/delayed through processes where some decay can be accepted, whilst other
decay aspects can be mitigated, such as its impact. Research panel one concluded that
decay starts small, but spreads if not detected and managed, propagating through the
rest of the PPS based on the interrelated aspects of systems in general, ultimately
affecting the organisations ability to achieve its goals therefore having a strategic
impact. These core themes will be presented to research panel two, where not initially
revealed, during their round two interview process towards evaluating their robustness
as explanations of security decay within a systems approach to security risk reduction.

7.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented phase three, research panel one (N=3) interview analysis. The
analysis provided a detailed account of participant’s thoughts, feelings and
understanding relating to the phenomenon of security decay, where in-line with Cohen,
et al, (2005, p. 24) such research designs enable the gathering of information which is
considered common sense, taken for granted, assumptions from lived experience. The
research questionnaire required panel members to reflect back on their experiences
within their respective security domains, inputting meaning retrospectively. This
reflection (Section 7.4) produced a number of core themes to be taken to research panel
two towards developing a consensus model of entropic security decay. These themes
include the argument that security starts with a top down approach at the strategic level.
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Risk management then steers the establishment of a systems parameters at the tactical
level of management, holistically integrating: technology, physical controls, the built
environment, and procedural risk control aspects which all have a defined role and are
combined into an integrated “whole”. Based on these themes Physical Protection
Systems (PPS) are commissioned against a benchmark as a summative integrated
“whole” where all constituent aspects suffer from decay. Decay within these
constituents is caused by many factors relating to the management of PPS.

This chapter also presented measures of reliability and validity (Section 5.9) in-line with
this study’s methodology. Reliability and validity was achieved by employing the
principle of participant triangulation, drawing on multiple participant information
sources relating to security decay underpinned by member checking, where during the
second round interviews, panel members were provided written transcripts of their
interview responses towards establishing a measure of truthfulness in this study’s
research analysis.
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CHAPTER 8

RESEARCH PANEL TWO
8.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the second stage of phase three, research panel two (n=3) of the
study. The chapter aims to produce a further growth in experienced based knowledge
towards developing an enhanced understanding of entropic security decay. To achieve a
successful outcome for this chapter an inductive analysis was conducted with research
participant responses to the interview questions (N=20), providing an analysis suitable
for deductive evaluation in Chapter 9 (Phase 4).

This chapter is broken into a number of sections providing participant responses to the
interview questions (N=20). Sections 8.1 presents research panel two’s participant’s
biographical information, establishing each participant as a security expert within their
respective security domains. Section 8.2 presents the interview data, which will be
drawn on in phase four of the study to achieve the required deductive analysis enabling
responses to this study’s research sub-questions and research question. Section 8.3
provides a reflection of themes and core principles which evolved across this study.
Section 8.4 concludes this chapter presenting, a summary of achievement and measures
of reliability and validity.

8.1 Participants
Participants’ for this panel consisted of peer nominated security experts (n=3). These
experts were selected and solicited to participate in this study based on the criterion that
they are employed to provide security category knowledge advice across the varied
security related occupations. As per panel one’s participants (Chapter 7), they were
selected based on their peer revere stemming from such criterion, as experience,
occupation and/or education and training so that others rely upon them for professional
opinion within the multi-disciplined security industry. These participants formed a nonprobability security expert sample.
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Participant number one
Panel member one has worked in the Oil and Gas industry for approximately five (5)
years as a senior security adviser. He has over twenty (20) years military experience
within the Special Forces fraternity, and holds a Bachelor of Science (Security) and a
Graduate Certificate in Operations Management. Panel member one provides security
compliance advice relating to Australia’s Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities
Security Act 2003 in the pursuit of organisational goals. In addition, the panel member
provides security advice relating to major capital works projects, prepares security plans
and procedures and has responsibilities in the area of emergency management.

Participant number two
Panel member two is a principle security consultant for a Perth based consultancy in
Western Australia. He has a combined twenty (20) years experience in criminal and
civil investigations, conducts corporate risk assessments, security audits and specialist
investigations for government and industry. Panel member two has lectured in Security
Risk and Physical Security at Edith Cowan University (ECU) and holds a Bachelor of
Science (Security) Honours, an Advanced Diploma in Business Management, and a
Diploma in Criminal Investigations.
Participant number three
Panel member three is a senior security consultant with over thirty three (33) years
experience consulting in high level security projects. Panel member three has
professional qualifications as an electrical engineer and building services engineer,
along with formal qualifications in security including Certified Protection Professional
(CPP) designation. He has presented over 60 papers on security issues at both national
and international conferences, and has lectured for sixteen (16) years in general security
and facility counter-terrorism at Edith Cowan University (ECU), holding a post as
Associate Professor of Security Science at ECU.

8.2 Panel study two interview questionnaire analysis
8.2.1Question one: Security’s organisational role
Questions one of the semi-structured interview questionnaire (Appendix C) asked panel
members to state what, from their experience, the role of security is within an
organisation, that is, the systems purpose. This question related to the functional
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approach towards security, discussed in Section 2.1.3 Security defined, and sought to
consider the validity of this study’s functional, focused approach to security. This
approach sought to validate the removal of attached disciplines such as safety from the
security function at the tactical level of management to enable a concentrated approach
towards discussing, explaining and defining security decay functionally and across all
three levels of organisational management (strategic, tactical and operational).

To this question, panel member one responded that for him, security’s role relates to the
protection of assets, and especially company personnel to enable work/business
objectives to continue in a safe and secure environment. This approach was consistent
with the pilot study’s responses and research panel’s one’s views. However, panel
member two responded that security’s role is to manage the various security related
risks for specific organisations. An approach also taken by panel member three, who
stated “the role is to manage the threats that pose a risk to either: institutional,
commercial and industrial organisations to mitigate risks”. During the feedback process
(Round two) a consensus was achieved that security’s role at the tactical level of
management relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and
electronic measures which aims to protect an organisation’s assets, including people,
information and property, through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond
against organisation specific threats.

8.2.2 Question two: Security’s organisational purpose
Question two sought to establish whether the panel viewed security’s role as a risk
reduction role, consistent with Section 3.4, Security and risk management. This view
was an important question, as an underlying premise framing the theory of entropic
security decay is that when security controls decay they are in actuality still in place;
however, their efficacy degrades as decay sets in, reducing their intended
commissioning levels of effectiveness. It is this reduced level of effectiveness which
may lead to an adversary determining that the balance of probabilities of success are on
their side and it is worth attempting a penetration, ultimately leading to a security event.
That is, the risks for an attacker are reducing therefore the strategic role of security is
decaying as well as its tactical and operational roles.
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For this question panel members’ one and two stated “yes it is”, where according to
panel member three, the reason you have security is the mitigation role against those
risks (Question one). In addition, for question one both panel member two and panel
member three responded that security’s role is to manage security related risks. The
pilot panel and research panel one agreed through consensus that risk reduction relates
to security’s role at the strategic level of management. During the feedback process
(round two) this aspect was put to the panel, where a consensus was achieved
supporting that security’s role at the strategic level of management is the reduction of
security related organisational risks to facilitate the achievement of organisational
objectives.
8.2.3 Question three: Security’s body of knowledge
Question three asked panel members how they apply security’s body of knowledge
including theories, principles and specifically Defence in Depth. Panel member one
responded to this question explaining that within his organisation they work of a
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery model, stating, “I do employ Defence
in Depth, but Defence in Depth can be hard to implement in our environment, on the
ground because of environmental pressures”. According to panel member one, Defence
in Depth does work in some contexts, and he utilizes Crime Prevention through
Environmental Design (CPTED). However, panel member two responded that he
employs CPTED and Defence in Depth, in-line with organisation’s management
systems. Panel member three responded “I absolutely use Defence in Depth, with
multiple rings of protection. During the feedback process (round two) panel member
one supported that in applying the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery
aspects of this model relate to the functions of Defence in Depth interrelated with
CPTED principles to achieve prevention, preparedness and initial response aspects of
their model.

In addition, to this question member three responded that he utilizes a philosophy
incorporating a Triangle model (Figure 8.1). Member three refers to this as: The
Campbell Triangle, stating “this provides the means of interrelating the multiple rings of
protection”. These rings stem from the integration of Defence in Depth and CPTED
with the systems planning and development, the technological solution and the
management aspects of the holistic solution. According to member three, once you
define the multiple rings of protection, all elements of the triangle (Figure 8.1) must be
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completed. Furthermore, for this question member two responded that he sees risk
management, which underpins the implementation of security controls, to be part of the
body of knowledge employed. This view was also stated by panel member three,
research panel one.

Figure 8.1 The Campbell Triangle.
For this question a consensus was achieved, consistent with the results from the pilot
panel and research panel one. This consensus agreed that Defence in Depth coupled
with CPTED and risk management applied holistically, with all aspects integrated,
based on multiple rigs of protection, depending on risk, is the salient and consistent
strategy/means of employing security’s body of knowledge. The panel’s agreed that the
employment of such a body of knowledge, in-line with member one, research panel one,
must be very functional.

8.2.4 Question four: Defining systems
Question four explored all panel members’ understanding of a system in relation to
Section 2.2.2 Defining systems and Section 2.2.3 the systems approach, and asked panel
members to explain their understanding of a system. To this question panel member one
responded that a system is something logical in sequence, with a start and an end point,
which has a designated and predicted outcome. Panel member two responded similarly,
stating “systems are processes working towards an output or goal. Their key factor is
that their components are interrelated and interdependent”. According to panel member
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two, he considers the interrelationships. Panel member three expanded this explanation,
adding, “Each system in itself is a system of systems. Each system has to be integrated
into other systems, where each must play its part underpinned by mission critical
infrastructure”. In addition to this question, member one, research panel one, stated that
“a systems approach is a top down process”; however it should be seen as a whole.
During the feedback process all panel members supported this additional view point,
with panel member three responding, “Yes he is right. A security system is aggregating
a number of systems to achieve the solution”.

For this question all panel members considered that a system embodies something
purposely designed to achieve a designated goal or outcome, where a consensus was
achieved supporting the responses that each component must be integrated and play its
part in supporting other systems aspects. For this panel a consensus was reached that a
systems approach is a top down process (systems purpose) which ties or brings together
the separate components which have a defined role. These components are interrelated
with other aspects to facilitate the achievement of the systems overall design goal.

8.2.5 Question five: The systems approach to security
Question five asked panel members if they support a systems approach to implementing
effective security. In response to this question panel member one stated “as much as
practically possible”, where panel member two responded “yes”. In his response to this
question, panel member three stated “yes, any security solution is based on an
organisation’s physical and technical needs, all of which must be compatible,
homogeneous, and completely supporting the risk mitigation process”. A consensus was
reached within panel two, consistent with the pilot panel and panel one, with all panel
members supporting the systems approach to implementing effective security.

Consistent with research panel one, this consensus is congruent with the literature
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, establishing an open systems approach to Defence in
Depth, where such an approach was recommended by many published security
professionals. It is the systems approach to security risk reduction which frames this
research’s approach to understanding security decay. Therefore it is interpreted that a
consensus exists amongst the panel supporting the systems approach to security and
specifically, security risk management.
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8.2.6 Question six: Defining the systems approach to security
Question six asked panel members what they believed the systems approach to security
involves. Panel member one responded that the systems approach incorporates
prevention, response and recovery, and all aspects which fall in place to minimize the
occurrence of an event, and the processes in place to respond and recover. Panel
member two suggested a systems approach provides a holistic approach from beginning
to end, starting with policy, then infrastructure, and how this infrastructure relates to the
threats where the gap is the vulnerability. Panel member three responded stating “in-line
with my previous response”, refers back to the Campbell Triangle (Figure 8.1), “where
each system is a system within a system”.

During the feed back process panel member two participants were presented panel one
member one’s response, where according to this panel member a system approach is a
holistic approach that recognises the main contributions to the security solution, be they
management processes, procedures, technology, physical barriers, built environment
and people, and how each of these components are implemented to complement and
support each other. In his explanation of a systems approach panel one member one
drew on the Swiss cheese analogy presented in Standards Australia (HB 167: 2006, p.
59), where many security controls will exist in a “layered” or Defence in Depth
structure, under normal circumstances the holes in each layer are covered up by
subsequent layers of controls (Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.2 The systems approach to Defence in Depth (Standards Australia, HB 167:
2006, p. 59).
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Consistent with this approach, panel one member two, responded that the systems
approach to security is the same as the systems approach to any other organisational
aspect. That is, the Physical Protection System (PPS) broken down into its component
parts relies on the other components within the system, where if one component within
the system is broken or removed, this changes the whole system. For example, Defence
in Depth relies on all its elements to be interrelated and at their measure of
effectiveness. For this question, research panel two reached a consensus consistent with
research panel one, that the systems approach to security is a holistic approach, which
starts with a policy (systems purpose) and achieves its objective through the integration
of separate security components/ constituents, being physical, technical and procedural,
each with a defined role, that are implemented in a manner where their interrelations
compliment and influence each other to reduce security related risks in a preventative
manner. Where accordant with panel member two, the gap is the system’s vulnerability.
During the feedback process all panel members supported panel one member one’s
explanation, drawing on the Swiss cheese analogy to emphasise the systems approach to
achieving holistic security.

8.2.7 Question seven: System sensitivity
Question seven related to a premise within systems theory that small changes within a
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of systems, and asked panel
members wether they agree with this premise and explain their reasons.

To this question panel member one responded that it goes back to a disproportional
effect, one small aspect of change on a system can change the output significantly. This
view was also reported by panel member two, who stated “variable inputs can have
significant ramifications that can become confounded. Small changes in something like
Defence in Depth, such as a passive infrared detection sensor not detecting renders the
remainder of the system useless”. Such a view was also reported by panel member
three, who responded “absolutely”. Panel member three referred back to the Campbell
Triangle, stating “there is an interrelationship between the management, planning and
design and the technology aspects of the system, any changes in one area affects the
other interrelated areas.

A consensus was reached within the research panel supporting both this principle within
systems theory and that it applies to PPS. In addition, a consensus was reached
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supporting panel one member one’s Swiss cheese analogy of how small changes in a
PPS can lead to a weakness within the “system” based on the interrelations, where
according to panel one member one, due to the reliance on each element, small changes
can have a domino effect on each other elements that combines to the systems base
structure. These changes may be small, but if not considered in a holistic manner or
without clear understanding of why an element was implemented or structured in the
first place, you can change the basic premise of why and how it supported other
elements within the system.

According to panel one member one you can actually move the “holes” so that the holes
in the Swiss cheese now align (Figure 8.3), where if you do this with several or many
small changes, you can create a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to recognise.
In response to this, during the feedback process, panel member three stated “the holes
may not be in a direct line, but align for a specific threat agent (defined threat) across
the layers, where decay may only occur in one aspect of the Swiss cheese, where the
specific capabilities across the other two layers means they now can exploit this
vulnerability, creating for themselves ‘opportunity”.

Figure 8.3 The Swiss cheese model where the holes line up, creating a system
weakness.

8.2.8 Question eight: Physical security and key performance indicators
Question eight related to an aspect of systems theory which focuses on those key
performance indicators that are directly related to the “whole systems” indicator. It is
argued within the systems literature that “the ultimate aim is to discover those
components whose measures of performance truly relates to the measures of
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performance of the whole system” (Churchman, 1968, p. 43). As such, this question
asked panel members within their understanding of a systems approach, what they
believed the key performance indicators are within PPS.

To this question panel member one responded that these relate to the amount of who can
enter a restricted area, the identification that something has occurred, the assessment of
the situation, the communication of an event, plus the response to the event. This theme
was also followed by panel member two who responded that these (it) come back to
Defence in Depth and the SANDIA EASI model. That is, the EASI key performance
indicators linked into the operational key performance indicators that achieve a Defence
in Depth key performance indicator. According to panel member two, whilst each set of
measurements will be different, the structure will be the same. However, panel member
three responded that at present there is no standard and that he does not like the term
key performance indicator, as this potentially degrades the significance of their
performance of ensuring ongoing performance. Panel member three stated “what
concerns me is that you could end up with a tick in the box approach”. However, what
we need is some quantifiable measure to ascertain the system is performing what it is
designed for, that is, the holes in the Swiss cheese are not getting bigger or aligning
over time.

For this question, research panel one stated that key performance indicators are those
items that you can use to monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each
element of a system. If the key performance indicators are not being met, this could
strongly suggest that a specific element is not delivering the full capacity of outcomes
for which it was specifically designed. In applying panel member three’s views that we
require some quantifiable measure, research panel one reached a consensus that the key
performance indicators for a PPS at the tactical level of management were based on the
Defence in Depth elements. These measures commence with detection as an element,
that is, the systems probability of detection, then the probability of successfully
transmitting the alarm actuation, followed by a measure of accurate assessment
(discrimination) of the alarm cause, then a probability of communicating that alarm
source (probability of communication) to the appropriate response component of the
system. Once detection has been achieved the next key performance indictors include
delay aspects measured against the response capability, based on the mean averages,
becomes the systems measures. During the feedback process all panel members
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supported this approach, providing a consensus in-line with the pilot panel’s and
research panel one.

Consistent with panel member two, who responded that EASI key performance
indicators are linked into the operational key performance indicators that achieve a
Defence in Depth, the pilot panel and research panel one reported through consensus
that constituent performance measures across the built environment, management
processes and technology provide the operational level key performance indicators,
which link in to the tactical level key performance indicators to achieve the system’s
macro state. For example, according to panel one member three’s probability of
detection “we look at the selection of components from their individual key
performance indicators, then combine them together into a designed whole”.

During the feedback process all panel members supported this approach to articulating
the Defence in Depth key performance indicators. Although panel member three still
does not like the label key performance indicator, he states “I don’t disagree with this
aspect; you need some methodology to evaluate the system. However, a significant
cause of decay is a lack in professional management of the systems and what we don’t
want is a tick box process where it is perceived anybody can manage the system based
on the boxes. It still requires professional knowledge”.

8.2.9 Question nine: Key performance indicators and system effectiveness
Question nine asked panel members’ in relation to their responses to question eight, do
they believe the key performance indicators of systems are related to the systems
effectiveness and how?

To this question panel member one responded “yes” and “no”. According to panel
member one, quantitatively the only way to get an indication or answer of how the
system is doing is to look at the key performance indicators. However, with security
there are so many variables and the key performance indicators are not so clear. In-line
with this approach, panel member two responded “yes”, as long as they are selected
appropriately. They must show efficacy, achieving what they are designed to achieve as
the key performance indicators aim to measure and monitor the systems level of
efficacy. Panel member three responded that whatever you call them (the measures of
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performance) they are related to the system’s output. During the feedback process a
consensus was achieved, in-line with research panel one that the panel support that the
key performance indicators of the systems are related to the systems effectiveness.
8.2.10 Question ten: Security decay
Question ten asked panel members if, based on their experience, do they believe that
security systems decay. This question related to Section 4.1 (Chapter 4), which
postulates that all physical systems, if left to themselves (become closed) move towards
a state of decay, that is, maximize their entropy. To this question panel member one
responded “yes” they do, if they are not maintained, where panel member two
responded “yes of course”. Furthermore, panel member three stated “I believe security
systems categorically decay”. For example, Figure 8.4 indicates how decay is
considered in engineering aspects, where for a lighting system, within the systems life
cycle, maintenance considerations are programmed in to mitigate natural decay.
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Figure 8.4 Panel member three’s lighting system decay cycle. (Fink & Beaty, 1978, pp.
22-42).
However, panel member three stated “there is no reason in the world why you cannot
keep the system working properly; however, to achieve this over time maintenance
costs will increase”. All panel members responded “yes” to this question, providing a
consensus that based on their experience, they believe, congruous with this study’s
reviewed literature, security systems decay.

8.2.11 Question eleven: Understanding security decay
Question eleven asked panel members what their understanding of security decay was.
Panel member one responded stating “the degradation of security systems, processes
and hardware (security) arrangements, and personnel procedures”. Panel member two
expanded on this response, reporting that security decay is the decline in the efficacy
(effectiveness) and efficiency of the security function, and correlating increase in risk.
Also, the inappropriate response to security events which causes a new or updated
security function which has no impact in altering or managing the risk, decay leads to
adhoc security.

In response to this question, panel member three stated “people install systems that do
not understand what underpins them”. “We do design in parameters to facilitate for
decay, however, the lack of knowledge and management of these parameters leads to
security decay”. That is, a number of factors leads to security decay, these include: lack
of professional management; lack of continuity in educating management on how the
system works; lack of formal training; where training is handed down rather than
through formal processes; physical aspects decay through lack of maintenance; and
technology gets old and decays. To this question panel member three, referred back to
the Campbell Triangle (Figure 8.1); where according to panel member three, decay
occurs in all three aspects: management, technology and physical engineering. Panel
member three states, “You can build in quality that will maintain the system over time,
for its life cycle, at the design stage”.

During the feedback process research panel two were provided panel one member one’s
explanation, who stated;
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Security system decay is the degradation in the performance of an
element of the security solution, both as a single element performing a
specific function and its role in supporting other elements in their
function within the total system. This may not be a major failure of the
system, but mere incremental decrease in performance that occurs over
time. This decay may however occur incrementally and continue over
an extended period to the point it has a significant impact on
performance and effectiveness. Furthermore, this may be compounded
further where this decay occurs over many or all of the elements within
a system.
All research panel two members supported this explanation. Consistent with research
panel one to this question a consensus was achieved within research panel two
supporting that decay embodies all aspects, constituents and elements within PPS. That
is, all aspects of PPS decay, where decay occurs when performance falls below preset
parameters, where a lack of knowledge and professional management of these
parameters leads to decay, where based on the systems interrelationships, this decay
affects the rest of the system.
8.2.12 Question twelve: An experience approach to security decay
Question twelve sought an evidence based approach, exploring real world examples of a
time when panel members had experienced security decay. This question asked panel
members to provide an example of a time when they experienced security decay. Panel
member one reported experiencing security decay stemming from people’s apathy.
According to panel member one, for them, one day they give individuals an induction
awareness lecture relating to security, and they walk out and forget it immediately. Then
security processes decay over time when nothing happens, for example, people do not
report security incidents, even though they have been told and trained to report them.
This human failure breaks down the knowledge (intelligence) of what is occurring in the
field.

To this question panel member two responded that decay is often why he, as a
consultant, is called in to review security after an incident. According to panel member
two, security decay is often found in non-systems arranged approaches to security,
where isolated security measures are failing. As an example, panel member two
explains that during a cash handling audit he conducted for local government, where he
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found that whilst staff were of the belief they were protected by a duress alarm, the
alarm had been disconnected for two years. In addition, the built environment
maintenance had decreased due to leasing issues, where complete lack of security
management lead to security decay. However, the operational environment had also
changed, where cash movements had increased dramatically. In one of the cash
handling facilities a successful robbery occurred, where in response to the robbery the
security improvements were excessive after the fact.

Panel member three’s response to this question was
I cannot name specific organisations”, however, an audit I did was on an
old system, where I had the privilege of speaking to the people who set it,
when I conduct a security audit I look at: management; physical and
technical systems aspects. The system I was auditing had clearly suffered
decay because no-body wrote down in the first place what the system was
meant to achieve (no measures of performance). I found that a lack of
education and awareness existed in how the system is meant to operate.

According to member three, to overcome such systemic decay the systems purpose and
aspects needs to be written down, as a document. What occurs is that changes based on
wants are implemented; however such changes are made to satisfy people; not to
maintain the efficacy of the security plan. The system needs a defined security plan
otherwise changes occur which lead to decay.

A consensus was reached within research panel two, supporting Figure 8.5, which
highlights that consistent with each panel member’s experience all aspects of PPS
decay, where decay can occur in each aspect and based on the systems interrelations,
affect another aspect of the system.
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Figure 8.5 The interrelated aspects of a Physical protection System.
8.2.13 Question thirteen: A systems approach to security decay
Question thirteen asked panel members that in considering the argument that security
controls decay, how did they think this occurs within a systems approach to security?
Panel member one responded that normally a benign security environment leads to a
reduction in the security program, that is, small changes. These changes eventually
leave the system vulnerable so when something does happen, everybody’s guard is
down. This view was also considered by panel member two, who stated “systems
require efficiencies, where spending cuts within the system occur which can lead to a
large change within the system. However, panel member three once again referred to
the Campbell Triangle, stating “decay occurs in each or all aspects of the triangle
(Figure 8.1), when based on what a system is and how the system operates, decay
occurs according to what underpins the system”.

Panel member three’s views are consistent with panel one member one’s, who stated “I
believe that security decay within a PPS occurs within its individual elements, them
propagates through the system. Decay occurs at the base elemental level over time”. To
support this view, panel one member three, stated, “Any aspect of decay affects the rest
of the system”. For example, multiple false alarms can propagate through the rest of the
system, when complacency sets in alarm inputs are not discriminated or reported,
ultimately affecting the response aspect of the system. In addition, the pilot panel
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responded that decay also affects the systems deterrence aspect as well. During the
feedback process all panel member two participants responded that they support this
articulation of how decay occurs within a systems approach to security, where panel
member three states “yes it can, that’s a fact”.

A consensus was reached within this panel consistent with research panel one, that
within a systems approach to security, decay starts in one aspect of the system;
however, this can manifest simultaneously across several constituents. Then based on
the systems interrelationships such decay propagates throughout the remainder of the
system, ultimately affecting the systems response element and its deterrence aspects as
well.
8.2.14 Question fourteen: Error propagation in Physical Protection Systems
Question fourteen asked panel members whether they support the premise that security
decay within a PPS occurs within individual constituents, within the PPS and its effects
propagate through the system from this point. Panel member one responded “yes”,
stating; “something serious would have a knock on effect”. In addition, panel member
two responded “yes”, small changes can lead to large security implications, much like a
chain. A chain is only as good as its weakest link or point. When the weakest point
breaks the result can be larger. In response to this question, panel member three once
again refers to the Campbell Triangle (Figure 8.1), stating “yes, decay can occur in all
three elements, based on the triangle”.

During the feedback process all panel members were asked if they support that a
consensus was reached supporting this premise, based on the summary that “a system is
a combination of various inputs, where each of these inputs has a function in performing
a specific function and supporting functions of others (interrelationships) therefore
small changes across many/all elements can have a major impact on the system at the
macro level”, with all panel members supporting this interpretation.

8.2.15 Question fifteen: The Butterfly effect
Question fifteen asked panel members if they feel an effect referred to as the “Butterfly”
effect, which suggests small input changes within a system can result in large changes at
the macro output, applies to PPS. In his response to this question panel member one
stated, “Yes it does”, where in his organisation, if they did not conduct drug and alcohol
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testing, then this deficiency would lead to a security or safety event. Panel member two
responded, “yes”, as discussed earlier, “one small change leads to larger chain
reactions”. Panel member three responded every security system has two mission
critical aspects. First, the context is established, where the system is analysed for single
point failure. Second, you need to apply tools to look for the single point factor, which
leads to the “Butterfly” effect, to overcome it. According to panel member three,
compatibility of design considers inbuilt redundancy as key. If these aspects of system
design do not occur, yes you will have the “Butterfly” effect.

For this question both the pilot panel and research panel one supported the application
of the “Butterfly” principle to PPS. As such, a consensus was achieved across this
study, supporting the argument that the “Butterfly” effect, certain conditions considered,
does apply to a PPS.

8.2.16 Question sixteen: The effects of security decay
Question sixteen asked panel members what, based on their experience, did they think
the effects of decay were. To this question panel member one responded that decay
results in a more apathetic work force, where degradation may affect assets, personnel
and service delivery of your product. Panel member two responded, “Invariably it will
lead to a security related incident, a degree of loss, then in response, excessive spending,
and potentially re-justification of the system itself”. Consistent with member two’s
approach, member three responded that the effects of decay are directly proportional to
the loss of risk management. This outcome was also mentioned by panel member two
for question eleven, where according to panel member two, “decay relates to the decline
in the efficacy and efficiency of the security function, and its correlating increase in
risk”.

This outcome was also reported by member two of the pilot panel who stated “decay
ultimately diminishes the security objective, increases the vulnerability of the asset,
where this increase in vulnerability modifies the risk equation, where likelihood ratings
become elevated and risk factors become increased”. Research panel one supported this
aspect of decay where, through a consensus they supported that decay occurs at the
component/constituent level, then degrades key performance indicators, reducing subsystem key performance indicators. Such decay ultimately affects the risk reduction
aspects of the system, bearing a strategic impact on the organisation.
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A consensus was achieved across this study, with all panel members supporting the
argument that one of the salient effects of security decay is that risks increase as a direct
result of decay within a security system. That is, where decay increases so does system
vulnerability.

8.2.17 Question seventeen: Correcting security decay
This question asked panel members once decay has set in did they think its effects, both
at the point of manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are reversible.
Panel member one responded “yes”, but it does come down to leadership and
management support, and of course the necessary resources. According to panel
member one, “you need the will to turn decay around”. This view was also reported by
panel member two, who stated “yes they are reversible. Whether that happens comes
down to management structure, through maintenance review, awareness recognition,
and preventative maintenance”. Panel member three also supported the argument that
decay could be reversed, stating “absolutely”. According to panel member three, as
soon as decay has been recognised, through professional management of the problem,
the decay can be overcome. However, panel member three states that usually
independent audit is usually required to recognise decay.

During the feedback process (round two), panel members were provided with additional
information from panel one which reported through consensus that procedural decay
can be reversed and prevented through management, that is, ongoing monitoring and
reviewing of the people component of the system. However, technical and decay can
only be controlled and delayed through processes, where with proper maintenance
decay can be slowed and managed. In response to this additional information, both
panel members one and two supported this view.

However, panel member three provided an engineering clarification to this aspect,
stating
Technical aspects have a finite life, as do physical aspects (life cycle)
between 8-12 years for technology, stating “and it should be 8-10 years but
it is pushed to around 12”. However, there is no reason why the system
cannot be kept at its commissioned level of effectiveness, that is, at the
original detection capabilities. Both physical and technology can be
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maintained at that level over the cycle of the system. It can be maintained to
ensure over the systems life cycle that it performs at the desired capabilities,
commissioned level performance. This usually requires about 10% of its
purchase prices per year over the life cycle.
A consensus was reached supporting research panel one’s view that decay can only be
countered if it is understood.
8.2.18 Question eighteen: Avoiding security decay
Question eighteen asked panel members if they believe decay within a PPS could be
avoided. Panel member one responded “yes, possibly”. However, according to panel
member one, decay is a political concern rather than a technical aspect; it comes down
to management’s will. Panel member two also responded “yes”, stating “through proper
management, the monitoring and review of the systems key performance indicators, as
the key performance indicators tell you what is going wrong”. In addition, panel
member two added, through a system driven by clear policy. Panel member three
responded “absolutely, and unequivocally”. It can be done (avoided) through
professional management which looks after the technology, physical aspects and
operational aspects. If you manage the triangle (Figure 8.1) you manage the system and
avoid decay, that is, avoid the movement below the level of inbuilt redundancy (Figure
8.4).

During the feedback process (round two) panel members were provided research panel
one’s views, who argued that only procedural security decay can be avoided. However,
technical and physical decay can only be managed and its effects delayed through
proper monitored maintenance. In response to this information, panel member three
stated “security decay is a quantifiable factor, decay must be managed so it does not fall
below the inbuilt redundancy level”. As such, it is argued that a consensus exists across
the study that decay can be avoided or delayed through professional management,
which focuses on the aspects of panel member three’s triangle, where by focusing on
the systems performance measures (key performance indicators) enables the
professional management of the triangle, towards avoiding decay by ensuring the
system does not fall below its levels of inbuilt redundancy.
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8.2.19 Question nineteen: Security decay and risk management
Question nineteen asked panel members if they believe the concept of decay has a place
in the risk management process. Panel member one responded “yes, the context
section”, decay is a risk. This view was also reported by panel member two who stated
“yes, in establishing the context, security decay is a context, recognising it as a risk”.
Panel member three also responded yes, stating “you would have to assess for decay”.
To this question all panel members responded yes. In addition, a theme developed
throughout this study, supported through consensus, that decay needs to be considered
as a risk, recognised at the design stage, considered against its consequences, with a
view to countering it where practicable as a risk treatment, towards designing out decay,
then continually assessed for in the monitor and review stage.

8.2.20 Question twenty: Exploring security decay
Question twenty asked panel members if, based on their experience, is there any facet of
security decay which they could add to the research enquiry. Panel member two
responded that security decay is very common in various forms. However, according to
panel member one, security decay will be constantly driven by organisational culture,
then the resource prioritization, coupled with the threat landscape. This view was
supported by panel member three, who stated;
Decay is caused by a lack in professional management, security
management, that is: a lack of education, a lack of system awareness,
and employing the wrong people to manage it, this goes back to
quantifiable performance measures of the system”. “I have come across
systems in Asia where there is absolutely no decay. That is, there is no
procedural decay, and the technological and physical aspects of the
system

are

professionally

managed

in-line

with

the

systems

commissioning security management plan.

For this question research panel one reported that the ongoing professional management
of the system needs to be considered at the design stage, as part of the capital works
submission, at a strategic level of management, where you need to identify whether the
system you are putting in is achievable, and you can maintain the installed systems.
This response was supported by panel member three, who responded saying “decay can
be designed out, to a point, however, the system will cost around 10% of its purchase
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price annually to maintain it over its life cycle, and yes this should be considered at the
design stage.
8.3 Reflection
Reflecting over research panel two’s interview data, based on the principle of
triangulation, a measure of robustness has developed pertaining to the consistent themes
and core aspects associated with security decay within a systems approach to security.
Consistent with research panel one, research panel two supported that security
commences at the strategic level of management, where a security systems purpose is
established based on organisational risk reduction requirements. These requirements
direct the tactical level of security controls towards managing the threats that pose a risk
against organisational objectives. These controls are selected based on the Theory of
Defence in Depth and Crime Prevention through Environmental Control (CPTED)
achieved through the holistic integration of technology, physical controls and the built
environment, all with a specified role, combined with procedures and management
principles to achieve a pre-determined output goal. The aim is to implement a Physical
Protection System (PPS) which is commission against a defined benchmark, being the
defined risk reduction requirements “system’s purpose”.

Congruous with both the pilot panel and research panel one, research panel two agreed
through consensus that PPS suffer from decay. Such decay relates to the degradation in
effectiveness of individual constituents/components across all aspects of the built and
natural environments (CPTED), physical components, technological controls, security
procedures and management aspects within PPS. Due to the interrelated aspects of
systems in general and specifically PPS, decay in one aspect of the system, if
undetected or not treated/managed can propagate through the system from its point of
manifestation, impeding the efficacy of higher order aspect of within the system,
ultimately reducing the systems output product.

Research panel two agreed that security decay can be professionally managed, where
the system can, through professional knowledge, management support and the provision
of resources, be maintained to ensure it maintains its commissioned output performance
levels over its life cycle. Research panel two reported that the management of decay
starts at the design stage, in-line with research panel two, where decay is considered as a
risk, the system is designed to either avoid decay, or mitigate it from the beginning of a
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security project, and that the system must be reviewed as a “system” to detect and
correct decay before it leads to a security event.

8.4 Reliability and validity
Consistent with Chapter 7, this stage incorporated the reliability and validity controls of
triangulation and member checking. Triangulation was achieved using data inputs from
all three panel members. This principle is underpinned by the argument that where
consistent views are reflected and where consensus is achieved a higher level of
confidence can be inferred towards supporting the core themes and principles evolving
from the panel. In addition, member checking was incorporated into this panel, where
during the second round feed-back process each panel member was presented with a
transcript of their interview responses. Furthermore, each panel member was asked
whether they supported the interpretations drawn from the data, and were provided with
the opportunity to respond to these interpretations. These methodologies aimed to
establish a level of trust towards the inductive analysis prior to moving forward to the
deductive analysis phase.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the second stage of phase three, research panel two (n=3)
interview analysis. This analysis provided a detailed account of participant’s thoughts,
feelings and understanding relating to the phenomenon of security decay. As with
Chapter 7, the research questionnaire required panel members to reflect back on their
experiences within their respective security domains, inputting meaning retrospectively.
In addition, this panel was required to reflect on research panel one’s experience with
security decay towards developing stronger support towards their thoughts and feelings
relating to entropic security decay.

This reflection enhanced and strengthened support towards the core themes which have
evolved during this research enquiry, developing a consensus model within the study of
entropic security decay. These themes were consistent with research panel one and
included support towards the argument that security starts with a top down approach at
the strategic level of management. Risk reduction requirements then guides the
establishment of a systems parameters at the tactical level of management. This includes
holistically integrating: technology, physical controls, the built environment, and
procedural risk control aspects, all with a defined role are combined into an integrated
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“whole”. Consistent with research panel one, panel two supported that based on these
themes Physical Protection Systems (PPS) are commissioned against a risk management
benchmark, where all constituent aspects suffer decay. Decay within these constituents
is inevitable if not managed.

Congruous with Chapter 7, this chapter also presented measures of reliability and
validity (see Section 5.9), employing the principle of participant triangulation, drawing
on multiple participant information sources relating to security decay underpinned by
member checking, where during the second round interviews, panel members were
provided written transcripts of their interview responses towards establishing a measure
of truthfulness in this study’s research analysis. Such an approach allowed the primary
themes to be put forward in response to the study’s research question, considered in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 9

STUDY INTERPRETATION
9.0 Introduction
This chapter presents phase four of the study, the deductive analysis of security expert’s
thoughts, feelings and experience with decaying security systems. The chapter draws on
the conceptual review of security literature (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and system decay
(Chapter 4) benchmarks. The initial deductive analysis facilitated a response to the
study’s research sub-questions. This analysis then facilitated a response to the study’s
research question: Do security experts support the argument that security decay is
represented by “the gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents),
and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship between the microscopic and
macroscopic quantities within a security system”?

In response to the study’s various research questions the chapter is divided into a
number of sections. Section 9.1 provides the interpretative context for this study,
explaining the interrelated aspects of Physical Protection Systems (PPS). Sections 9.2,
9.3 and 9.4 provide responses to their relevant research sub-question, utilizing an
interpretative analysis and linking the deductive analysis from the three sub-questions
forming a response to the study’s research question. Section 9.5 presents a response to
the study’s research question. This response is supported by Section 9.6 the study’s
Security Decay preliminary item bank (Table 9.1), which provides a tabulated analysis
of participants thought, feelings and experience with security decay. This chapter is then
summarised with a conclusion (9.7).

9.1 Interpretation: The theory of entropic security decay
Security is a multi-disciplinary industry (Brooks, 2007, p. 1) and Physical Protection
Systems (PPS) are heterogeneous, where such parts are brought together to achieve an
output goal. To achieve this output goal a PPS aims to (A) deter, (B) detect, (C) delay
and (D) respond to security events. Accordant with Section 4.3, the theory of entropic
security decay, the sum of detect, delay and response (BCD) leads to A. In addition,
detect (B) (Action) and delay (C) (Interaction) leads to response (D) (Consequence).
These interrelations are achieved utilizing people, procedures, technology, and physical
properties. These combined phenomena draw on many heterogeneous categories with
varying domain specific specializations and are achieved by putting resources through a
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process to achieve an output function. Such a process, indicated by Figures 2.6 and 3.6,
conforms to the underpinning principles of General Systems Theory (GST) which
provides the scientific systems frame for the study.

In combining this diverse literature, the study’s research question seeks to determine if
security experts support the argument that security decay is represented by “the gradual
degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents), and, or, the gradual
degradation in the relationship between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities
within a security system”, as reported by Coole and Brooks (2009). It is argued this
research question can be responded to through the deductive analysis and synergy of the
following research sub-questions:
1. Do security experts support the systems approach to implementing effective
security controls?
2. Do security experts support the argument that security systems can and do suffer
from decay?
3. Do security experts support that security decay lies within the systems elements,
constituents and their interrelationship?

9.2 Research sub-question one.
In responding to this study’s overall research question, research sub-question one asks:
Do security experts support the systems approach to implementing effective security
controls?
In response to research sub-question one the aim is to interpret whether the study’s
research sample support a General Systems Theory (GST) approach, as it applies to
physical security, to implementing effective security controls. As with the pilot study,
this interpretation will be framed around the core principles underpinning GST.
Congruous with the writings of Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation
was achieved through a deductive, interpretative analysis, responding to the subquestion by drawing on the inductive analysis from each research panel and the study’s
benchmarks (Chapters 2, 3 and 4).
9.2.1 Research sub-question one: the systems approach to physical security.
The systems approach towards implementing effective physical security is supported by
many published security authors (Underwood (1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997, p. 59;
Garcia, 2001, p. 6; Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164). For example, according to Fisher and
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Green (2003, p. 147) every security program must be an integrated “whole”. A view
depicted by Fennelly (1997, p. 59) who states “maximum security is a concept, whereas
alarm systems, physical barriers, guard forces and other components of a security
system do not individually (silo thinking) achieve this”. Congruous with Fennelly’s
(1997) view Underwood (1984, p. xi) emphasises the Gestalt approach stating “this
combined should be seen as a whole”. Accordant with this combined literature, both
research panels reported that they support such a systems approach to security risk
reduction, with all panel members responding “yes” they support a systems approach
towards security. Furthermore, panel one member one added, “as long as the systems
are properly designed tools for the management of the security risk”. To this point,
panel two member three stated, “any security solution is based on an organisation’s
physical and technical needs, all of which must be compatible, homogeneous and
completely supporting the risk mitigation process”.

Research panel one reported that a systems approach to security relates to how
organisational security risks can be reduced using a top “down process”, tying together
separate security components/constituents that have a defined role. According to panel
one, these components are interrelated with other aspects to facilitate the achievement
of the systems overall goal. Such a depiction conforms to the writings of Bertalanffy
(1968, p. 19) who considers a system to be “a set of elements standing in interaction”.
For example, panel one member two stated “a system ties together a group of elements
and constituents which maintain a role towards an overall outcome, where all aspects
are interrelated”. This view was supported by panel one member one, who stated:
“the systems approach is a holistic approach, “seen as a whole”. It
requires structure with good interactions between components (highly
interrelated) interface between components, “it’s a top down
process”.
Panel one’s viewpoint is compatible with Midgley’s (2003, p. 64) standpoint who states
“the systems approach is focused strongly towards the interrelationships within, where,
it is these interrelationships which tie the system together”.

Research panel two’s responses were congruous with research panel one, where
consistent with the GST literature, panel two reported that a systems approach is a
logical sequential process with a start and end point, which has a designated
predetermined outcome. Panel two reported that a key factor in supporting a system
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approach is that the components of a PPS are interrelated and interdependent, with each
sub-system being a system of systems. That is, based on an orderly relationship each
constituent within a PPS is unable to achieve its output without the cooperation and/or
interaction of other constituent parts. For example, according to member three, “every
system has to be integrated into other systems, where each must play its part
underpinned by mission critical infrastructure”, where uniform with panel one’s
opinion, utilizing a top down process. Such a consensus is true to the writings of
Bertalanffy (1968) and Midgley (2003) where according to Midegley (2003) the
systems approach is focused strongly towards the interrelationships within, these
interrelationships which tie the system together.

In responding to sub-question one, accordant with Checkland’s (1980) view that all
physical systems are created for a specific purpose, panel one agreed that from a
functional perspective security, and therefore the “Physical Protection System’s
purpose”, at the strategic level of management is to reduce an organisation’s risk
exposure, both functionally and through deterrence. For example, member one stated
“security’s role is the protection of people”, where member two added “the protection
of assets, including: people, information and physical property, integrated to assist the
organisation to achieve its specific business objectives”. However, member one added
“it needs to be very functional”. Panel one’s viewpoints were supported by panel two,
where they reported that security’s role therefore that system’s purpose, at the “strategic
level” of management, relates to the reduction of an organisations risk. For example,
panel two member two stated “security’s role is to manage the various security related
risks for specific organisations”. A view supported by member three who stated “the
role is to manage the threats that pose to risk to either: institutional, commercial and
industrial organisations to mitigate risks”.

In evaluating the evidence supporting the systems approach to implementing effective
security, research panel one suggested that organisational risk reduction is achieved
through the holistic implementation of security’s body of knowledge. According to
panel one this body of knowledge saliently employs the theory of Defence in Depth,
integrated with Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), as a
“system”. For example, member one stated “Defence in Depth is an absolute”, where
member two stated “I combine all aspects of Defence in Depth and CPTED”. Panel
one’s standpoint was also reported by panel two, where panel members agreed that such
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risk reduction is achieved through the holistic implementation of security’s body of
knowledge, including Defence in Depth, integrated with Crime Prevention though
Environmental Control (CPTED) and underpinned by security risk management. For
example, member three stated “I absolutely use Defence in Depth, with multiple rings of
protection’. Such views are congruous with the writings of Smith (2003, p. 8) who
explains that Defence in Depth as a functional strategy has been applied to the
protection of assets for centuries.

In pursuing a chain of evidence to respond to sub-question one, research panel one
reported that the systems approach to security is the same as the systems approach
towards achieving any other business objective. Member two stated:
“the systems approach to security is the same as the systems approach with
any organisation aiming to achieve business objectives”. That is, “the system
broken down into its component parts relies on the other components within
the system, where if one component is broken, or removed, this changes the
whole system”.

According to panel one, a functional physical security system is achieved through the
combining of procedural, physical and technological measures to protect an
organisation’s assets, which includes people, information and physical property through
their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to adversary threats. Such views are
supported by the writings of Bertalanffy (1968, p. 18) who considers the systems
approach to be focused on forms of “wholeness”, where wholeness relates to problems
of organisation where phenomena are not observable by respective parts in isolation.

Uniform with panel one’s views panel two reported that this involves “a holistic
approach from beginning to end”, with member two stating “starting with policy, then
infrastructure, and how this infrastructure relates to the threats”. According to panel
two, each aspect of a security system has a defined role and implemented in a manner
where their interrelationships compliment and influence each other to reduce security
risks. Both research panel’s perspectives are congruous with Standards Australia (HB
167: 2006), Security Risk Management, which states, “In addressing security risk
concerns, the key elements of organisational, community and individual security
controls are those components which contribute to the management of risk through their
ability to deter, detect, delay, respond to and recover from adversary attack”.
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Further evidence indicating support towards the systems approach stems from both
research panels agreement towards a systems principle stipulated by Churchman (1968,
pp. 42-43). This principle purports that as individual measures of performance of a
system’s constituent components increases so does the holistic measure of performance
of the total system. In considering this proposition, research panel one supported that
the key performance indicators of the system are related to the systems effectiveness.
For example, panel one members two and three stated:
“we select individual components from their individual key performance
indicators, then, combine then together into a “designed whole”. The overall
key performance indicator provides a strategic level of monitoring
effectiveness...this is your means of ensuring elements are achieving your
design goals”.

Research panel one agreed that within a systems approach to physical security, the key
performance indicators of a PPS at the “tactical level” of management were based on
the Defence in Depth elements. For example, member three stated “the key performance
indicators for a PPS are the core elements of Defence in Depth, where the panel agreed
that these start with the probability of detection, then the probability of successfully
transmitting an alarm actuation, followed by a measures of accurate assessment
(discrimination), then a probability of communicating that alarm source (probability of
communication) to the appropriate response component of the system. Once detection
has been achieved, the next key performance indicators include delay aspects measured
against the response capability, based on the mean averages.

Panel one’s viewpoint relating to the writings of Churchman (1968) was supported by
research panel two. For example, members one and three stated:
“key performance indicators are those items that you can use to monitor
the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each element of a system.
If the key performance indicators are not being met, this could strongly
suggest that a specific element is not delivering the full capacity of
outcomes for which it was specifically designed”. Congruous with this
viewpoint, member three stated, “I don’t like the term key performance
indicator, however, whatever you call them, we need some quantifiable
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measures to ascertain the system is performing what it was designed for,
that is, the holes in the Swiss cheese are not getting bigger over time”.

Panel two supported that the key performance indicators (measures) for a PPS at the
“tactical level” of management were based on the Defence in Depth elements. Member
two stated “this comes back to the Defence in Depth and the SANDIA (EASI) model,
that is, the EASI key performance indicators”. Research panel two agreed that the key
performance indicators (measures) start with detection as an element, that is, the
systems probability of detection, then the probability of successfully transmitting the
alarm actuation, followed by a measure of accurate assessment (discrimination) of the
alarm cause, then a probability of communicating that alarm source (probability of
communication) to the appropriate response component of the system. Once detection
has been achieved, the next key performance indicators include delay and response
aspects measured against the response capability based on mean averages, become the
systems measures.

Both research panels consensus is consistent with the works of Spencer (1998, p. 3) and
Garcia (2001, p. 246), where according to Spencer (1998, p. 3) overall system
performance measures are achieved through the combining of component subsystem
performance measures. Spencer’s (1998, p. 3) view is uniform to panel one member
three, who stated “We select individual components from their individual key
performance indicators, then, combine them together into a designed whole”, where
according to Garcia (2001, p. 246) the overall performance measures for a PPS is the
integrated measure of the detection, delay and response functions.

Evidence indicating the research sample’s support towards the systems approach to
implementing effective security also stems from their support towards Waldman’s
(2007, p. 272) standpoint that as part of a system changes, the nature of the overall
system changes. Research panel one provided consensus support towards the
proposition that small changes within a specific component can lead to a large change at
the output of systems. For example, panel one member one stated “due to the reliance
on each element, small changes can have a domino effect on each of the other elements
that combines to the system’s base structure”. In addition, consensus support towards
this principle within the context of physical security was also reported by research panel
two. For example, panel members three and two stated:
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“absolutely, (referring back to the Campbell Triangle), “there is an
interrelationship between the management, planning and design and the
technology aspects of the system, any changes in one area affects the other
interrelated areas”, where member two stated “small changes in
something like Defence in Depth, such as a passive infrared detection
sensor not detecting renders the remainder of the system useless”.

Panel member two’s example is supported by Garcia (2006, p. 14) who explains that to
be effective, a detection capability must ensure its sensors are correct for their
application, installed correctly, have a low nuisance alarm rate and be difficult for the
threat to defeat. Where according to Adams, et al, (2005, p. 2) factors such as corroded
wires could impede this capability, as stated by King (2008, p. 1) “it is the erosion of
seemingly minor security controls which eventually leads to a security incident,
resulting in a loss event”.

Waldman’s (2007, p. 272) standpoint according to Peirce (2000, p. 5) is what Lorenz
(1968, p. 306) referred to as the “Butterfly Effect”, which describes the principles of
error propagation within a system. Accordant with this underpinning principle of
systems theory, research panel one supported the application of Lorenz’s (1968)
“Butterfly” metaphor to physical security. For example, panel one member one stated:
“a system is a combination of elemental inputs, the system is very much
dependant on the correct operation of the effectiveness of each of these
elements performing their function and supporting functions of other
elements. Therefore, small changes in the elements, particularly where it
occurs across many/all elements can have a major impact on “system”
output at the macro level”.

Such support towards the “Butterfly” effect was also reported by research panel two,
with all members responding “yes” they feel this effect applies to PPS. To this aspect of
systems theory member one stated “Defence in Depth relies on all its elements to be
integrated and at their measures of effectiveness”. In addition, member two stated “one
small change leads to a larger chain reaction”, where member three reported that
unless the system is designed and managed for single point failure, that is, the
appropriate amount of inbuilt redundancy, “yes, you will have the Butterfly effect”.
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9.2.2 Research sub-question one deductions
In responding to sub-question one the available evidence indicates that both research
panels’ views relating to the implementation of effective security controls are accordant
with the various underpinning principles of General Systems Theory (GST). It is argued
that both research panels consensually agree to the systems purpose, its functions and its
architecture, and comprehend the various interrelations, organisation and orderly
aspects which achieve the systems output goal. Furthermore, both panels thoughts
relating to how, based on the systems interrelating aspects, small changes in one area of
a system are associated with changes throughout the remainder of the system, and how
these changes directly affect the various sub-systems and “whole” systems macro-state
(key performance indicators) are congruous with the literature underpinning GST.
Based this analysis, it is put forward that in response to sub-question one, it can be
argued that both research panels do support the systems approach to implementing
effective security controls.
9.3 Research sub-question two: The phenomenon of security decay
Research question two directly relates to the premises of Underwood (1984) and
McClure’s (1997) writings, where according to Underwood (1984, p. xi) “security
decay” is the most serious threat to a security systems and “security decay” must be
expected. Research question two asks, “Do security experts support the argument that
security systems can suffer from decay”? In response to research question two, the aim
was to interpret whether panel members support the argument that “security systems”
suffer from decay. Accordant with Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation
was achieved by drawing on the conceptual review of literature as an existing
benchmark to deductively test and affirm the research data in response to this research
question. This interpretation was framed around the panel’s understanding of their real
world experience (evidence) relating to decay within Physical Protection Systems
(PPS), achieved by comparing the data analysis of the panel interviews to the
embodying literature presented in the conceptual review of literature (Chapters’ 2, 3 and
4).
9.3.1 Research sub-question two Interpretation: security decay
Accordant with Underwood (1984, p. xi; Howlet, 1995, p. 222; McClure, 1997; King,
2008, p. 1) research panel one reported that they believe “security systems” suffer from
decay. For example, all members responded “yes” they believe security systems suffer
from decay, where member one stated “I do believe that security systems can and do
210

experience decay”, with member two stating “yes they do decay”. Such a consensus
supporting the argument that security systems decay was also reported by research panel
two. Again all panel members responded “yes”, where member three stated “I believe
security systems categorically decay”. Member three’s view was supported by member
two, who stated “security decay is common in various forms”.

The results of this question are uniform with King (2008, p. 1) who applies Lovey and
Manohar’s (2007, p. 99) and Styer’s (2000, p. 1) views to explain the decay of physical
protection systems, stating that security controls inevitably degrade over time as a result
of natural entropy. For example, panel two member one responded, “yes they do, if they
are not maintained”. Member one’s point is congruous with Howlet (1995, p. 220) who
stated “without proper maintenance the system will not work”. In explaining his
understanding of security decay, panel one member one, stated:
“security decay is the degradation in the performance of an element of the
security solution, both, as a single element performing a specific function,
and the elements role in supporting other elements in their function within
the total system”.

This approach was supported by panel one member three, who stated “key performance
indicator reduction at the micro-level reduces key performance indicator at the macro
level”. Member three’s viewpoint is compatible with Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (Section 4.4),
and conforming to Pitzer’s (1995, p. 30) sentiment that entropy is an extensive property,
where the entropy of a system is equal to the sum of the entropies of its parts (see
Equation 26). That is, the entropy of a system is a macro state. Such views were also
reported by research panel two, where member two stated, “decay relates to the decline
in the efficacy and efficiency of the security function, and its correlating increase in
risk”. Such a view was also reported by member three, who stated “the effects of decay
are directly proportional to the loss of risk management”. Members two and three’s
views indicates that as decay increases, risk reduction decreases and opportunity for a
defined threat increases. These views are consistent with the propositions represented in
Figure 4.2 and Equation 28.

Furthermore, panel one member one adds “decay may not be a major failure of a
system, but more incremental decrease in performance that occurs over time”.
Nonetheless, panel member two added, “decay may occur incrementally or rapidly”.
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For example, procedural decay may occur rapidly. Furthermore, decay may continue
over an extensive period, to the point where it has significant impact on performance
and effectiveness. This view was supported by the pilot panel’s findings, suggesting that
if one component fails, its key performance indicator is reduced and such component
failure reduces the effectiveness of the response force key performance indicator,
ultimately reducing the overall protection process, (see Section 4.11, Tables 4.1 and
4.2). In addition, according to panel one member two, decay may be further
compounded where it occurs over many or all elements within a system, which can lead
to major failure.

The panel’s views relating to security decay are congruous with the writings of Konicek
and Little (1997, p. 18. For example, Konicek and Little (1997, p. 18) state, “a security
systems is only as good as its parts, when a single part fails, this failure can cause
degradation of the total system. A standpoint supported by Garcia (2006, p. 26) who
states, “system effectiveness can become degraded through the reduction in
effectiveness of individual components”, where according to Standards Australia
HB167 (2006, p. 62) a small change in control effectiveness may have a substantially
magnified effect on vulnerability. It is these combined viewpoints which draw on the
writings of Lorenz (1968, p. 306) who referred to this aspect of systems theory as the
“Butterfly Effect”, to describe how error propagation occurs within a system.

In examining the argument that security systems decay, research panel one considered
that the effects of decay were as heterogeneous as the system itself, where according to
panel one member three, “decay leads to a breakdown in reliability, and increases the
risk of significant events occurring” (see Equation 28). Research panel one agreed that
all Physical Protection Systems (PPS) decay, where all physical and technical aspects
components have a life cycle. However, according to research panel one, the effects of
decay can be managed, delaying its onset through processes, that is, with monitored
maintenance. For example, member one stated “decay is like risk, you can mitigate
some decay, you can accept some decay, and you can reduce the impact”. This view is
accordant with the writings of Byeon (1999, p. 287) who states “open frame systems are
able to circumvent the effects of the second law of thermodynamics (entropy law)
through their feedback processes”.
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Congruous with research panel one panel two, member three stated, “decay occurs in all
aspects: management, technology and physical engineering”. Panel two supported the
argument that all PPS decay, stating “all physical and technical components have a life
cycle”, where congruous with member three, “decay occurs in each, or all, aspects of
the triangle (see Figure 7.4), based on what a system is, and how the system operates,
decay undermines the system”. The research sample’s views are congruous with the
writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) who argue that all
physical systems, if left to themselves, tend to maximise their entropy true to the laws of
thermodynamics. Within the context of physical security, this view is supported by
Underwood (1984) and Howlet (1995), where according to Underwood (1984, p. 252)
whatever security measures were established initially, they would not last forever,
where according to Howlet (1995, p. 219) “that from the time of taking a system into
use, it will start to deteriorate”.

In response to sub-question two, panel two member three felt that a number of factors
lead to security systems decaying. Member three stated:
“people who have systems installed that do not understand what underpins
them, systems are designed with parameters to facilitate for decay, a lack
in professional system management, that is, a lack of knowledge to manage
these parameters, a lack in education, in formal training leads to decay
within Physical Protection Systems”.

Member three’s views are consistent with the writings of Garcia (2006, pp. 24-25) who
states “systems engineering considers both business objectives and the technical needs
of customers. This is an approach concerned with the integration of functional, technical
and operational requirements, where integration includes physical, electrical, customer
needs, technical performance, safety, reliability, procedures, personnel, training, testing
and life cycle of the systems solution”. Congruous with Garcia’s (2001, pp. 24-25)
writings, panel two, member three stated:
“there is no reason why the system cannot be kept at its commissioned level
of effectiveness. That is, at the original detection capabilities, both physical
and technology can be maintained at that level over the cycle of the system.
It can be maintained to ensure over the systems life cycle, that it performs at
the desired capabilities “commissioned level performance”.
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Such a standpoint was supported by Howlet (1995, pp. 219-220) who states “no system,
however well designed, can be completely reliable without proper maintenance. If left
without attention (proper maintenance), it will become unserviceable, that is, not work.
The operator may not be aware of it, but the system will now perform as intended”.
Congruous with Garcia’s (2006) writings and according to member three, the avoidance
of decay requires professional management of the system. Panel two member three
further states, “I have come across systems in Asia where there is absolutely no decay.
That is, there is no procedural decay, and the technological and physical aspects of the
system are professionally managed in-line with the systems commissioning security
management plan”. This experience suggests a cultural aspect to security decay.

Nevertheless Underwood (1984, p. xi) wrote, decay should be avoided and countered
where possible, most of all, it must be expected. In relation to countering decay panel
two member one, responded “decay is reversible, however it comes down to leadership
and management support, and of course the necessary resources, stating “you need the
will to turn decay around”. This view was supported by member three, who considered
security decay to be a phenomenon which could be both reversed and avoided, stating:
“as soon as decay has been recognised, through professional management
of the problem, “decay” can be overcome”. “Decay is a quantifiable
factor; decay must be managed so it does not fall below the inbuilt
redundancy level”.
These views are compatible with the writings of Byeon’s (1999, p. 287) who explains
that open frame systems are able to circumvent the effects of the second law of
thermodynamics (entropy law) through their feedback processes (management and
maintenance).

In responding to sub-question two, all panel one members reported real world examples
of how they have experienced decay or degradation within PPS. For example, panel one
member one provided a substantial list of examples where he has observed decay
manifestation within PPS. member one states:
“poor maintenance of the environment in which PPS components are
deployed leads to decay, based on the interrelated aspects of PPS elements.
That is, weeds or feral growth in detection zones triggers high nuisance
alarm rates, or poor electronic system maintenance having the same effect”.
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As Howlet (1995, p. 220) writes, without proper maintenance the system will not work,
where he states “ideally maintenance should be considered at the design stage, and that
maintenance costs are very closely tied to the original design specifications of the
system. Furthermore, member one responded that a lack of ongoing operator training, or
operator training through handed down experience rather than through formal training
processes ultimately leads to decay in the system as a “whole”. In addition, panel one
member two provided similar views, stating:
“I have noticed that as staff competencies fluctuate, this fluctuation alters
individual key performance indicators, where decay occurs in relation to the
reduction in competencies and capabilities of the people components”.

Member two’s experience was supported by member three who responded similarly
with
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familiarization/awareness with procedural security during system checks leads to decay
within the system. Such procedural decay results in technical decay; as it is not known
if systems are truly working around its designed parameters”. The human aspect of
security decay was considered by Underwood (1984, p. 250) who states “it is important
that the security operation is subject to the same management-by-objectives as the other
management functions in an organisation”. In addition, all panel two participants
reported real world examples of how they have experienced decay or degradation within
PPS. For example, panel two member three, stated:
“I conducted a security audit of an old system; when I do an audit I look at
management, physical and technological aspects. The system I was auditing
had clearly suffered decay because no-body wrote down in the first place
what the system was meant to achieve (no measures of performance). I
found that a lack in education and awareness in how the system was meant
to operate lead to decay”.

An example based support towards the phenomenon of security decay was also
provided by member two. Member two stated “decay is often why I as a consultant is
called in, in the first place, to review security after an incident. In our experience we
find that security decay occurs in non systems arranged approaches to security, where
isolated security measures are failing”. Member two states “during a security audit I
found that whilst staff believed they were protected by a duress system, the system had
been disconnected for two years”. Uniform with research panel one, a consensus was
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achieved that decay embodies all aspects, constituents and elements within PPS.
Research panel two reported that all aspects of PPS decay, where such decay occurs
when performance falls below the system’s preset parameters. In addition, panel two
member two responded “after a security event, often the security improvements become
excessive”. This view was supported by Underwood (1984, p. 249) who writes, “the
immediate reaction is often to increase the security measures established, but in fact this
is not usually necessary and all that may be required is the re-establishment of the
intended level of protection”.
9.3.2 Research sub-question two deductions
In response to sub-question two the evidence indicates that a consensus was reached
within the study, where both research panels one and two supported the argument that
security systems “do suffer from decay”. The research sample’s outcome is congruous
with the pilot panel’s finding. Accordant with the pilot panel’s outcome, the evidence
suggests that such decay relates to a failure to maintain security “systems” at their
commissioned operating levels of effectiveness, diminishing their ability to deliver the
required output goal (risk reduction).

9.4 Research sub-question three
Research question three directly related to the premises of Coole and Brooks (2009),
and focused on the heterogeneous aspects of the Physical Protection “System” (PPS), in
response to writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1). Lovey
and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) stated that “all physical systems, if left
to themselves, tend to maximise their entropy, true to the laws of thermodynamics”.
Accordant with the writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1)
sub-question three asks “Do security experts support that security decay lies within the
systems elements, constituents and their interrelationship”?

9.4.1 Research sub-question three Interpretation
The study asked panel members that in considering the argument that security controls
decay, how did they think this occurs within a system approach to security? Too this
question panel one member one stated:
“decay within a PPS occurs within its individual elements, and propagates
through the system. Decay occurs at the base level over time. This decay at
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elemental level occurs through many causes, and the effect can result in
major system breakdown”.
Panel one member two responded similarly, stating “decay occurs at the element level,
the efficacy of the system decays as small changes occur, changes start small, however,
spread when not detected and managed”, where according to member two, procedural
decay starts initially, stating “procedural decay occurs when staff no longer maintains
their initial personnel based key performance indicators, where this initial decay
propagates throughout the remainder of the system”. Panel one’s viewpoints are
compatible with Section 4.4 (Tables 4.1 and 4.2) which indicate how changes in a
Physical Protection System’s (PPS) microstates have a direct effect on its macro-state
output measure.

Panel one’s thoughts relating to security decay from a systems approach were also
reported by research panel two. For example, panel two member three, stated “decay
occurs in each, or all aspects of the triangle (Figure 8.1), where based on what a system
is, and how the system operates, decay occurs in-line with what underpins them”.
During Delphi method round two all research panel two participants responded that they
support research panel one’s articulation of how decay occurs within a systems
approach to security.

A consensus was reached within research panel two congruous with research panel one
that within a systems approach to security, decay starts in one aspect of the system;
however, this can be manifest simultaneously across several constituents. Then based on
the systems interrelationships, decay propagates throughout the remainder of the
system. Such propagation ultimately affects the system’s response element and its
deterrence aspects as well. For example, panel two member one stated “something
serious would have a knock-on effect”, where member two states, “small changes can
lead to large security implications, much like a chain. A chain is only as good as its
weakest link or point. When the weakest point breaks, the result can be large”. Both
research panel’s views relating to security decay from a systems approach conform with
the early works of Isacc Newton who stated “the extension, hardness, impenetrability,
mobility and inertia of every object, depends on, the extension, hardness,
impenetrability, mobility and inertia of its component parts (The Open University,
1976, p. 68).
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Within the context of PPS, Newton’s views are supported in the writings of Garcia
(2006, p. 29) who states “system effectiveness can become degraded through the
reduction in effectiveness of individual components”. As Koniceck and Little (1997, p.
184) state “when a single part of a security system fails, such failure can cause
degradation within the total system”. Uniform with this view, panel one member three
stated “the selection of components is made based from their individual key
performance indicators, such as probability of detection, nuisance alarm rate etc, then
we combine them together into a designed “whole” .

A consensus was reached within the research panel one that decay occurs within a PPS,
within individual constituents and its effects propagate through the system from this
point. For example, panel one member one stated:
“a system is a combination of elemental inputs, the system is very much
dependant on the correct operation of the effectiveness of each of these
elements in performing their function and supporting functions of other
elements”.

The panel’s responses are uniform to the literature stemming from Bertalanffy (1950;
1968) and Konicek & Little, 1997; Mosely and Coleman, 2000; Garcia 2006; Broder,
2006; Waldman, 2007). Furthermore, in providing his examples of decay manifestation
within a PPS, panel one member one stated:
“each of the above may have only minor degradation, or degradation that is
not significant in its own sphere, the accumulated impact however,
presented significant risk. In this instance it was clear that the input
changes or performance degradation with each element had the potential to
result in large change or performance degradation without evaluation in
consideration of the total PPS”.

Such a consensus was also reached by research panel two. For example, panel two
member three stated, “each system is a system of systems. Each system has to be
integrated into other systems, where each must play its part, underpinned by mission
critical infrastructure”. Research panel two supported the views of research panel one,
who reported that the systems approach to security embodies the Physical Protection
System (PPS) broken down, into its component parts, which relies on the other
components within the system, where if one component within the system is broken or
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removed, this changes the whole system. Once again, this view is uniform to Koniceck
and Little’s (1997, p. 184) who stated “when a single part of a security system fails,
such failure can cause degradation within the total system”.

The combined panels thoughts, feelings and experiences towards security decay are
accordant with Section 4.3.2 (Chapter 4) which discusses the effects of entropic decay
on PPS. Section 4.3.2 purports the original decay within a PPS expands to the
boundaries of that specific subsystem component, resulting in a failure within this
specific part of the system. Based on the system interrelationships between the Defence
in Depth elements, results in the system becoming disordered, ultimately causing this
point disturbance propagating through the remainder of the defence in depth system. In
considering this aspect of security decay, all panel members supported the application
of the “Butterfly” metaphor to PPS, which has been used to articulate such interrelated
aspects of specific systems. For example, according to panel one member two, “system
training has a macro-level output through the system. However, over time the training
levels set at the system’s commissioning are allowed to decline, then the level of staff
competency declines, affecting the remainder of the system”. This view was also
reported by panel one member one, and panel two member three.
9.4.2 Research sub-question three deductions
Based on the available literature, it is argued that the evidence indicates both research
panels support the argument that security decay lies within the systems elements,
constituents and their interrelationships. That is, based on panel member’s responses, all
panel members’ support that decay occurs at the constituent level, manifests, then
expands to incorporate and affect specific sub-system key performance indicators. Then
expands to the specific Defence in Depth element for which it is located. Such decay
then propagates throughout the remainder of the Defence in Depth system from that
point, ultimately affecting the systems macro-state key performance indicator (Pi) based
on the systems interrelations, consistent with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950; 1968).

9.5 Research question Interpretation
Results of the study indicates that both research panels, and the pilot panel’s views
relating to the implementation of effective security controls are congruous with the
measures discussed in the study’s security benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Accordant
with the underpinning principles of General Systems Theory (GST) all study panels
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understand the systems purpose, its functions and its architecture, and comprehend the
various interrelations, organisation and orderly aspects which achieve the systems
output goal. Furthermore, all panels support and understand how, based on the systems
interrelating aspects, small changes in one area of a system are associated with changes
throughout the remainder of the system, and how these changes directly affect the
various sub-systems and “whole” systems macro-state (key performance indicators).

In addition, a consensus was reached across the study’s participant sample with the pilot
panel, and research panels one and two supporting the study’s security decay
benchmark premise (Chapter 4) that physical security systems (Physical Protection
Systems) “do suffer from decay”. The panels supported that such decay relates to a
failure to maintain security “systems” at their commissioned operating levels of
effectiveness” and to deliver their required output goal (risk reduction).

Furthermore, all panels supported the argument that security decay lies within the
systems elements, constituents and their interrelationships. That is, based on participants
responses, all panel members support that decay occurs at the constituent level,
manifests, then expands to incorporate and affect specific sub-system key performance
indicators, then expands to the specific Defence in Depth element for which it is
located, propagating throughout the remainder of the Defence in Depth system from that
point. Such decay propagation ultimately affects the systems macro-state key
performance indicator (Pi) based on the systems interrelations, true to the writings of
Bertalanffy (1950; 1968).

In responding to the study’s research question it is argued that the available evidence
from the study indicates that the participant sample (N=9) collectively supported the
view that security decay can be represented as “the gradual degradation of the
microscopic quantities (constituents), and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship
between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system”.

9.6 Security decay preliminary item bank
Consistent with the writings of Loewanthal (2001, p. 3) (Section) Table 9.1 presents the
security expert’s pool of variables and factors (item bank) associated with the concept
of security decay. This item bank is underpinned by the expert panel’s thoughts,
220

feelings and experience with degradation within Physical Protections Systems (PPS).
Table 9.1 highlights participant’s real world experiences and explanations relating to
security decay.
Table 9.1 Security decay preliminary item bank

PPS Components

Decay Categories
Phenomenon

Condition
Technical

People

Consequence

Poor detection system
maintenance

Triggers increased
nuisance alarm rates

Staff ignore alarm, or,
do not assess alarm
causes properly
reducing probability of
accurate assessment
KPI.

Incorrect technical
maintenance

Causes high nuisance
alarm rates.

Staff
become
complacent, resulting in
accurate assessment as a
KPI diminishes.

Degradation of lighting
system

Light lamp failure
affects the performance
of CCTV systems.

Diminished ability to
assess (discriminate)
alarm sources.

Lack of professional
management of the
security function, as a
system.

System decays across
all aspects of the
management triangle,
technological, physical
and procedural.

Eventually a security
related event will occur
due to a diminished risk
reduction program.

Poor, or lack of system
testing, or, breaches of
system
testing
procedures.

Accurate state of system
efficacy not established.

Potential sub-system
vulnerability
manifestation.

Poor formal training for
new
staff,
where
training occurs through
handed down processes.

Incorrect procedures or
bad habits passed on to
new staff.

Cultural
decay
established within the
human aspect of the
system.

Lack of qualified staff
continuation training.

Decay in response
requirements for nonroutine events.

Decay in efficiency and
efficacy
of
staff
responses.

People changing the
built environment to
suit
personal
requirements.

Changes various system
inputs, discordant with
their design
specifications.

Can
trigger
small
changes in various subsystem KPI’s which are
not understood until a
security event.

Fluctuations in staff
competencies

Alters specific subsystem KPI’s for where
competency reduction is

Staff may not react in
an
efficient
and
effective manner, based
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Physical

related to.

on
system
requirements.

design

Poor physical attribute
(lighting
and
air
conditioning)
within
CCR.

Provide inappropriate
output conditions.

Poor staff concentration
and focus, degrading
operator effectiveness
within CCR.

Standard operating
procedures being
modified without
reference to holistic
system requirements (to
address minor elemental
issues).

Degrades the
performance of the
operating system as a
“whole”.

System
may
not
perform accordant with
design specifications.

Poor communication
structures between
Central Control Room
(CCR) staff and
security management
and operational staff.

Degradation in efficacy
across “whole” system.

System may not
perform efficiently
against defined threat,
accordant with
designed specifications.

Lack of maintenance of
PPS environments
(weeds and feral
growth).

Triggers increased
nuisance alarm rates

Staff ignore alarm, or,
do not assess alarm
causes
properly
reducing probability of
accurate
assessment
KPI.

Deterioration of delay
physical elements.

Barrier
effectiveness
based
on
commissioning
measures
degrades
against defined threat.

This changes the delay
time
along
an
adversary’s
path,
altering the system’s
commissioning Pi.

Physical components
designed without
considering physical
environment impact.

Leads to premature
physical decay.

Physical
components
may not perform as
designed when put
under defined threat
stress.

(Adjusted from Gillham, 2000, p. 68).

9.7 Conclusion
This chapter presented phase four of the study, the deductive analysis of security
expert’s thoughts, feelings and experience with decaying security systems drawing on
the outcomes of phase one, the conceptual review of literature as security (Chapters 2, 3
and 4) system decay benchmarks. Phases two (Pilot study) and three (Research panels
one and two) provided the interview data for this deductive analysis. The study’s
research question was responded to by drawing on the deductive analysis of the three
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research sub-questions. Research sub-question one asked: Do security experts support
the systems approach to implementing effective security controls? Section 9.2 presented
evidence that security experts do support the systems approach to implementing
effective security controls. Research sub-question two asks: Do security experts support
the argument that security systems can and do suffer from decay. Section 9.3 presented
evidence that security experts do support the argument that security systems can and do
suffer from decay. Research sub-question three asks: Do security experts support that
security decay lies within the systems elements, constituents and their interrelationship?
Section 9.4 presented evidence that security experts do support that security decay lies
within the systems elements, constituents and their interrelationship.

Based on the sum of security experts responses to the research sub-questions, it is
argued that it can be interpreted that the study participants do support that security
decay can be represented by “the gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities
(constituents), and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship between the
microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system”. These results will be
taken forward to Chapter 10 where the study’s conclusions can be drawn, providing
study findings, limitations and recommendations.
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CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the study’s conclusion, methodological limitations and
recommendations. Section 10.1 provides a summary of the study’s research enquiry and
presents how the research data generated from this enquiry relates to previous works
focusing on security decay theory. Section 10.2 provides a management philosophy and
methodology (Figure 10.1) towards maintaining Physical Protection Systems (PPS) at
their commissioned levels of effectiveness. In addition, this section presents a summary
of how security decay directly relates to the degradation within a security “system”
based on its designed purpose in relation to its defined threat (Figure 10.2).
Furthermore, Section 10.2 presents the study’s formal research findings. Limitations of
the study are presented and discussed (Section 10.3), and recommendations for future
investigations are made (Section 10. 4). Section 10.5 summarises this research enquiry
providing the study’s conclusion.

10.1 Summary of the study
As previously stated, to date there is a dearth of dedicated published literature
underpinned by academic research pertaining to security decay. In considering such an
academic void Koffka (1963, p. 4) explains that in contemporary times, knowledge is
regarded as an aim in its own right, stating “find facts, and again find facts; when you
are sure of your facts, try and build theories...But your facts are more important”. The
current knowledge and theory relating to security decay stems from the previous works
of Underwood’s (1984) writings in his book “The Security of Buildings”, or McClure’s
(1997) thesis “Security Decay: The erosion of effective security”, which is a dedicated
published research works towards discussing the phenomenon of security decay.
McClure (1997, p. 71) stated “security decay theory is a long way from extending
beyond being an abstract model”, where security decay theory is primarily concerned
with the influence apathy has on security and how management react to risk
materialization when decay is evident. However, McClure (1997, p. 71) recommended
the pursuit of a more functional model of security decay.
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In pursuing McClure’s (1997, p. 71) recommendation, Hamlyn (1969, p. 16) states
“explanations in science are and can be divided into two kinds, those which make
reference to laws, and those which make reference to theories”. In considering
Hamlyn’s (1969, p. 16) views, this study approached the investigation into security
decay by drawing on both theory and laws. That is, the theory of Defence in Depth
which achieves a functional security system, and General Systems Theory (GST) which
provides a scientific frame for considering systems of all types, regardless of their
purpose and components. In combining these theories, this research then drew on the
laws of thermodynamics (Entropy law) to explain the natural decay occurring in
systems of all types, regardless of make-up. This approach was considered necessary
given the variety of different sciences which make a Physical Protection System (PPS)
possible, where the one science which binds all various sciences to achieve the systems
output goal is systems science (Bertalanffy, 1950; 1968).

In investigating the concept of security decay from a systems approach, contrary to
McClure’s (1997) works, this study argues apathy is not the salient factor driving decay.
The study indicated that for Physical Protection Systems (PPS) apathy can actually be a
product state, manifested in the poor management of PPS. For example, panel one
member three, stated “all technology decays, as technology decays it constantly false
alarms, then staff ignore them, where ultimately they lose confidence in the system and
their work decays”. Such a view was also reported by Howlet (1995, p. 222) who stated:
“from the time of taking a system into use it will start to deteriorate. No
system, however well designed, can be completely reliable without proper
maintenance. If left without attention it will become unserviceable...A poorly
maintained security system will have many unexplained alarms, leading to
the guard force losing confidence in the system and eventually ignoring a
true alarm as just another false alarm. However, the operator may not be
aware of it, but the system will not perform as intended” (Howlet, 1995, p.
220).

Howlet’s (1995, p. 220) viewpoint was supported through consensus across this study.
The study identified that decaying work practices, manifested in technology decay (high
nuisance alarm rates), can lead to a state of apathy. Such an account indicates that
apathy can be a product state of decay, manifested in a specific constituent within the
system, propagating to directly affect the human aspects rather than the salient driving
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factor. Consistent with this view, panel two member three stated, “a lack of professional
management underpinned by poor knowledge and awareness of how the system was
designed to work (manage the risks) leads to decay”. According to member three, “if
you manage the triangle (Figure 10.1), you manage decay”. A common theme emerged
across the study from both the textual literature (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and the panel
interview data (Chapters: 6, 7 and 8), that as a result of the heterogeneous nature of a
PPS, decay in one specific area (point disturbance) due to the interrelationships,
propagates throughout the remainder of the PPS, ultimately changing the performance
(Macro-state) of the system as a “whole”.

Figure 10.1 Security system management diagram.
Based on the available literature, the study proposes that for PPS to maintain their
commissioned measures they must be managed as a “system”, in-line with its original,
or reviewed, design parameters, or as stated by Underwood (1984, p. 250) “managed by
objectives”. For example, Figure 10.1 graphically indicates a pyramid analogy of how
the system starts with a top down approach, where based on a defined threat (systems
purpose) the systems objectives and parameters are established, where accordant to
Figure 8.1 (Campbell Triangle) the operational deliverables are implemented and
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managed to ensure the system maintains its commissioned measures of performance or
key performance indicators over time. However, if the system is allowed to decay, the
effects of this decay propagate back up the pyramid, in a bottom up approach. Such
propagation diminishes the risk reduction efforts increasing organisational risk exposure
(see Equation 28). That is, it is argued security decay transcends all levels of systems
management.

In addition, the study asserts that security decay is about the degradation within a
security “system” based on its designed purpose in relation to its defined threat. For
example, Howlet (1995, pp. 219-220) stated “without proper maintenance the system
will not work”, where the operator may not be aware of it, but the system will not
perform as intended. This view was articulated by panel one member one who stated
“decay may not be a major failure of this system, but more incremental decrease in
performance that occurs over time”. Based on the evidence, the study recognises that
whilst a system may have a measure of decay, it is most probably still at a level where it
would be effective against lower level, or lesser threats. As panel two, member three
stated “security role is to manage the threats that pose a risk to either: institutional,
commercial and industrial organisation to mitigate the risks”.

It is argued decay in just one of the Defence in Depth elements may for some
adversaries provide the necessary vulnerability, facilitating their opportunity to execute
an attack and breach the layers of security. This opportunity is based on the defined
threat’s capabilities in relation to the other Defence in Depth elements within the
system. The findings from this study suggest that a system may still be effective against
a large percentage of a population, but not its defined threat, where the system is
vulnerable to attack only by these higher level threat agents for which it was intended to
defeat (Figure 10.2). This view was explained by Garcia (2001, p. 245) who argued that
the adversary factor is strongly interrelated with the effectiveness measure of PPS,
where the designer must understand the facilities operations and threat.
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Figure 10.2 The effects of decay based on a normal distribution of attack capabilities.
For example, Figure 10.2 presents the argument that a system’s defined threat is based
on the combined capabilities of a threat agent/group across all Defence in Depth
elements (see Section 3.4.1). It is therefore suggested that such capabilities would be
held by a very small percentage of people within the general population. However, for a
small targeted percentage of the population the system’s vulnerability increases as the
holes get bigger in the appropriate elements. Therefore the opportunity for success for
this population sample increases. This aspect of system degradation is shown in Figure
4.2 (Section 4.5), where based on the principle equifinality (see Figure 2.5) in open
systems the steady state reached is independent of initial conditions and determined by
the systems parameters. Consistent with the principle of equifinality the system, based
on alterations to these parameters, alters its original steady state, arriving at a new,
lesser steady state condition. However, this new condition presents the intuitive
perception it is still functioning at its commissioning state (see Section 4.5, Figure 4.2).
10.2 Research findings
McClure (1997, p. 1) wrote, “There is a complex interrelationship between technology,
people and management processes within a security function”. Consistent with
McClure’s (1997) viewpoint, the available literature indicates that within a systems
approach to security, it is the interrelations which tie the system together towards
achieving an output goal, rather than a collection of side-by-side or juxtafication of
controls. Coole and Brooks (2009, p. 22) highlighted such a complex relationship within
a PPS. They argued that an orderly relationship exists where the space and time
distribution of the Defence in Depth elements creates a comprehensive state of order in
relation to a Physical Protection System’s (PPS) macro level of effectiveness.
Consistent with this view the study presented the argument that as a result of managers
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not understanding how the physical, technological and procedural aspects combine
through management principles and processes within preset parameters to achieve and
maintain the systems output goal, they decay. The available literature indicates that in
order to maintain PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness during their life
cycle, they need to be managed in accordance with their commissioned designed
specifications. It is argued that the most appropriate means to manage decay within PPS
is through the use of a performance indicator frame work, which enables full
management of the heterogeneous nature as a “system”.

Combining the summative aspect of a Defence in Depth system with the textual
benchmark and the interview data, the evidence indicates that the study supported the
proposition that security decay can be represented as: The gradual degradation of the
microscopic quantities (constituents), or the gradual degradation in the relationship
between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system. It is
argued that such a definition provides rigor and genuine conceptual substance that can
be integrated into Physical Protection Systems performance measures and appeal to
both security academics and practitioners alike. Furthermore, the acceptance of entropic
decay theory means that the laws, theories and principles of systems theory associated
with maintaining PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness can be applied to
the security function management processes. In addition, such an approach may also be
applied to personnel and information frameworks to cover the entire security
management system (see Figure 2.1).

The study defined the effects natural entropy has on a PPS, where such degradation
reduces a PPS’s effectiveness; however given the ubiquitous usage of entropy, limited
understanding and definitional ambiguity, the study argues that consistent with
Underwood’s (1984) and McClure’s (1997) writings, the term security decay become
adopted to represent the effects and measure of degradation within PPS. Nevertheless,
in considering such an outcome, the study argues that in contrast to Underwood’s
(1984) writings and the findings of McClure (1997) security decay theory is primarily
concerned with managing the natural entropic processes/pressures occurring against
commissioned levels of effectiveness across all elements within PPS. In some cases
these processes are allowed to manifest due to a lack of professional management of the
security function as a “system”.
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10.3 Study limitations
This section highlights the methodological limitations within the study. These
limitations include a lack of published security benchmarking within the security
domain. In addition, this section explains the limitations within the study due the small
sample size. Furthermore, the study highlighted a potential cultural aspect to security
decay; however, due to limitations in time this aspect was not pursued. Finally, the
study’s conceptual review of literature considered security decay to be an aspect
predominately considered during the monitor and review stage of the risk management
cycle, after the system was commissioned. However, the research indicated that decay
should be considered well before this stage, at the design stage of a security project.
10.3.1 Benchmarking
Due to a lack in formal Physical Protection Systems (PPS) benchmarking, this research
conceptually reviewed the literature (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Whilst the principles of this
benchmark had been peer reviewed prior to this study through the works of Coole and
Brooks (2009), the conceptual review as a benchmark had not been double blind peer
reviewed. This restricted peer review provides limitations within this study’s deductive
analysis.
10.3.2 Research Sample
The research panel participants formed a purposive sample (N=9), providing a relatively
small research sample. In addition, whilst panel members were selected based on their
meeting certain criterion, this sample was chosen based on geographical location and
willingness to participate. Some security experts declined to participate, limiting the
security domain specializations represented within this study. In addition, another
limitation within the sample is the multidimensional nature and many practicing
domains of security.
10.3.3 Cultural theory
Research panel two, member one, explained that security decay is like risk, you can
accept some decay, mitigate some decay and avoid some decay. Consistent with this
approach, according to member three panel two, he has come across some security
functions in South East Asia which are so professionally managed that there is
absolutely no decay That is, there is no procedural decay and the physical and
technological parameters are managed in accordance with the systems designed
specifications. This suggests, like risk, security decay has a degree of cultural aspect,
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which could be organisational or geographical. This aspect of decay theory was not
investigated during this study.
10.3.4 Security decay and risk management
Section 3.6 presents Figure 3.3 the security risk management cycle. At the start of the
study, decay was considered to be an aspect which was predominately considered
during the monitor and review stage of the risk management cycle, after the system was
commissioned. However, the research indicated that decay should be considered well
before this stage, at the design stage of a security project. Such an approach considers
decay as a risk and treated as such. The aim would be to design and commission a
system where decay has been considered and where possible, the system designed to
minimize or mitigate decay before the system is commissioned. The study’s conceptual
review of literature benchmark did not consider this aspect of decay. Therefore this
aspect of decay theory was not explored in depth.
10.4 Recommendations
In combining the findings from the study in conjunction with the conceptual review of
literature as a benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4), a number of recommendations have
been made. These recommendations aim to further develop the knowledge and
understanding of entropic security decay so that McClure’s (1997, p. 71)
recommendation, of pursuing security decay theory beyond an abstract model can be
achieved.
10.4.1 Recommendation one: further research into Physical Protection
Systems complex interrelations
The study’s findings support McClure’s (1997) view that there exists a complex
interrelationship between technology, people and management processes within a
security function. It is recommended that academia pursue further research into this
complex interrelationship. The benefits would be the establishment of suitable security
benchmarks facilitating more robust security research in the future.

10.4.2 Recommendation two: development of operational performance
measures
It is recommended that academia pursue the development of performance measures or
key performance indicators at the operational level, which would combine to achieve
the tactical level measures presented in the EASI model. These measures would
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facilitate the ongoing performance management of the operational deliverables that
combine to achieve the tactical measures across the system. Such a management
framework would assist security management develop further as a professional
management domain.
10.4.3 Recommendation three: the teaching of systems theory for security
It is recommended that academia consider how security studies and security
management is taught. This study indicates that a true systems based approach to
achieving effective security is required. Therefore, security needs to be managed as a
system to ensure that the natural entropic processes/pressures occurring against Physical
Protection Systems are avoided or countered through management principles and
processes. A significant amount of time is spent within management theory discussing
open systems theory. As such, it is recommended that in teaching the management of
the security function, that the academic focus towards systems science be adopted into
security studies syllabus.
10.4.4 Recommendation four: security decay at the design stage
The research sample, as a consensus, considered that security decay needs to be
considered at the design stage of a security project. The security body of literature has
focused significantly into designing the environment to reduce crime, referred to as
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). This study recommends
applying such a philosophy to research how PPS can be designed to reduce/minimize
decay over the systems life cycle.
10.4.5 Recommendation five: security decay and cultural theory
It is recommended that cultural theory be employed to investigate the cultural aspects
leading to the manifestation of decay, or its avoidance within security systems
management.
10.4.6 Recommendation six: the adoption of security decay into the body of
knowledge
It is also recommended that the characteristics of security decay i.e. Table 6.1 (Section
6.6) and Table 9.1 (Section 9.6) be further defined, and that security decay theory
become adopted into the security domain’s body of knowledge. The adoption of
security decay theory would enable security managers to draw on this body of
knowledge when developing business cases for the ongoing maintenance and review of
their respective organisational security functions.
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10.4.8 Recommendation seven: the pursuit of a systems approach.
This research indicates that a true systems approach to implementing effective security
controls is required to achieve a state of effective security. However, much of the
security literature dissects security reviews and security auditing into discrete domain
specific categories, including Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
(CPTED) reviews, physical security audits, security lighting audits, etc. This study
suggests that in order to maintain PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness
during their life cycle, they need to be managed in accordance with their commissioned
designed specifications as a “system”. Therefore consistent with recommendation two,
it is proposed that security auditing tools and methodologies be developed to audit the
security function as a “system” rather than seeing security control components standing
in a side-by-side relationship or Silo thinking. This focus was emphasised by
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 18) who considered the systems approach to be one of
organisation where phenomena are not observable by respective parts in isolation.

It is argued that a systems focus would highlight the quantitative aspect of security
which leads to two different security states. These two states include security by denial
and security by apprehension. For a denial state the system is commissioned to deny a
defined threat access to a protected asset, where through the employment of
mathematics the sensitivity settings within a PPS can be adjusted to ensure such an
objective is achieved. In contrast, security by apprehension is a state where the system
is commissioned to increase the level of difficulty associated with achieving a
successful attack. However, the cost benefit analysis does not justify the level of
Defence in Depth to resist high level attacks, where the system hinders the attack and
facilitates the collection of evidence towards apprehending the offender/s at a later time.
Such separation of two different security objectives provides a means of qualitatively
articulating the effects of decay on a commissioned PPS, where the system can move
from a denial state to one of apprehension.
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the study’s research conclusion (Section 10. 1) summarising the
available literature relating to the concept of security decay towards presenting this
study’s research finding (Section 10.2). The study investigated the concept of security
decay from a systems approach to implementing effective security controls. This
investigation was framed within an open systems approach, drawing on the
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underpinnings of General Systems Theory (GST). GST facilitated the examination of
how individual security components are tied together to achieve a predetermined output
goal. It was argued that this predetermined output goal is the systems purpose, which is
achieved through the implementation of various layers of controls. These layers include
the use of technological, physical and procedural aspects combined in an orderly
relationship, which are interrelated and commissioned as a “whole” against a desired
benchmark. This benchmark is designed to counter the threats that pose a risk to various
organisations towards achieving the amount of desired risk reduction.

To account for the concept of decay within an open systems frame the study drew on the
concept of entropy. Entropy as a concept is derived from a metric, defined as a measure
of disorder in a system and a process characterised with: decay, running down, and
becoming disordered. For a system it is argued that as its entropy level increases its
output or working capabilities decrease. As such, entropy provided the scientific frame
for considering security decay within a Physical Protection System (PPS). The study
argued that if PPS are left to themselves, that is, not provided with the appropriate
feedback open systems require too circumvent the effects of the second law (entropy
law) of thermodynamics, they become closed. Closed systems eventually reach a state
where they are no longer capable of delivering the required risk control they were
commissioned to achieve.

The study recognised and highlighted the complexity of entropic decay theory and the
professional management required to ensure that Physical Protection Systems (PPS)
maintain their commissioned levels of performance over the course of their life cycle.
This complexity is based on the vast number of domain specializations which draw on a
variety of science disciplines to achieve the PPS’s output goal. The evidence indicates
that security decay can be seen as either technological, physical, or procedural in its
manifestation. Based on what a system is, such decay can under certain conditions
propagate to affect other sub-systems within the system and ultimately the system’s
macro-state output. The findings of the study suggest that for systems to maintain their
commissioned levels of effectiveness over their life cycle they must be professionally
managed. It is argued that such professional management requires a specific focus,
where the technological aspects of the system are managed in accordance with their
designed parameters. In addition, the physical aspects of the PPS needs to managed in
accordance with their structural underpinnings, and the human functions and procedural
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aspects must be managed by those principles and processes underpinning management
theory.

The evidence indicates that these three aspects are the structural categories towards
countering entropic decay within PPS. Consistent with this view it is argued that the
systems objectives must be clearly defined and underpinned by key performance
indicators which directly contribute to the systems output goal. This study purports that
such a management philosophy will facilitate an efficacy based approach to the
professional management of PPS. That is, facilitating the professional management by
objectives.

The study also highlighted the problems associated security’s lack in consensus
definition. In addition, the dearth of knowledge and lack of dedicated published
literature underpinned by academic research pertaining to security decay. In-light of this
knowledge gap, this chapter presented a number of study limitations (Section 10.3),
highlighting the complexity in conducting robust academic research within the security
domain. Furthermore, this chapter presented a number of recommendations (Section
10.4) to both expand the knowledge relating to security decay and expand the
robustness of security research for future knowledge categorisation development.
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APPENDIX A
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE LETTER

The Theory of Entropic Security Decay
Thank you for considering participating in our research study pertaining to the concept
of security decay. This research project is being undertaken as part of the requirements
of a Master of Science degree at Edith Cowan University. Your insights will be
extremely helpful in evaluating the existence of this phenomenon within the security
domain.
Aim: To develop the concept, define the term and establish a framework for measuring
entropic decay within a security system.
Benefits: This research will develop an understanding of how the characteristics that
may make an organisation prone to entropic decay can be identified, and measured.
Once these characteristics are understood, this will enable the use of small funding to
stimulate and maintain the effectiveness of various security risk mitigation strategies.
This information can assist managers when conducting formal risk assessments to
ensure their risk reduction strategies take into account the decaying aspect of
implemented security controls.
The theory of entropic security decay
The theory of defence in depth aims to link layered security elements into a system
incorporating; people, technology, barriers and procedures to ensure a holistic and
functional security system. This system aims to deliver effective risk based decisions,
enhanced operational effectiveness, and reductions in overall risks and costs for a
facility. However, it has been argued that security controls degrade over time reducing
the effectiveness level of risk treatment. This argument was first considered by
Underwood (1984) who referred to this as decaying security, stating “Security decay” is
the most serious threat to a security system, and that such decay must be “expected”,
“avoided”, and “countered”.
The theory of entropic decay considers that security controls are implemented within a
systems approach towards reducing security related risks, and that in line with the
premises of systems theory the elements of defence in depth (detect, delay and
response) must be employed and successfully achieved within their sequential order and
that over time all systems are prone to entropic decay, including security systems.
This study requires your assistance to explore the application of security controls within
a systems frame. Specifically, we seek your experience with the argument that in line
with the principles of systems theory, all systems includes security systems degrade
over time, leading to decay, and that this decay does/is manifested within the system.
Results from this study will be integrated into the conceptual literature review framing
the theory of entropic security decay for interpretation and analysis towards drawing
conclusions relating to the research questions. In addition, each participant within the
study will receive a critique of the findings as they occur. This will provide you with the
most up-to-date discourse relating to the concept of security decay.
248

Guidelines: This research enquiry is employing a Delphic poll methodology. The
purpose of a Delphic Poll is to gather a consensus of expert opinions relating to a
specific topic under investigation using several rounds of interviews or questionnaires to
facilitate the identification, evaluation, and clarification of research problems and
establish positions towards identifying solutions, by drawing on the current knowledge
of participating experts. You have been nominated by your peers as a security expert.
This Delphic study will be undertaken utilizing Interviews as they are a systematic
means of discussing with people an area under investigation towards collecting data and
constructing knowledge in research. The use of interviews in research considers that
knowledge is something generated between people, often through conversation.
Interviews enable research participants in a study to discuss their interpretations of the
world in which they live, and to express how they regard issues under investigation
from their personal experience. As sch the core aspect of your role within this study will
consist of providing experience-based knowledge when answering interview questions.
Risks and Discomforts
There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with your participation in this
study. However, you will be required to participate in two rounds of interviews, with an
information feedback process between these rounds.
Confidentiality
Information obtained from this study which could identify you will be kept private to
the extent allowed by law. However, information which may identify you will be shared
with research supervisory staff from Edith Cowan University where necessary.
Results
The results of this study will be published as a thesis and made available through
various library catalogues. In addition, it is anticipated that the results of this study will
be reported in conference proceedings and relevant journal publications. The reporting
of results will not include any information that may identify individual participants.
This study incorporates a Delphic Poll, as such results will be disseminated to
participants during the course of the research phases, and final results will be reported to
all participants once conclusions have been drawn at the completion of the research
phase.
Refusal or withdrawal without penalty
Your taking part in this study is your choice. There is no penalty if you decide not to be
in the study. In addition, you are free to withdraw from this research study at any time.
In addition, you may be removed from this study without your consent if Edith Cowan
University chooses to end the study.
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this research or a researchrelated enquiry, please contact this research’s supervisor Dr Dave Brooks;
d.brooks@ecu.edu.au or telephone: 08 63045788, or
Student Researcher; Michael Coole: 0415874595 or email, mcoole@our.ecu.edu.au
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INFORMED CONSENT
Thank you for choosing to participate in this research study. Your signature
below indicates that you agree to participate in this study. If you agree to participate in
this study you will receive a copy of this signed document.
I______________________________________ agree to participate in this research
study (the theory of entropic security decay). I have had the aims of the study explained
to me, its research methodology and my commitment requirements. In-line with the
requirements of informed consent, I provide my informed consent.

Signature___________________________ Date____/____/____.
This
document
was
Witnessed
Coole_________________________Date___/___/____.
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by

Michael

APPENDIX B
PILOT STUDY SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Category

Questions

Responses
Date: ___/___/___
Panel No._________
Round No.________

Systems approach to
security.

a) Can you please tell me from your experience what the role of security is within an organisations
•

Do you see it as a risk reduction role?

b) Can you tell me how you apply the body of knowledge including theories and principles of
Prompts and Probes:
a) Would you elaborate
on that?
b) How did that come
about?
c) That’s helpful I’d
appreciate it if you
could give more
detail.
d) Some say,..do you
agree?
e) What you’re saying
now is very
important, and I want
to make sure that I
get it down exactly
the way you mean it,
please explain some
more.

security, specifically DiD
•

Do you support a systems approach?

Can you please explain to me your understanding of a system
•

Do you consider the relationships between the micro state and the macro state?

•

What do you think this involves?

c) According to the principles of systems theory small changes within a specific part can lead to a
large change at the output of the systems
•

Do you agree with this premise?

d) Systems theory is concerned with those key performance indicators that are directly related to
the whole systems key performance indicator.
•

Within your understanding of a systems approach, can you tell me what you believe the
key performance indicators are within a PPS

•

Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance indicators of the systems
are related to the systems effectiveness?
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Security Decay

a)

Based on your experience do you believe that security systems decay;

This study is specifically focused
towards establishing an
understanding of the concept of
security decay.

b)

What is your understanding of security decay;

c)

Can you tell me about a time when you experienced security controls degrading;

d)

In considering the argument that security controls decay, how do you think this occurs within a

Prompts and Probes:
a) Would you elaborate
on that?
b) How did that come
about?
c) That’s helpful I’d
appreciate it if you
could give more
detail.
d) Some say,..do you
agree?
e) What you’re saying
now is very
important, and I want
to make sure that I
get it down exactly
the way you mean it,
please explain some
more.

systems approach to security;
e)

The theory of entropic security decay argues that the concept of decay within a PPS occurs
within the individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system
from this point. Based on your experience, do you support this premise;

a)

Systems theory, and specifically an effect referred to as the butterfly effect suggests small
input changes within a system can result in large changes at the macro output. Do you feel this
applies to a PPS; Can you give me an example where you have come across this;

b)

Based on your experience, what do you consider the effects of decay are;

c)

Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at the point of manifestation, and
throughout the remainder of the system are reversible;

d)

Do you think decay can be avoided;

f)

Do you believe the concept of decay has a place in the risk management formula?
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Biographical data
Participant No.
Panel No.
What is your current security employment context and role?
Can you please tell me what type of security advice you
supply in this role?
How long have you been in this role?
Can you please tell me what formal qualifications you hold
for this role?
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APPENDIX C
FINAL SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Category

Questions

Responses
Date: ___/___/___
Panel No._________
Round No.________

Systems approach to
security.
Prompts and Probes:
f) Would you elaborate
on that?
g) How did that come
about?
h) That’s helpful I’d
appreciate it if you
could give more
detail.
i) Some say, do you
agree?
j) What you’re saying
now is very
important, and I want
to make sure that I
get it down exactly
the way you mean it,
please explain some
more.

1) Can you please tell me from your experience what the role of security is within an organisation?
2) Do you see it as a risk reduction role?
3) Can you tell me how you apply the body of knowledge including security methodologies and
concepts? Do you use DID? (If not stated).
4) Can you please explain to me your understanding of a system? Do you consider the relationships
between the components and the goal of the system?
5) Do you support a systems approach towards security? Yes/No.
6) What do you think the systems approach towards security involves?
According to the principles of systems theory small changes within a specific component can lead to a
large change at the output of the systems
7) Do you agree with this premise? Yes/No Can you explain why?
Systems theory is concerned with those key performance indicators that are directly related to the whole
systems key performance indicator.

8)Within your understanding of a systems approach, can you tell me what you believe the key
performance indicators are within a PPS

9) Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance indicators of the systems are related
to the systems effectiveness? Can you explain how?

Security Decay

10) Based on your experience do you believe that security systems decay;

This study is specifically focused
towards establishing an
understanding of the concept of
security decay.

12) Can you tell me about a time when you experienced security controls degrading, what occurred?

11) What is your understanding of security decay;
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13) In considering the argument that security controls decay, how do you think this occurs within a
Prompts and Probes:
f) Would you elaborate
on that?
g) How did that come
about?
h) That’s helpful I’d
appreciate it if you
could give more
detail.
i) Some say, do you
agree?
j) What you’re saying
now is very
important, and I want
to make sure that I
get it down exactly
the way you mean it,
please explain some
more.

systems approach to security;
The concept of security decay argues that decay within a PPS occurs within the individual constituents,
within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system from this point.
14) Based on your experience, do you support this premise Yes/No, why, why not?
Systems theory, and specifically an effect referred to as the butterfly effect suggests small input changes
within a system can result in large changes at its macro output.
15) Do you feel this applies to a PPS? Yes/No. Can you give me an example where you have come
across this?
16) Based on your experience, what do you consider the effects of decay are?
17) Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at the point of manifestation and throughout the
remainder of the system are reversible? Yes/No. How do you think so? Or, why don’t you think so?

18) Do you think decay can be avoided? Yes/No. How do you think the effects of decay within a
security system can be avoided? Or, why don’t you think the effects of decay within a security system
can be avoided?
19) Do you believe the concept of decay has a place in the risk management process? Yes/No. If so,
where in the process? If not, why not?
20) Based on your experience, is there any facet of security decay which you can add to the research
enquiry? This may include factors associated with either the cause of decay or impacts from it.
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APPENDIX D
RESEARCH PANEL ONE: PHASE THREE EXPERT INTERVIEW AND
FEEDBACK TRANSCRIPT
The following transcript was taken from panel one member two’s feedback (Round two
participant interview) transcript from questions 1-10 to demonstrate a typical interview .
Interview transcript
Question 1: Can you please tell me from your experience what the role of security is
within an organisation?
You answered: Security’s role is the protection of assets, including: physical
information and personnel in order for the organization to function to achieve its
business objectives. Security should be integrated with the organization to assist it in
achieving its objectives.
Participant 1; Re: Security depends on context and relates primarily to the safety of
people, not Occupational Safety and Health, but the safety of people from human
adversaries. It also encompasses asset protection, secure containment and incident
management.
Participant 3; Re: For me, in principle, the role is around maintaining custody and
containment of all prisoners within the justice system. This is achieved through the
provision of physical, procedural, dynamic security measures in a balanced and holistic
approach.
Feedback: Both yourself and panel member number one (1) stated that security’s role
is the protection of assets. However, panel member number three (3) stated that
security’s role encompasses and is achieved through the provision of physical,
procedural, dynamic (intelligence) measures in a balanced and holistic approach.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) statement?
Res: These are functions towards achieving the objective, that is, this is how a state of
security is achieved.
Furthermore, the pilot study panel concluded that security at the tactical level of
management relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and
electronic measures which aims to protect an organisation’s assets which includes
people, information and physical property through their ability to deter, detect, delay
and respond against organisation specific threats.
Qu: Do you agree with the pilot panel’s conclusions?
Res: Yes.
Question 2: Do you see security roles as a reduction role?
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You answered: Yes, because its role is to mitigate known or perceived threats to an
organization.
Participant 1; Re: Yes, everything is risk based. Without knowledge of risk there is no
baseline.
Participant 3; Re: Most definitely, it is about reducing risk all the time, not just within
the justice system, but across the wider community.
Feedback: All panel members responded yes to this question, that security is a risk
reduction role. As such, it is interpreted that a consensus exists amongst the panel
members that security is a risk reduction role.
Qu: Do you support this interpretation?
Res: Yes I do.
In addition, the pilot panel reported that security is a risk reduction role at the strategic
level of management.
Qu: Do you agree with the pilot panel?
Res: Yes, of course.
Furthermore, the pilot panel as a consensus agreed that security also has a deterrent role
within an organisation towards preventing security related incidents.
Qu: Do you support the pilot panel’s views in relation to this aspect of security’s role
within an organisation?
Res: Yes, it is one of its functions.
Question 3: Can you tell me how you apply the body of knowledge including security
methodologies and concepts. Do you use defence in depth?
You answered: I combine all aspects of defence in depth, Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED) and risk management to achieve security objectives.
These are, and need to be interrelated. To achieve defence in depth, in-line with a
security context requires all aspects of security. For example, security intelligence
(SYNT) aligns with risk management to ascertain how defence in depth will be
achieved. For example, CPTED detection or a technology based detection component.
This takes into account zoning at a facility, where different levels of risk reduction are
required within each zone (Hierarchical system) of defence in depth, where defence in
depth achieves a level of access control.
Participant 1; Re: It depends on the security context. Defence in depth is an absolute
underpinned by security risk management. That is, you need to understand the client’s
needs and their risks. It needs to be very functional.
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Participant 3; Re: I definitely adopt the principles of defence in depth, also crime
prevention through environmental control (CPTED) within physical security. I utilize
CCTV as alarm verification/discrimination. For me It incorporates a balanced approach
of physical, procedural, dynamic (Intelligence) and risk management.
Feedback: For this question, all panel members responded that they employ defence in
depth interrelated with risk management to establish a level of security based on risk.
As such, it is interpreted that al panel members agree that the consistent body of
knowledge employed to security an organisation’s assets is defence in depth and risk
management.
Qu: Do you agree with this interpretation?
Res: Yes.
In addition, panel member number two (2) stated that he employs a hierarchical system
of defence in depth, where defence in depth achieves a level of access control, within
zones to achieve a desired level of risk reduction.
Qu; Do you support panel member number two’s (2) approach?
Res: Yes.
In addition, panel member number one (1) stated that when employing the security body
of knowledge it needs to be very functional. That is, applied from a functional approach.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views relating to the
employment of security’s body of knowledge?
Res: Yes.
Question 4: Can you please explain your understanding of a system? Do you consider
the relationship between the components and the goal of the system?
You answered: For a system, you tie in a group of elements and constituents which
maintain a role towards an overall outcome. All aspects are interrelated, it depends on
how they are interrelated, and yes I certainly consider the interrelationships.
Participant 1; Re: The systems approach is a holistic approach, “seen as a whole”. It
requires structure with good interactions between components (highly interrelated)
interface between components. “It’s a top down process”. A systems approach considers
strong interrelationships between interrelationships at the design stage with operator
interface. That is, the components must help achieve the objective of the system.
Participant 3; Re: For me systems are the components and linking’s between them, the
physical components and procedures are linked to achieve a goal, which for me the goal
is to reduce risk.
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Feedback: For this question both yourself and panel member number one (1) focused
on linking in individual components and their various interrelationships to achieve an
overall goal or objective. Specifically, panel member number one (1) stated that a
system a system is a top down process which requires structure incorporating
components with good interactions between them, and all being highly interrelated to
achieve the objectives of the system. However, the system should be seen as a “whole”.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views?
Res: Yes.
Furthermore, panel member number three (3) stated the systems approach links in the
physical components and human procedures to achieve the systems goal, which in the
security context is the reduction of risk.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) views?
Res: I do in a security context, but a systems goal may not be to reduce risk. As such, I
think this is an oversimplification.
In addition, the pilot panel reported through consensus that the systems approach to
security relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the
separate components which combine together to achieve an overall goal.
Qu: Do you support the pilot panel’s consensus?
Res: Yes.
Question 5: Do you support a systems approach towards security?
You answered: Yes for sure.
Participant 1; Re: Yes, as long as the systems are properly designed tools for the
management of security risks (systems are sets of tools).
Participant 3; Re: Yes, definitely.
Feedback: For this question all panel members responded yes, that they support a
systems approach towards security. It is therefore interpreted that a consensus was
reached with this question. Such a consensus was also reached by the pilot panel.
Qu: Do you agree with this interpretation?
Res: Yes.
Question 6: Too the question: What do you think the systems approach towards
security involves?
You answered: The same as it does with any organization. The Physical Protection
System (PPS) broken down into its component parts relies on the other components
within the system. If one component within the system is broken, or removed, this
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changes the whole system. For example, defence in depth relies on all its elements to be
interrelated and at their measure of effectiveness.
Participant 1; Re: The systems approach to security is a holistic approach that
recognizes the main contributions to the security solution. Be it, management processes,
procedures, technology, people and physical security, the built environment and
planning. It is how each of these elements are implemented, recognizing the importance
of each other and how the interactions compliment and influence each other. Each
element is configured or implemented to support each other to form a holistic security
system approach, and recognizes the Swiss Cheese choice approach.
Participant 3; Re: The systems approach means to have sound security practices in
place before an event occurs. This applies the dynamic approach (Intelligence) to
security. The systems approach adopts the principles of security, and has them in place
before an event, to reduce the risks associated with a security context. The systems
approach starts before a security project commences. The majority of risks should be
mitigated before, at the planning stage.
Feedback: To this question panel member number one (1) focused on the idea that the
systems approach is a holistic approach that recognises the main contributions to the
security solution, be they management processes, procedures, technology, physical
barriers, built environment and people, and how each of these components are
implemented to compliment and support each other.
Panel member number one specifically draws on the Swiss cheese analogy presented in
Standards Australia (HB 167: 2006, p. 59), where many security controls will exist in a
“layered” or defence in depth structure, where under normal circumstances the holes in
each layer are covered up by subsequent layers of controls.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views?
Res: Yes.
In addition, panel member number three (3) stated that he views the systems approach
as being sound security practices in place before an event occurs, that is, adopting the
principles of security to reduce risks associated with a security context at the start of a
security project.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) views?
Res: I don’t agree as I don’t think he really has answered the question. Looking at it
from management theory, the systems approach is about putting in place a combination
of strategies to achieve a set goal. That is, systems theory should be applied to the
security function.
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Furthermore, the pilot panel reported through consensus that the systems approach to
security relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the
separate components which combine together to achieve an overall goal.
Qu: Do you agree with the pilot panel’s consensus relating to the systems approach?
Res: Yes, this makes what panel member number three (3) seem clearer.
Question 7: According to the principles of systems theory, small changes within a
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of the systems. Do you
agree with this premise, can you explain why?
You answered: Yes, it comes down to a cause and effect. By one small element
changing, results in a larger-more-macro change. This stimulates a chain reaction
through the system.
Participant 1; Re: I agree with this comment.
Due to the reliance on each element, the systems based approach must regularly be
reviewed or weaknesses are created. These small changes can have a domino effect on
each of the other elements that combines to the systems based structure. The changes
may be small, but if not considered in a holistic manner or without a clear
understanding of why an element was implemented or structured in the first place you
can change the basic premise of why and how it supported other elements within the
system. Using the Swiss cheese analysis you can actually move the “hole” so that it now
aligns with another hole. Do this with several or many small changes and you can create
a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to recognize or identify.
A clear understanding of the system is needed. This understanding needs to be
underpinned by security risk management, integrated through security management
plans, assessed and reviewed regularly with understanding of the holistic approach. For
example, time changes in procedures, staff, complacency and a lack of training or
understanding of initial concepts are enemies of the systems based approach.
Participant 3; Re: Yes I do. For me, one of the reasons our system breaks down is that
we are unable to intervene, based on the intelligence due to pressures (political) on the
system. Small systems changes can have a significant impact at a much higher level and
can change the strategic direction of an agency.

Feedback: Too this question both panel members’ number one and three agreed. In
addition, panel member number one’s (1) views were in-line with your own, and states
“due to the reliance on each element small changes in a system can have a domino
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effect on each of the other element that combines to the systems based structure”. The
changes may be small, but if not considered within a holistic manner or without clear
understanding of why an element was implemented or structured in the first place, you
can change the basic premise of why and how it supported other elements within the
system.
Panel member number one (1) draws on the Swiss cheese analogy from Standard
Australia (HB 167: 2006, p. 59) where under normal conditions the holes in each
security layer are covered up by subsequent layers of controls. However, small changes
in the system results in the holes aligning with another hole, where if you do this with
several or small changes you can create a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to
recognise or identify.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views?
Res: Yes, each hole gets bigger as decay sets in, eventually aligning the holes.
In addition, panel member number three (3) stated that he agrees as small system
changes can have a significant impact at a much higher level, and can change the
strategic direction of an agency.
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) views in relation to this
specific principle of systems theory?
Res: I am not sure.
Question 8: Within your understanding of a system, can you tell me what you believe
the key performance indicators are within a PPS?
You answered: The key performance indicators give you a measure, where you set
goals in an organization to ensure you are achieving what the system is designed for, it
is a monitoring process. As such, the elements of the PPS become the key performance
indicators. They start off with a probability of detection, then a probability of
transmitting an alarm actuation, followed by a measure of accurate assessment of the
alarm cause, then a probability of communicating that alarm source to the appropriate
response component of the system. Then, the delay time and response time based on
their mean average become the following system measures.

Participant 1; Re: Key performance indicators are those items that you can use to
monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each element of a system. If
key performance indicators are not being met this could strongly suggest that a specific
element is not delivering the full capacity or the outcomes for which it was specifically
designed.
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If an element is not delivering required performance full capacity or outcomes it may
therefore not be supporting other elements within the total system in the manner for
which it was intended to, designed and implemented.
These shortfalls in elemental performance is very likely to have an impact on the whole
of the systems performance and therefore if “whole of system KPI’s” are correctly
identified, structured and monitored these will be directly influenced by elemental
KPI’s.
The KPi’s include:
Management/Procedures
Log in out systems each shift, recorded training frequency, recorded proficiency
assessment, recorded regular performance diagnosis. Annual-Bi-annual audits of staff
training levels, of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s), of response procedures. In
addition, minutes of team meetings, minutes of management meetings and activities
altered from annual, bi-annual audits.
Planning/Built environment
Frequency of physical inspections, frequency of maintenance (gardening type),
frequency of maintenance (structure type), annual, bi-annual audit, action on annual, biannual audit. Inspection of Central Control Room (CCR) and physical environment.
Inspection of perimeter zones (erosion, debris, materials) and actions, results of
inspections.
Technology
System false alarm rates, nuisance alarm rates, maintenance records, service breakdown
records, system down time records, repair period records, record of maintainer training
records, records of maintainers agent accreditation, records of maintainer’s site
induction training, records of length of time to rectify “sign off” fault, independent audit
of routine maintenance, records of daily tests and results, regular audit of compo entry
integration testing.
Participant 3; Re: From a prisons perspective, the key performance indicators relate to
the core elements of defence in depth, they start at deterrence where reducing
opportunity provides a level of deterrence, then a capability of detection, within a
context, the verification (assessment) of an alarm event, the delay aspects, where all of
this is measured against the response capability. In addition, aside from key elements
other key performance indicators include: fit for purpose (environment) reliability,
robustness, and technical support. These aspects relate to probability of detection,
nuisance alarm and false alarm rates.
263

Feedback: Too this question, panel member number three (3) followed a similar view
to yours, proving what is considered tactical level key performance indicators within the
system, as the systems key performance indicators.
Qu: Do you agree with this view relating towards the level of key performance
indicators?
This view was also supported by the pilot panel study. However, panel member number
one (1) provided a much more detailed account of the system key performance
indicators, some of which were also reported by panel member number three (3). It is
considered therefore that the key performance indicators reported by panel member
number one (1) are operational level key performance indicators.
Qu: Do you support this interpretation?
Res: Yes, I mean ultimately it is a broad question. As such, a hierarchical level of key
performance indicators needs to be articulated. The system needs to be designed and
key performance indicators established through a top down approach, however, audited
utilizing a Bottom up approach where the operational key performance indicators
directly relate to the tactical key performance indicators which ultimately relate to the
systems strategic objective.
Question 9: Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance indicators
of the systems are related to the systems effectiveness? Can you explain how?
You answered: Yes. This is your means to ensure the elements are achieving your
design goals. To ensure you can measure for any problems at its earliest opportunity.
Key performance indicator reduction at the micro-level reduces key performance
indicators at the macro level. The overall key performance indicator provides a strategic
level of monitoring effectiveness.
Participant 1; Re: Yes, KPi’s are and should be related to system effectiveness. If you
refer back to my answer to question 7, I believe that KPi’s are a measure of whether an
element and therefore a system is delivering the outcomes and functionality for which it
was designed. This directly determines or impacts on the elements effectiveness as a
single element performing its required function and effectiveness is supporting other
elements in its functions within the total system. Again, the Swiss cheese effect. If one
or more elements of a system are not performing in the manner intended, they do not
support system security and would therefore directly impact on KPI’s.
Participant 3; Re: I do believe the systems performance indicators are related to the
systems overall key performance indicators. We look at the selection of components
from their individual key performance indicators, such as probability of detection,
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nuisance alarm rate, false alarm rate etc, then combine them together into a designed
whole.
Feedback: Too this question all panel members reported that they do believe the key
performance indicators of the system are related to the systems effectiveness, based on
the argument that key performance indicator reduction at the micro-level reduces key
performance indicators at the macro level, where according to panel member number
one, if one or more elements of a system are not performing in the manner intended,
they do not support system security and would therefore directly impact on it.
Such a consensus was also reported by the pilot study.
Qu: Do you support that a consensus to this question exists?
Res: Yes.
Question 10: Based on your experience, do you believe that security systems decay?
You answered: Yes they do decay.
Participant 1; Re: Yes I do believe that security systems can and do experience decay.
Participant 3; Re: Oh yes.
Feedback: Too this question all panel members reported yes. Therefore it is interpreted
that a consensus exists amongst the panel that security systems do suffer from decay.
In addition, a consensus was also reported by the pilot study congruent with this panel’s
consensus.
Qu: Do you support such an interpretation?
Res: Yes I do.
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APPENDIX E
RESEARCH PANEL TWO: PHASE THREE EXPERT INTERVIEW AND
FEEDBACK TRANSCRIPT
The following transcript was taken from panel two, member three’s feedback (Round
two participant interview) transcript from question 10 -20 to demonstrate a typical
interview.
Interview transcript
Question 10: Too the question: Based on your experience, do you believe that security
systems decay?
You answered: I believe security systems categorically decay. There is however, not a
reason in the world why you can’t keep the system working properly; however, to
achieve this, over time maintenance costs will increase.
Participant 1; Re: Yes they do if they are not maintained.
Participant 2; Re: Yes of course.
Feedback: Too this question, all panel members responded yes, providing a consensus
amongst the panel supporting the argument security systems decay. Furthermore, a
consensus supporting the argument that security systems decay was also achieved by
research panel one and the pilot panel. As such, it is interpreted that a consensus
achieved across the research panel that security systems decay.
Qu: Do you support this interpretation?]
ANSW: Yes.
Question 11: Too the question: What is your understanding of security decay?
You answered: People install systems that do not understand what underpins them. We
do design in parameters to facilitate for decay. For example, Figure 3 Shows how decay
is considered in engineering aspects.
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Figure 3: panel member three’s lighting degradation diagram
However, the lack of knowledge and management of these parameters leads to security
decay.
That is, a number of factors lead to decay:
• Lack of professional management is a significant factor,
• Lack of continuity in educating management on how the system works,
• Lack of formal training, where training is handed down rather than through
formal processes,
• Physical aspects decay through lack of maintenance,
• Technology does get old and decays.
This once again refers back to the Campbell triangle (Figure 7.1), where decay occurs in
all three aspects: management, technology and physical engineering.
There is however, no reason in the world why you can’t keep the system working
properly. That is, if you manage the engineering aspects of decay, there is no reason that
you shouldn’t be able to avoid decay.
Participant 1; Re: The degradation of security systems, processes and hardware
(security) arrangements, and personnel procedures.
Participant 2; Re: The decline in the efficacy (effectiveness), and efficiency of the
security function, and correlating increase in risk. Also the inappropriate response to
security events which causes a new or updated security function which has no impact in
altering or managing the risk, decay leads to adhoc security.
Feedback: To this question, panel member two (2) responded that security decay
relates to the decline in the efficacy (effectiveness) of the security solution, and its
correlating increase in risk. Panel member one (1) responded that degradation of the
security systems, processes and hardware arrangement and personnel procedures is what
he consider to be security decay. In considering these views, panel member one (1),
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research panel one (1) stated, “Security system decay is the degradation in the
performance of an element of the security solution. Both as a single element performing
a specific function, and its role in supporting other elements in their function within the
total system. This may not be a major failure of the system, but mere incremental
decrease in performance that occurs over time. This decay may however occur
incrementally and continue over an extended period to the point it has a significant
impact on performance and effectiveness. Furthermore, this may be compounded further
where this decay occurs over many or all of the elements within a system.
Qu: Do you agree with this view relating to security decay?
ANSW: Yes.
In considering panel member one’s (research panel one) views, you stated that systems
are designed with parameters to facilitate for decay. Figure ? shows an engineering
aspect of such inbuilt tolerance. That is, decay occurs when performance falls below
these engineered parameters. However, a lack of knowledge and poor management of
these parameters leads to security decay
QU: Do support this representation of your views?
ANSW: Yes that’s right. Build in the quality that will maintain the system over time.
Question 12: Too the question: Can you tell me about a time when you experienced
security controls degrading, what occurred?
You answered: I cannot name specific areas or organisations. An audit (security audit)
I did was on an old system. However, I had the privilege of speaking directly to the
people who set it. When I do an audit I look at:
•

Management

•

Physical

•

Technical.

The system I was auditing had clearly suffered decay because no-body wrote down in
the first place what the system was meant to achieve (no measures of performance). I
found that a lack of education and awareness in how the system is meant to operate. To
overcome such systemic decay, the systems purpose and aspects needs to be written
down, as a document. What occurs is that changes based on wants are implemented;
however these changes are made to satisfy people, not to maintain the security plan. The
system needs a defined security plan otherwise changes occur which lead to decay.
Participant 1; Re: Yes in people’s apathy, for us, day one we give them an induction
awareness lecture, then they walk out and forget it immediately. Then security processes
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decay over time when nothing happens. For example, people do not report security
incidents, even though they have been told and trained to report them. This failure
breaks down the knowledge of what is going on in the field.
Participant 2; Re: Often why I as a consultant is called in, in the first place is to review
security after an incident. In our experience we find that security decay occurs in non
systems arranged approaches to security, where isolated security measures are failing.
For example, I conducted a cash handling audit for local government. During the audit I
found that whilst staff believed they were protected by a duress alarm system, the
system had been disconnected for two years. In addition, the built environment
maintenance had decreased due to leasing issues. However, the operational environment
had changed, where cash movements had increased dramatically. I was called in as a
robbery in the area occurred, where in response to that robbery the security
improvements were excessive after the fact.
Feedback: To this question all panel members provided practical examples,
highlighting they have experienced security decay. In-line with this panels self report of
experiencing security decay, both the pilot panel and research panel one also provided
practical examples of where they have experienced security decay. For example,
research panel one provided the following examples:
Participant 1; Re: There are many practical examples of where elemental and or,
systems decay/degrading. Examples include:
1. Lack of maintenance in the perimeter zones (weeds and other feral growth)
causing an increase in nuisance alarm rates, causing lack of confidence and
increasing operator’s complacency, Lack in electronic system maintenance,
having the same cause and effect as above.
2. Poor or total lack of daily testing procedures being implemented, resulting in a
failure to identify systems not working. Training occurring for new staff by
handed down experience rather than from training processes, meaning incorrect
procedures or bad habits being passed down.
3. A lack of ongoing training to reinforce correct processes and procedures, having
the same cause and effect as above.
4. Changes to the perimeter built environment or changes to adjacent areas without
considering the perimeter detection and surveillance systems.
5. Changes to the Central Control Room (CCR) physical environment without
consideration of operational efficiency or operational performance.
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6. Changes to electronic systems, set up in CCR, i.e. CCTV/SMS etc to suit
personal preference without reference to initial design considerations and
integrated response requirements.
7. Physical deterioration of physical elements, which are not maintained, reducing
the effectiveness of the element as a barrier, or in whatever function it performs.
There are many others
Participant 2; I have noticed that as staff competencies fluctuate, this fluctuation alters
individual key performance indicators where decay occurs in relation to the reduction in
competencies and capabilities of the people components. That is, most agencies work at
the lowest common denominator where system key performance indicators are based on
the lowest standard, this includes training, of competency to achieve that aspect of the
system. System key performance indicators increase with competency increase, and of
course decrease as those competencies decrease.
Participant 3; Re: Yes, a situation involving staff’s lack of familiarization/awareness
with procedural security, during perimeter alarm checks. A system we put in introduced
a microphonic alarm in a cowling, where the decay relates to improper testing around its
designed requirement. Often staff do not test systems properly, in-line with their
procedures resulting in technical decay as we do not know if the system is working
based on its design configuration. Also camera alarm presets, staff when testing
perimeter systems do not test all aspects such as alarm preset positions and field of view
objectives for cameras.
Also, environmental impact on physical structure, for example, on a high security fence
the plinth was not designed to move water, therefore water sat at the base of the fence,
and due to the high salt content in that area physical decay of the barrier occurred. Such
physical decay needs to be considered at the design stage of a security project.
As such, it is interpreted that security decay as a phenomenon has been directly
experienced by all research sample members.
Qu: Do you support this interpretation.
ANSW: Yes.

Question 13: Too the question: In considering the argument that security controls
decay, how do you think this occurs within a systems approach towards security?
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You answered: Once again the Campbell triangle (Figure ?), decay occurs in each, or
all aspects of the triangle, then based on what a system is, and how the system operates,
decay occurs in-line with what underpins the system.
Participant 1; Re: Based on what we have talked about, normally a benign security
environment leads to a reduction in the security program, that is small changes. These
changes eventually leave the system vulnerable so when something does happen
everybody’s guard is down.
Participant 2; Re: A breakdown in monitoring and reviewing, as well as
accountability, against external pressures, finance, people over time. Systems require
efficiencies, but security events can lead to spending cuts within the system which can
lead to a large change within the system.
Feedback: To this question, you responded, once again the Campbell triangle (Figure
?), decay occurs in each, or all aspects of the triangle, then based on what a system is,
and how the system operates, decay occurs in-line with what underpins the system. Inline with your views, panel member one (1) research panel one (1) stated, “I believe that
security decay within a PPS occurs within its individual elements, them propagates
through the system. Decay occurs at the base elemental level over time”. In-line with
this approach, panel member three (3), research panel one (1) stated, “Any aspect of
decay affects the rest of the system”. For example, multiple false alarms can propagate
through the rest of the system, when complacency sets in, alarm inputs are not
discriminated or reported, ultimately affecting the response aspect of the system.
Qu: Do you support this approach to how security decay occurs within a systems
approach?
ANSW: Yes, it can be an outcome.
Furthermore, panel member three (3), research panel one (1), and the pilot panel
reported that security decay can affect the systems deterrence aspect as well.
Qu: Do agree with this view?
ANSW: Yes it can, that’s a fact.

Question 14: Too the question: The concept of security decay argues that decay within
a PPS occurs within individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate
through the system from this point. Based on your experience, do you support this
premise and why/why not?
You answered: Yes, decay can occur in all three elements based again on the Campbell
triangle.
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Participant 1; Re: Yes. Something serious would have a knock on effect elsewhere.
Participant 2; Re: Yes. Small changes can lead to large security implications, much
like a chain. A chain is only as good as its weakest link or point. When that weakest
point breaks the result can be larger.
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded yes, based on and in-line
with their earlier responses. In considering the panel’s consensus responses to this
question, research panel one supported through consensus the summary that a system is
a combination of various inputs, where each of these inputs has a function in performing
a specific function and supporting functions of others (interrelationships) therefore
small changes across many/all elements can have a major impact on the system at the
macro level.
Qu: Do you agree with this summary and support that a consensus exists within the
research sample that, based on the above reasoning, decay within a PPS occurs within
individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system
from this point.
ANSW: Yes.
Question 15: Too the question: Systems theory and specifically an effect referred to as
the butterfly effect suggests small input changes within a system can result in large
changes at its macro output. Do you feel this applies to a PPS? Can you give me an
example where you have come across this?
You answered: Yes. However, every time you do a security system, there are 2 x
mission critical analysis.
1. Establishes the context required, analyses the system for single point failure.
This analysis considers built in redundancy to stop single point failure.
2. Apply the tools, to look for the single point factor, which leads to the butterfly
effect, to overcome it. That is, compatibility of design, where the key is inbuilt
redundancy. Once again, Figure ? Shows how inbuilt redundancy works, decay
occurs when the effectiveness falls below this inbuilt redundancy.
If these aspects of system design do not occur, yes you will have the Butterfly effect.
Participant 1; Re: Yes it does. For us, during drug and alchohol testing for mine sites.
If the system is not in place, or effective, this deficiency can lead to a security or safety
related incident.
Participant 2; Re: Yes, as discussed above, one small change leads to larger chain
reactions.
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Feedback: Too this question, all panel members responded yes. However, panel
member three (3) highlights the point that inbuilt redundancy to stop single point failure
is/should be built in, where decay occurs when the effectiveness falls below this inbuilt
redundancy, and states “if these aspects (Figure ) of system design do not occur, or are
not maintained, yes you will have the “Butterfly” effect. In considering panel member
three’s (3) views, panel member two (2), research panel one (1) provides the following
supporting statement: Yes I agree with this metaphor being applied to PPS. The
example I can give relates to procedural decay. I have observed that for systems an
initial level of training is introduced, at a specific level. This training has a macro-level
output throughout the system. Over time, when this level of training is declined, that
level of competency is declined, affecting the remainder of the security system.
As such, it is interpreted that, certain conditions considered in-line with panel member
three (3), research panel two (2), that a consensus exists across the research sample that
the “Butterfly” metaphor does apply to a PPS.
Qu: Do you support this interpretation?
ANSW: Yes.
Question 16: Too the question: Based on your experience what do you consider the
effects of decay are?
You answered: The effects are that if the system decays, it is directly proportional to
the loss of risk management.
Participant 1; Re: A more apathetic work force, degradation may affect assets,
personnel and the service delivery of your product.
Participant 2; Re: Invariably it will lead to a security related incident, a degree of loss,
then in response excessive spending, and potentially re-justification of the system itself.
Feedback: To this question, a common theme is that security risks increase as a direct
result of decay within a security system. Research panel one (1) supported through
consensus that decay occurs at the component/constituent level, then degrades key
performance indicators, reducing sub-system key performance indicators. Such decay
ultimately affects the risk reduction aspects of the system, bearing a strategic impact on
the organisation.
Qu: Do you support such a view towards the effects of security decay?
ANSW: Yes.
Question 17: Too the question: Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at
the point of manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are reversible.
How do you think so, or why don’ you think so?
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You answered: Yes, absolutely. Because as soon as decay has been recognised
(independent audit is usually required), through professional management of the
problem the decay can be overcome.
Participant 1; Re: Yes, but it does come down to leadership and management support
and of course the necessary resources. You need the will to turn decay around.
Participant 2; Re: Yes they are reversible. Whether that happens comes down to
management structure, through maintenance review, awareness recognition, and
preventative maintenance.
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded yes, providing a consensus
within the panel that decay, both at its point of manifestation and throughout the
remainder of the system are reversible. Such a consensus was also achieved by the pilot
panel. However, research panel one (1) argued that it depends on what the decay is
related to. Research panel one (1) agreed that procedural decay could be reversed and
prevented through management, that is, ongoing monitoring and reviewing of the
people component of the system. However, physical and technical decay can only be
controlled/delayed through processes. Research panel one (1) agreed that all physical
and technology components have a life cycle, where eventually they will decay beyond
a repairable state. However, with proper maintenance, decay can be slowed and
managed.
Qu: Do you agree with these additional aspects relating to security decay from a
systems perspective?
ANSW: All points are right to a point. From an engineer’s perspective, technology has
a finite life 8-10 years, however this is usually pushed to 12, it does vary from system to
system. There is no reason why the system cannot be kept at the original detection
capabilities, however these costs associated with this will rise each year. If you budget
for about 10% of the systems costs a year it would balance out across the systems life
cycle. With proper maintenance there is no reason why the system cannot maintain its
design specification capabilities over its life cycle.
My philosophy is that decay is a quantifiable factor, decay must be managed so it does
not fall below the inbuilt redundancy level.
Furthermore, panel member two (2), research panel one (1) stated, “decay can only be
countered if it is understood”.
Qu: Do you agree with this panel member’s view?
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ANSW: Yes, once again you need to professionally manage the system in-line with the
triangle, to do this you must understand how it works, if you don’t understand how it
works how do you manage decay?
Question 18: Too the question: Do you think decay can be avoided. How do you think
the effects of decay within a security system can be avoided, or why don’t you think the
effects of decay within a security system can be avoided.
You answered: Absolutely, and unequivocally. It can be done (avoided) through
professional management which looks after the technology, physical aspects and
operational aspects. If you manage the triangle you manage the system, avoid decay,
that is, avoid the movement below the level of inbuilt redundancy.
Participant 1; Re: Yes, possibly. It comes down to management’s will and capacity.
Decay is a political concern rather than a technical aspect.
Participant 2; Re: Yes it can be avoided, through the proper management, the
monitoring and review of the systems key performance indicators, as the key
performance indicators tell you what is going on and wrong. In addition, through a
system driven by clear policy.
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded that decay can be avoided,
where panel member three (3) stated through professional management, focusing on
technology, physical and operational (procedural) aspects. According to panel member
three (3), if you manage the triangle, you manage the system, and avoid decay, that is,
you avoid the movement below the level of inbuilt redundancy. In-line with panel
member three’s (3) views, panel member two (2) states, “proper management,
monitoring and reviewing the systems key performance indicators enables decay to be
avoided, the key performance indicators tell you what is going on and wrong.
However, research panel one (1) argued that procedural decay can be avoided, however,
technical and physical decay can only be managed, and its effects delayed through
proper monitored maintenance.
QU: Do you agree with this additional information?
ANSW: Not true, as stated, both physical and technical aspects of the system can be
maintained at their commissioned level over time, that is over the cycle of the system. It
can be maintained to ensure over the systems life cycle that it performs at the designed
capabilities, for example the designed detection capabilities “Commissioned level
performance” .
As such, at this point, it is interpreted that a consensus exists within the panel that decay
can be avoided through professional management, which focuses on the aspects of panel
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member three’s (3) triangle, where by focusing on the systems performance measures
(KPI’s) enables the professional management of the triangle, towards avoiding decay.
Qu: Do you support this summary and interpretation that a consensus in relation to
these aspects of security decay.
ANSW: Yes, but I still don’t like the key performance indicator terminology as you
could end up with a tick in the box approach, the system requires professional
knowledge to manage the system to avoid decay. What worries me is the idea that we
can develop a tick box solution where it is considered that the sheets provide the
expertise not the people, especially since over time the impression will be anybody can
manage the system using the tick box approach, and this just isn’t true.
Question 19: Too the question: Do you believe the concept of decay has a place in the
risk management process. If so where in the process, if not why not?
You answered: Yes it does have a valid place, you would have to assess for decay. You
need to able to take the security objective measures to management, to show them how
we don’t have enough money to manage the system. The only place decay has, is that if
you don’t manage it properly.
Participant 1; Re: Yes, I think in the ISO 31000, the context section, decay is a risk.
Participant 2; Re: Yes, in establishing the context. Security decay is a context,
recognising it as a risk. Also, in the evaluation process.
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded yes. In addition, a theme
developed where the majority of the research sample see that decay needs to be
considered as a security risk. A consensus was reached by research panel one (1) that
security decay should be considered as a “system”, considered at the design stage,
considered against its consequences, with a view to countering it where practicable as a
risk treatment, towards designing out decay, then continually assessed for in the monitor
and review stage.
Qu: Do you support this summary and finding?
ANSW: Yes.
Question 20: Too the question: Based on your experience, is there any facet of security
decay which you can add to the research enquiry. This may include factors associated
with either the cause of decay or impacts from it?
You answered: Decay is caused because of a lack of professional management,
security management. That is:
•

Lack of education

•

Lack of system awareness
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•

Employing the wrong people to manage it, for example ex police or ex military
people who don’t understand the technical aspects of security, what they are
actually managing. This goes back to the quantifiable performance measures of
the system.

Participant 1; Re: Security decay as a concern will be constantly driven by
organizational culture, then the resources prioritization, coupled with the threat
landscape.
Participant 2; Re: Security decay is common in various forms.
Feedback: Too this question panel members from research panel one (1) provided the
following responses:
Participant 3; Re: Security decay will always be managed against the level of recurrent
funding available.
Feedback: Too this question, panel member number three stated that security decay
will always be managed against the level of recurrent funding available.
Qu: Do you agree with this point?
ANSW: No necessarily, it comes down to professional management.
Res: When you put your capital submission forward you must, at a strategic level,
indentify whether the system you are putting in is achievable, and you can maintain the
system you are putting in. This recurrent funding submission is required at the design
stage.
Qu: Do agree with panel member three’s responses?
ANSW: Absolutely.
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